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ABSTRACT
Understanding the Turkish foreign policy has become even more important in
recent years given the developments surrounding the country. Furthermore, the last
decade witnessed a radical change in the Turkish foreign policy making under the Justice
and Development Party (AKP).
This dissertation aims to explain the nature of this change based on the
application of the Policy Paradigms Theory, comparing the components of the AKP
foreign policy understanding with those of the Kemalist, the status que paradigm that
defined the foreign policy making in Turkey well into the early 21st century. The
application of the theory provides evidence, based on the changes in ideological,
institutional and practical settings, that a paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy did
indeed take place, but not in the manner of leaving the west in favor of the east but the
paradigm shift was in the Kemalist understanding being replaced by the neo-Ottomanist
approach.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

Objectives and Significance of the Study
The advent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power by forming a

super majority government in the Turkish Parliament in 2002 heralded far reaching
implications not only for Turkey’s social, economic and cultural makeup but also in the
country’s foreign policy. The foreign policy practices under the AKP coupled with the
background and the pro-Islamic identity of the party brought about the oft asked
question; “Is Turkey leaving its traditional westward foreign policy direction in favor of
the East, creating a paradigm shift?” For example, the direction of Turkey’s foreign
policy orientation became a source of contention when Turkey set out to improve its
relations with the Bashir Regime in Sudan, openly siding with the Hamas Government in
Gaza severing the relations with Israel, and fostering more resilient ties with Russia and
China. Therefore, in this context, the question of a paradigm shift was merely posed
based upon the foreign policy snapshots of the time, omitting the bigger picture. What is
missing with this approach is that it fails to properly establish the concept of “paradigm”
in policy making and what constitutes “shift”.
By applying the policy paradigms theory with the focus of Peter Hall’s “Policy
Paradigms, this research seeks to establish whether there is an actual paradigm shift in
Turkish foreign policy happening under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) where

1

Turkey is leaving the West focusing on the East. Although predominantly applied to
Economic policies, the major theoretical and methodological contribution of the
dissertation is to set the groundwork for the application of the “Paradigm Shift” concept
as applied to foreign policy. As part of comparative case study, process tracing and
pattern matching techniques are employed. According to this, “process tracing focuses on
the unfolding of events or situations over time…To characterize process, key steps in the
process must be properly characterized.” 1
In order to accomplish this objective, this dissertation compares the instrument
settings, overall goals, instruments of policy and the ruling elite of the main paradigm,
Kemalism, with those of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Furthermore, the
periods of the former prime minister and the president of Turkey, Turgut Ozal (19831993) and the former Prime Minister Necmeddin Erbakan (1996-1997) were also
included in the comparative study as, like AKP, they too display signs of deviation from
the Kemalist paradigm. Additionally, these two prominent figures, their ideology and
their implemented policies culminated into the creation of those of the AKP.
This dissertation also aims to contribute to the literature on the impact of domestic
politics on foreign policy. A substantial part of this dissertation is devoted to evaluating
Turkey’s social, economic and cultural evolution since its inception in 1923 and how the
identity has had an impact on decision makers’ thinking, determining the priorities and
the means of the Turkish foreign policy.

1

David Collier, (2011) Understanding Process Tracing, Political Science and Politics 44, No.4, p. 824.
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The main idea of this dissertation, such that it corresponds to Hall’s definition of a
paradigm shift, is to examine if the AKP government has changed and reoriented the
instrument settings, overall goals, and instruments of policy in Turkey turning it towards
the East away from the West. The study has found that there is a paradigm shift.
However, the findings disproved the supposition that Turkey is leaving the West and
turning to the East as Turkey’s economic and political interaction with the West has
increased under the AKP administration. Turkey’s increasing interaction with nonWestern actors does not in fact constitute a complete detaching from the West but is
attributed to the nature of the emerging post-Cold War international environment.
Turkey’s aspirations to be a regional power, as well as an important international actor is
opting for more dynamic foreign relations, not leaving the West. It is just diversifying its
foreign policy options to include the East.
Finally, the research carries policy relevance. Due to its history, geography and culture,
Turkey’s relations with state and non-state actors in a vast geography from Eurasia and
Africa to North America, have important political, economic and cultural implications.
Especially, in light of the current tumultuous situation in the Middle East, the TurkishAmerican relations in this context, political and economic changes in the European Union
and the recent resurgence of Russia in the Black Sea rim have made it more important to
understand the dynamics and practices of the Turkish foreign policy as well as the
thinking of the policy makers in Turkey. Therefore, this dissertation hopes to be a broad
source of information for those scholars and individuals who are interested in Turkish
foreign policy. Furthermore, considering that the internal socio/political evolution of and
the identity politics under the Justice and Development Party has evoked considerable
3

attention, this dissertation also endeavors to contribute to the literature providing relevant
research information to understand the changes in Turkish domestic policy that brought
about changes in Turkish Foreign policy development.
1.2 The Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter two establishes the theoretical framework on which this dissertation rests.
Drawing from literature, it defines the concept of a policy paradigm, scrutinizing the
conditions which bring about change in those paradigms as well as the nature of
paradigmatic changes.
Chapter three conceptualizes the Kemalist paradigm in Turkey. It starts with a
comprehensive analysis of the events that took place in the late stages of the Ottoman
Empire that culminated into the creation of the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal
and the establishment of a new paradigm. The second part of the chapter comprises an indepth analysis of the ideological make-up of Kemalism, which has important implication
for the domestic and foreign politics. The last part of the chapter explores the impact of
the Kemalist ideology on the making of the Turkish foreign policy of the time referring to
the cases that were reflective of the Kemalist worldview.
Chapter four provides a comprehensive analysis of how the Kemalist paradigm
created and consolidated its ruling elite through institutional means, especially the
military and the civilian bureaucracy. This chapter includes the exploration of the
transition to democracy in the late 1940s and 1950s. The results of the first democratic
elections of 1950 has had profound impact on the relations between the existing Kemalist
ruling elite and the new rising, more conservative elite, whose five decade long of
political, economic and social defiance to the status quo resulted in the advent of the AKP
4

to power. One of the most important parts of the chapter is the detailed examination of
the praetorian Turkish Military, who has been considered to be the defender of the
Kemalist values and the foundation of the republic. In this context, the means through
which the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) established and maintained its privileged and
sovereign status within the state bureaucracy as well as the methods it employed to
control the civilian administrations based on Kemalist principles and the creation of a
securitization culture by TAF are examined. I found that with the failure of the Kemalist
civilian state machinery in 1950 to prevent the opposing entities from rising, the Kemalist
elite began to rely heavily on the Turkish Military, part of the Kemalist elite itself, in the
hopes of keeping such future challenges under control. Therefore, after the 1960 military
coup, the Turkish military became the single most important Kemalist entity to navigate
the civilian governments. Furthermore, this chapter provides an overarching inquiry of
the military-civilian relations in Turkey and aims to contribute to the related literature.
Chapters five and six are an in-depth exploration of the political movements that
display features that fall outside of the Kemalist realm in Turkey. Also, these movements
represent the rise of an alternative elite to that of Kemalism and they preceded the Justice
and Development Party, ideologically, especially in foreign policy, inspiring it. In
Chapter five, I scrutinized the Turgut Ozal Era (1983-1993). His period is relevant for
this dissertation in that Ozal challenged the status-quo oriented, stagnant, isolationist,
reactive orthodox Kemalist foreign policy tradition that persisted for decades in favor of a
more pro-active as well as culture based foreign policy, which then was coined as “neoOttomanism” since it aspired for Turkey to become a more dominant entity in the
Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and North Africa, where the Ottoman Empire
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once was a dominant power. Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of the AKP foreign policy
stated that Ozal inspired him greatly in his foreign policy making. Ozal overtly criticized
the Kemalist bureaucracy and ideology for its insufficiency to meet Turkey’s growing
demands in the post-Cold War era as well as the Kemalist demonization of the Ottoman
past. He clearly shows his intention to revive Ottoman multi-culturalism, and the
“glorious” days of that time.
I heavily resorted to qualitative document analysis by examining Ozal’s speeches,
related newspapers, parliamentary archives and documents. This chapter begins with
examination of the social, political and economic conditions that brought Ozal to power.
It scrutinizes his distinct personality and ideology that separated him from the
mainstream Kemalist paradigm. The next part of the chapter examines the Ozalist foreign
policy in action delving into the implications of the fall of the Soviet Union and how he
perceived it as an opportunity to fulfill his foreign policy aspirations as well as promote
his staunch pro-American stance during the Gulf War of 1991, which created friction
with the Kemalist military and bureaucracy. In the end, I find that while Ozal’s ten year
tenure, which ended abruptly upon his premature passing, display thoughts and practices
that run counter to traditional Kemalist approach, it cannot be said that he ushered in a
paradigm shift in Turkey for the very reason that the institutional, bureaucratic and
ideological fabric of the Kemalist paradigm remained intact despite Ozal’s efforts to
challenge them.
The sixth chapter dwells on Erbakan and his “Just Order Movement”. The
Erbakan movement represents the fruition of political Islam, the major blatant challenge
to Kemalism as well as anti-West attitude in Turkey thus it is of relevance for the

6

dissertation. Furthermore, the rise of political Islam epitomizes the demographic shift in
the form of a more Islamized population as well as the intensification of the identity
politics, which also has important implications for foreign policy. Finally, understanding
the movement is significant since the founders of the AKP are the former members of the
Erbakanist movement, who broke apart from it after the 1997 military ousting of
Erbakan, establishing the reform movement in Turkish political Islam.
The beginning of the sixth chapter offers a comprehensive explanation of the
nature and the rise of political Islam in Turkey. This is followed by the analysis of the
application of the Erbakanist ideology in Turkish foreign policy. While the Erbakan Era
Turkish foreign policy displayed activism as well as neo-Ottomanist elements, its heavy
reliance on pan-Islamic principles, limited the foreign policy priorities of the Erbakan
government to the Islamic world. The forcible overthrow of the Erbakan government by
the all-powerful Kemalist Turkish military demonstrated that the short lived Erbakan
government failed to create a paradigm shift.
The final and the seventh chapter is the overarching examination of the AKP
government. The first part of the chapter is divided into three parts; the examination of
the process that led to the inception of the AKP, as well as an in-depth analysis of the
ideological composition of the party and the subsequent successful ascent to power by
forming single party government in the parliament; the power struggle with the Kemalist
establishment, especially with the military and finally the consolidation of power, in
which the AKP government managed to subdue the military and took over the Kemalist
bureaucracy. The second part of the chapter seven is devoted to theoretical and operative
analysis of the Turkish foreign policy under the AKP administration, resorting to the use

7

of case analyses. Additionally, export and import figures between 1994 and 2013, are
charted in order to determine whether there is a change of direction in Turkey’s economic
policy vis-à-vis its immediate neighborhood. The final section of Chapter seven contains
the comparative analysis of the institutional makeup of the foreign ministry under the
AKP government with that of the pre-AKP era.
The eighth chapter concludes the dissertation by providing a comprehensive
summary of the findings and the implications of the research to the Turkish foreign
policy.

8

CHAPTER 2. PARADIGM SHIFT CONCEPT IN THEORY
2.1 Introduction
The importance of using the policy paradigm concept has been proven significant
in evaluating and understanding the interplay between the ideas, organizations and related
actors who are involved in political and organizational process. According to Marcus
Carson et al. the policy paradigm concept can be used to explain the key ingredients of
paradigms, how they form, develop, institutionalize and de-institutionalize as well as how
paradigm shifts occur.2
Louis Moreno argues that overall, paradigms offer a novice means to gather
scientific data, new problem solving techniques, and even enable us to find new solutions
that existing paradigms fail to expound. Thanks to paradigms we are able to understand
how important political and social actors behave when they attempt to solve important
problems. He says, “Paradigms, value systems and réferentiels provide normative and
cognitive elements, which shape principles and actions adopted by actors within the same
frame.”3
Policy paradigm, which Marcus Carson calls ‘a powerful, cognitive-normative
concept’, allows us to theorize such aspects of policymaking as interests, goals and
solutions. A policy paradigm is defined as a “generally coherent complex of assumptions
2

Marcus Carson, Tom R. Burns, Dolores Calvo eds. (2009) Paradigms in Public Policy: Theory and
Practice of Paradigm Shifts in the EU. Peter Lang GmbH. 1st edition. pp. 11-12.
3 Luis Moreno, “Europeanization, Decentralization and Welfare Reform” Paper presented at the
International Conference: “Territorial Governance for the 21st Century”, Royal Flemish Academy of
Belgium for Arts & Sciences, Brussels, 16-17 September 2005. pp. 2-3
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and principles, simplifying metaphors, and interpretive and explanatory discourses”. It
represents a shared conceptual framework through which adherents envision "how things
should be" and "how the world works", and with which they define the kinds of issues
that should be considered social problems. This conceptual frame-work helps impose
order on a chaotic environment in which actors engaged in making or influencing public
policy are frequently required to make decisions with limited expertise, inadequate or
contradictory information, and often on a comparatively short time frame.4
One of the most widely recognized conceptualization of policy paradigm is that of
Peter A. Hall. Hall derives this conceptualization from Charles Anderson's "the Logic of
Public Problems: Evaluation in Comparative Policy Research" in which Anderson states
"the deliberation of public policy takes place within a realm of discourse...policies are
made within some system of ideas and standards which is comprehensible and plausible
to the actors involved.”5 In other words, Hall is convinced that policymakers routinely
work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of
policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them but also the very nature
of the problems they are meant to be addressing.6 It is this point that Hall utilizes Thomas
Kuhn’s notion of scientific paradigms to better explain Anderson's "system of ideas and
standards".7 According to Hall, policy paradigms can be seen as one feature of the overall
terms of political discourse. They suggest that the policymaking process can be structured

4

Carson et.al, p. 17
Peter A. Hall. (1993) "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic
Policymaking in Britain", Comparative Politics 25 (3), p. 279. Quoted from: Charles Anderson, "The
Logic of Public Problems: Evaluation in Comparative Policy Research," in Douglas Ashford, ed.,
Comparing Public Policies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978), p. 23
6
Hall, p. 279.
7
Thomas Kuhn (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago University of Chicago Press, pp.
43-51.
5
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by a particular set of ideas, just as it can be structured by a set of institutions. He further
argues that the two often reinforce each other since the routines of policymaking are
usually designed to reflect a particular set of ideas about what can and should be done in
a sphere of policy.8
Hall's main concern is to explain factors that bring about the stability as well as
the precipitating factors that create paradigmatic change. Hall's dependent variable is
policy change and he is more interested in explaining not a single change but the nature
of change in general. Some of the questions of interest are "Is it typically incremental, is
it immune from radical change?” or, is it perhaps prone to the characteristics of
punctuated equilibrium?" This would indicated that policy change is minimal most of the
time but liable, on rare occasion, to be quite dramatic. One of the most important
explanatory variables is the ideas due to the fact that policy change is typically highly
constrained because the ideas that support the status quo remain extremely powerful.
However, in the presence of paradigmatic shifts the policies themselves can be
transformed, creating a new equilibrium and a severe break from the past. 9
In discussing paradigm shift, Hall identifies three orders of change in a policy
environment or domain. The first-order is the “process whereby the [policy] instrument
settings are changed in the light of experience and new knowledge, while the overall
goals and instruments of policy remain the same…” The process of first order change is
likely to display the features of incrementalism, satisficing, and routinized decision-

8

Hall. p. 290
Frank R. Baumgartner. (2012) "Ideas and Policy Change", Governance: An International Journal of
Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Volume 26, Issue 2, p. 240.
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making that we normally associate with the policy process.10 First order change is likely
to be ongoing, incremental and often routine - "normal" policymaking.11
With second-order change, the hierarchy of goals remains largely the same;
however, the basic methods used to achieve these goals are altered due to dissatisfaction
with the prevailing policy. Hall notes that such changes can lead to a situation where “the
instruments of policy as well as their settings are altered in response to past experience
even though the overall goals of policy remain the same”12 Second order change
represents increasingly "strategic action" in developing policy, but does not directly
challenge the fundamental goals of policy, and is therefore less likely to be conflict
ridden. 13
Hall refers to the third-order change as policy making marked by radical changes
in the overarching terms of policy discourse creating a policy paradigm shift. Third-order
change entails simultaneous changes in instrument settings, instruments themselves, and
the rearrangement of policy goals. He argues that the third-order change occurs when an
emerging policy failure leads to the discrediting of an old paradigm, which subsequently
leads to “a wide-ranging search for alternatives and to a process of experimentation with
modifications to policy.”14 The movement from one paradigm to another that
characterizes third order change is likely to involve the accumulation of anomalies,
experimentation with new forms of policy, and policy failures that precipitate a shift in
the locus of authority over policy and initiate a wider contest between competing

10

Hall, p. 280
Carson et al. p. 403
12
Hall, p. 280.
13
Carson et al. p. 403
14
Hall, p. 291
11

12

paradigms. 15 This contest may well spill beyond the boundaries of the state itself into
the broader political arena. It will end only when the supporters of a new paradigm secure
positions of authority over policymaking and are able to rearrange the organization and
standard operating procedures of the policy process so as to institutionalize the new
paradigm.16
First and second order change can be seen as cases of "normal policymaking,"
namely of a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given
policy paradigm, much like "normal science." Third order change, by contrast, is likely to
reflect a very different process, marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of
policy discourse associated with a "paradigm shift." If first and second order changes
preserve the broad continuities usually found in patterns of policy, third order change is
often a more disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy.17
Hall goes on giving examples to these three orders of changes. For the first order
change Hall gives the example that the levels (or settings) of the basic instruments of
British policy, such as the minimum lending rate or the fiscal stance, were altered at
frequent intervals during the 1970-89 period, even when the overall goals and
instruments of policy remained the same. Most of the adjustments made in the annual
budget took this form: the settings of the government's policy instruments were modified
in the light of past experience and projections for the future performance of the economy.
We can call the process whereby instrument settings are changed in the light of

15

Hall, p. 279
Hall pp. 280-281
17
Hall, p. 279
16

13

experience and new knowledge, while the overall goals and instruments of policy remain
the same, a process of first order change in policy.18
Second, there were several instances in the 1970-89 period when the hierarchy of
goals behind British macroeconomic policy remained largely the same but the basic
techniques used to attain them were altered, as a result of dissatisfaction with past
experience. These episodes included the introduction of a new system of monetary
control in 1971, the development of a new system of "cash limits" for public spending
control in 1976, and the movement away from strict targets for monetary growth in 198183. Changes of this sort, when the instruments of policy, as well as their settings, are
altered in response to past experience even though the overall goals of policy remain the
same, might be said to reflect a process of second order change.19
Finally, when monetarism replaced Keynesianism as the template guiding policy,
there was a radical shift in the hierarchy of goals guiding policy; the instruments relied on
to affect policy, and the settings of those instruments. Moreover, these changes were
accompanied by substantial changes in the discourse employed by policymakers and in
the analysis of the economy on which policy was based. In short, the third order change
in British policymaking that occurred during this period was accompanied by a wholesale
shift in policy paradigms.20
One aspect of the third order change that Hall emphasizes is the simultaneous
shift in authority. He says the center of authority over macroeconomic issues began to
shift. Although the movement began around 1976, the most intense break in policy came

18

Hall, p. 278
Hall, pp. 278-279
20
Hall, p. 284
19
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after a Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher was elected in 1979. Not only
were the settings of policy changed but hierarchy of goals and set of instruments
employed to guide policy shifted radically as well. Inflation replaced unemployment as
the

preeminent

concern

of

policymakers.

Macroeconomic

efforts

to

reduce

unemployment were rejected in favor of balanced budgets and direct tax reductions.
Monetary policy replaced fiscal policy as the principal macroeconomic instrument, and it
was reoriented toward fixed targets for the rate of monetary growth. Many regulatory
instruments associated with state intervention, such as incomes policies, exchange
controls, and quantitative limits on bank lending, were eliminated. To Hall, this was a
clear case of third order change in policy.21
Frank Baumgartner asserts that Hall's “third-order” change, in order to happen,
may require a serious degree of discredit to the status quo policy and to its protectors.
Things that could produce such change include obvious policy failures or crises that
occur “on the watch” of a set of incumbent policymakers. When the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 occurred, it was clear that major elements of U.S. intelligence had
failed and that airport security procedures were insufficient. No one stepped forward to
defend these policies, especially the private security firms that hired poorly paid and
relatively ill-trained personnel to screen passengers in airports. The creation of the
Transportation Security Administration was not particularly controversial in spite of the
fact that it was a Republican administration creating a vast new public bureaucracy. So, it
is clear that obvious policy failures can discredit the status quo, sometimes even to the

21

Hall, pp. 283-84
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level that the incumbents who benefit from or who implement the existing policy do not
even mobilize to protect it, knowing that this is a hopeless cause.22
Lawrence C. Reardon states that paradigm shifts can be either comprehensive or
sectoral. The former takes place when revolutionary elites undergo complex learning
initiated by the absolute rejection of the polity adaptations adopted by the country's ruling
elites. Such was the case in 1917 and 1949 when the Soviet and the Chinese communist
revolutionaries became the new ruling elites; they fundamentally transformed the state's
political, economic and social structures. Sectoral paradigm shift occurs when policy
elites learn that adaptations of policy strategies have failed over time. According to
Lawrence, this type of paradigm shift includes many of the anti-authoritarian "color"
revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia since 2000, which he classifies as
political; China's transition from a revolutionary to techno-economic paradigm as
economic; and the United States’ adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as social.23
Marcus Carson, Tom R. Burns, and Dolores Carvo state that paradigm shifts
entail fundamental, conceptual and organizational changes, which guide policy in a
markedly different direction than previous paradigms. Such shifts are the result of the
creation of a new-problem solving model within a particular policy sector. These shifts
manifest themselves in the reconfiguration of the core principles used in defining the
nature of policy problems and in guiding political problem solving activities.24
The term paradigm shift is best used to characterize what amounts to conceptual
and organizational tipping points in an ongoing, often incremental process of adjustment
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that began long before the actual "shift" is said to occur and is likely to continue for some
time afterwards. That is to say, Carson et al. define the concept of paradigm shift as the
articulation of a new model and the initial concrete steps taken to realize that model in
practice. Given the nature of the process, they continue to argue, it is likely that the
actions constituting paradigm shift cannot be pinned down to a single moment in time
and that should be considered as a phrase in a broader process of change. Therefore, the
institutionalization of paradigm shift is best understood as a process rather than a point of
time and constitutes changes in the institutional arrangement, a rule regime that gives
effect to reordering of guiding principles and redefinition of policy problems through
changes in regulatory, organizational, and relational structures. 25
Another important point that Carson et al. make regarding the policy paradigm
shift is that due to its lengthy duration of institutionalization, and such institutionalization
must frequently take place within a variety of existing, organizational/ institutional
cultures, policies adopted after the paradigm change may not be greatly consistent with
the new paradigm. An operative policy paradigm may not be necessarily
contemporaneous with the conceptual framework that has guided it.26
Paradigms are complexes ideas of how to conceptualize, analyze and deal with
public issues. In that vein, one of the important features of policy paradigms is that
paradigm transformation entails a fundamental restructuring of elements of such
problem-solving and organizational complexes and the relations between them. This
reconfiguration may or may not entail the introduction of new principles or goals. Carson
et al. found in their case studies that new principles are introduced and adopted
25
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incrementally as considerations that temper the application of existing institutionalized
paradigm. The paradigm shift can be identified in some form of the re-ordering of core
principles. When competing goals came into conflict with one another, the new paradigm
is distinguishable in terms of a different priority ordering of principles, and thus different
kinds of problem definitions, preferred remedies, authorities and experts, and ultimately
different outcomes.27
The paradigm shift can be identified in some form of re-ordering of core
principles whereas changes in the periphery do not constitute a paradigm shift. When
competing goals come into conflict with one another, the new paradigm is distinguishable
in terms of different priority ordering of principles and therefore different kinds of
problem definitions, preferred remedies, authorities, experts and eventually different
outcomes.28
In general, the analytical strategy is to trace the process of fundamental policy
change as it evolves from ideas and through action to become institutionalized. The basic
elements of this change process include: a) the emergence of new phenomena that are
defined as problems or the redefinition of existing phenomena as pressing problems, then
impelled by new claims and demands for structural change made by organized interests
and policy entrepreneurs, b) the replacement of an established complex of policy ideas
with a new one that is not comparable in the same terms, and c) the institutionalization of
the new set of ideas in the form of new norms, policy competencies, revised or new
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organizational structures and goals, and new types or groups of actors defined as having a
legitimate role to play.29
Replacing an earlier elite to institutionalize the new paradigm may occur relying
on force, as in coup d'état or violent revolution or through democratic process, such as
elections or nominations, societal negotiation, or generational cohort shift. A new group
or coalition with a new paradigm or model of institutional arrangements appears on the
scene and assumes a position of power, enabling it to bring about a substantial shift in the
institutional paradigm and arrangements. This may be, but is not necessarily, proceeded
by a breakdown in consensus among established power elites about the appropriate
paradigm or about reform of the existing paradigm. However, a breakdown in consensus
facilitates a coalition between parts of the elites and the contender groups, which refuse
to defer to the established authority or to adhere to the established, rule regime and its
organizing principles and norms. Such new, emerging coalitions were apparent in the
case of "peaceful" revolutions in, for example, Poland or Hungary, in 1989, which
involved negotiated settlements and elections. In Poland the negotiated elections brought
unexpected victory to groups advancing liberal market and political paradigms.30
Carson et al. summarize the conditions of paradigm shifts as follows:
(1) Policy failures, anomalies. A "paradigm crisis" arises when policy failings
occur and accumulate, or cognitive and control problems emerge (policies and programs
lead to unacceptable or negative unintended consequences), and the status and authority
of the original policy paradigm is undermined. The negative judgments may be those of
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key authorities or experts associated with the established paradigm- or, more often,
challengers to the authority and expertise of the established groups.
(2) Emergence of new ideological ideas, a change in the normative context.
Initiatives to change paradigm, in such a way, that a restructured paradigm is perceived or
judged to fit better or to be more compatible with global values and norms. Those
responsible and/or experts are driven to adopt these ideas and values or are pressured by
their constituencies or the general public. These generalized norms may concern gender
equality, security, health, etc.
(3) Power gain. Power agents propose (or adopt) a new paradigm as a way of
enhancing their power and/or undermining the power of those associated with the
established paradigm. There may be no anomalies or performance failings of the
established paradigm.
(4) Competition. Political or group competition may pressure a group to
differentiate themselves from others. Interest in differentiating "them" from "us" results
from agential processes in a group configuration or network.
(5) Breaking of Solidarity. A key shift in a paradigm, such as a transformation of
dominant values (e.g. increased value placed on the environment or social welfare (or on
the market) in conjunction with an economic crisis (and relative decrease in government
revenues, or increases in the cost of fuel) may contribute to conflicts and the breakdown
of an existing coalition, e.g. in an oligarchy or a majority within a polyarchy. For
instance, this has happened in the case of social welfare coalitions; or, environmental
groups that were integrated earlier.
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(6) Problematic change in practice. Paradigm shifts result more from changes in
institutional practices. The Marxian conception of the "contradiction" between
institutional

arrangements/cognitive-normative components

("the

relations

of

production"), on the one hand, and new knowledge, new technologies, new practices
("the forces of production") sets the stage for "revolution" (of course, there are other
possibilities, such as suppression of "forces of production").
(7) Failure of Change Efforts. The failure of mass mobilization to bring about a
paradigm shift when structural conditions (problem situation or crisis) seem otherwise
ripe may be accounted for by the absence of a resonant paradigm and/or insufficient
power to overcome a dominant regime.31
While changes may involve one or more of these dimensions, changes in radical
nature would include significant changes in multiple dimensions. Even if only a few
dimensions are changed initially, some changes have much greater secondary
consequences than others. Examples of such changes are:
•

Shift from public agency responsibility to private (the laws, incentive

structures etc. differ substantially),
•

Shifts from covering one population (the middle class) to another (lower

classes or marginal groups), or both,
•

Shifts from narrow scope of policy to comprehensive scope, which will

affect many more us and involve a much greater array of methods, types of
knowledge and expertise.32
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Michael J. Oliver and Hugh Pemberton refer to Hall's propositions as deliberate
evocation of Thomas Kuhn’s argument that scientific paradigms “gain their status
because they are more successful than their competitors in solving [the] problems that the
group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute”33 In Hall’s schema, Oliver and
Pemberton argue, first and second order change are essentially the same as Kuhn’s
“normal science” but third order change amounts to a revolution in ideas and practice in
policy and the replacement of one policy “paradigm” by another.34
While ideas as policy solutions may exist, their proponents must wait for the right
opportunity to present them and have them adopted. This shifts the focus from an ‘idea
whose time has come’, suggesting inevitability to the need for a range of conditions to be
satisfied before a policy will change, suggesting uncertainty and that the receptivity to,
and acceptance of, the idea is more important than the idea itself.35
Robert C. Lieberman suggests, an idea’s time arrives not simply because the idea
is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political circumstances favor it. At
those moments when a political idea finds persuasive expression among actors whose
institutional position gives them both the motive and the opportunity to translate it into
policy-then, and only then, can we say that an idea has found a time.36
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Table 2.1 Order of Changes
Order of Changes Features

First Order

Second Order

Third Order
(Paradigm Shift)

-The [policy] instrument settings are changed in the light of
experience and new knowledge, while the overall goals and
instruments of policy remain the same.
-It is likely to be ongoing, incremental and often routine - "normal"
policymaking.
-It can be considered "normal policymaking," namely of a process
that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given
policy paradigm.
-The instruments of policy as well as their settings are altered in
response to past experience even though the overall goals of policy
remain the same.
-It does not directly challenge the fundamental goals of policy, and
is therefore less likely to be conflict ridden.
-It can be considered "normal policymaking," namely of a process
that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given
policy paradigm.
-A policy making marked by radical changes in the overarching
terms of policy discourse creating a new paradigm.
-Major departure from the way that policymaker think and act.
-Simultaneous changes in instrument settings, instruments
themselves, and the rearrangement of policy goals.
-A serious degree of discredit to the status quo policy and to its
protectors.
-The accumulation of anomalies, experimentation with new forms
of policy, and policy failures that precipitate a shift in the locus of
authority over policy and initiate a wider contest between
competing paradigms.
-The new paradigm is institutionalized when the supporters of the
new paradigm secure positions of authority over policy making.
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CHAPTER 3. THE KEMALIST PARADIGM
3.1 Introduction
It is crucial to recognize that the fundamentals of Turkish policy were conceived
and implemented by the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk between 1923
and 1938. These standards and code of conducts that he created became so embedded in
the Turkish politics that literally every government and policymaker who came after him
strove not to veer off from them and those few who did or believed to have done so were
labeled as the traitor to his legacy and to the republic. Therefore, it would not be wrong to
call these principles “indisputable dogmas” to denote that they are religiously perceived
unquestionably and implemented unconditionally.37
This chapter is an in-depth exploration of many aspects of the Kemalist paradigm
in Turkey. The chapter starts with an analysis of the conditions of the very late stages of
the Ottoman Empire, out of which the Kemalist ideology was born. A good grasp of the
historical background of Kemalism is important as it will be a useful tool to compare
between the Kemalist paradigm, which is seen as the anti-thesis of the Ottmanism, and
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) policy making, which is considered to have
undertaken the task of reviving the principles of the Ottomanist policy making. The
second part of the chapter will analyze the birth and the institutionalization of the
Kemalist ideology in the newly created Turkish Republic. The final part will study how
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the Kemalist ideology and the conditions of the time laid the foundations of new
republic’s foreign policy as well as its evolution after the death of Mustafa Kemal.
3.2 In Search of a Paradigm
Mustafa Kemal was a soldier in the last decades of the crumbling Ottoman
Empire. Therefore, his experiences during his time in the Ottoman army greatly shaped
his worldview, thus it shaped the paradigm he would create for Turkey. The late 19th
century was extremely gloomy for the Empire. Among the territories that had already
been lost was Greece (1832), Egypt (1882) Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878). To make
matters worse, Trablusgarb (today’s Libya) was occupied by the Italian forces only to be
lost in 1912. The sultans and the bureaucrats endeavored to implement a series of reforms
to amend the military and daily life but they were proven ineffective. The most
detrimental development for the empire turned out to be the impending upsurge of
nationalism and ensuing involvement of European powers in the Ottoman domestic
politics. Because of “the capitulations”, the Ottoman Empire continued to lose power
against Russia, Great Britain and France, as these powers intensified their patronage over
such Christian subjects as the Greeks and the Armenians.
It is important to point out that the Ottoman Empire did not constitute a nation
state nor were its subjects recognized based on their nationality. The Millet System38 that
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the Ottoman Empire implemented for centuries to govern its vast territories stipulated
that the subjects be divided into Muslims and non-Muslims, rather than their ethnic
background. Therefore, such concepts as Arab, Greek, Armenian and Turk were foreign
to the Ottoman ruling elite. This aspect of the Ottoman governance would later play a
great role in the creation of ideologies that were aimed to save the Ottoman Empire from
collapsing.39 This is an important point because it will play a great role in shaping
Ataturk's policy making before and after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and
has serious implications in the debate whether the AKP government, which adopted a
more pro-Ottoman approach in both domestic and foreign policy, is shifting its foreign
policy making paradigm away from the established Kemalism.
Bernard Lewis concedes that it was the religion of Islam not the ethnic
background of Muslims that kept them loyal to the Ottoman sultan, who was at the same
time the Caliph. He was considered to be the ultimate epitome of Islam for the Ottoman
society while at the same time acted as the commander in chief. His religious role
overshadowed all his other roles, including the military one. Because of this reason, the
Sultan was a Muslim before anything else. Hence, it would not be wrong to assume that
the concept of Turkishness as we see in the Kemalist Turkey was not applicable to the
Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the ruling elite and the Sultan did not really resort to the
concept of Turk or Turkishness to define themselves or the empire, although they were
cognizant of their ancestral background. This began to change through the mid-19th, the
Tanzimat (Reorganization) Era, when it became evident to the ruling elite and the sultan
that serious measures had to be taken to halt or even reverse the fast implosion of the
empire. While the need for a drastic change was acknowledged, what was not agreed
39
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upon was the method by which it was to be implemented. Because of this divergence,
several movements were put forward. Most important of these were Ottomanism, panIslamism and Westernism/Turkism. 40
In the following section, I will explain these streams of ideologies that impacted
the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.
3.2.1. Ottomanism
One of the ideological movements was the Ottomanism. According to this the
empire could be saved if the non-Muslim entities were to be declared equal with the
Muslims in order to construct, what Yelda Demirag of the Baskent University coins, a
"we-feeling of being Ottoman" and an incorporating "Ottoman nation".41
The roots of this movement go back to the Greek independence. The secession of
the Greeks prompted the need for a new constitution by the sultan, named the Tanzimat
Fermani (Imperial Edict of Reorganization), which was declared in Istanbul in 1839. This
ensured the legal equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Although the ruling
elite of the Empire hoped that this new constitution would quell the resentments of nonMuslims, fortifying their loyalty to the sultan and thus the empire, the European powers
deemed it an exceptional tool to meddle with domestic politics of the Ottomans. The new
reforms only deteriorated the situation in the Balkan territories of Ottoman, where the
majority of its non-Muslim subject lived, only aggravating the nationalistic feelings.42
Through the end of the 19th century it was evident that Ottomanism was due to fail.
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The signs of failure began to emerge when the Muslim subjects expressed
displeasure that they were rendered equal with non-Muslims. The Ottoman-Russian War
of 1877-78 was the real blow to the Ottomanist idea as the Ottoman Empire lost its
Balkan territories (Romania, Serbia and Montenegro), where most of the non-Muslims
Ottomans lived. The Muslim influx from these territories into the Ottoman heartland,
Anatolia, and the only remaining territories outside Anatolia, albeit under the British and
French threat, were those of the Middle East and North Africa. The influx of Muslims
into Anatolia brought the idea of pan-Islamism.43
3.2.2 Pan-Islamism
The dismal defeat against the Russians prompted the rescinding of the
constitution by Sultan Abdulhamid II (1842-1918). Having realized that the European
style governance did not work, he resorted to the idea of Muslim unification in order to
save the empire. The fact that now the Muslims in the empire made up of the majority of
population reinforced his hopes. His title “Caliph”, the ruler of all Muslims, would be
functional not only to coalesce the Muslims at home but also those who were in India and
South East Asia. The emphasis in the splendor of bygone Arab-Islam past which
appealed to Muslims, especially those in the Middle East only resulted in the Arabs’
gaining their national consciousness. This even resulted in the emergence of such ideas
among Arabs such as Arabic is the language of the Qur’an, hence Arabs were the chosen
people of Allah. All this was in conjunction with the rising British and French influence
on Arabs. In the early 20th century, with the dismantling of the Ottoman Middle East, it
was proven that pan-Islamism too was in vain.44 Eventually, it became evident that
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Islamism turned out to be a futile effort to save the empire as the Arabs, one of the most
important Muslim nations in the empire, put their ethnicity in front of the religion.
Despite Abdulhamid's efforts to use Islamism, the empire was losing territories in the
Middle East and North Africa.
3.2.3 Pan-Turkism/ Westernism
When Abdulhamid’s pan-Islamist movement failed to address the problem of
dissolution, secular ideas gained prominence. In this regard, the Ottoman Committee of
Union and Progress (CUP) was established by the Young Turk movement in 1889 in
defiance of the Sultan. The Young Turks were heavily influenced by such European
streams of thought as scientific materialism and Social Darwinism. Pan-Turkism was also
part of their worldview.45 Also, pan-Turkist ideology was a principal one in the CUP.
Among the prominent members of CUP and pan-Turkist, Yusuf Akcura, who at
the same time was a close friend of Mustafa Kemal, urged the Ottoman rulers to embrace
pan-Turkism, which aimed at resuscitating the Turkish nationalism and uniting not only
the Ottoman Turks but also the Turks in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This idea of
uniting the Turks across the Eurasia was a new concept in history.46 To him, this
endeavor was a new one and not even Genghis Khan, let alone the Ottoman Empire,
whose founders were of Turkic origin, had ever pursued such an ideology.47
The prominent Turkologue Jacob M. Landau argues that the secular nature of
pan-Turkism in the second part of 19th century is worth noting because it meant that the
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pan-Turkists had been convinced that Islam was not strong enough an identity to retard
the dissolution of the empire.48
One of the most remarkable developments in the late history of the Ottoman
Empire took place in 1906 when the anti-Abdulhamid opposition of bureaucrats, military
officers and members of the CUP united under the Ottoman Freedom Society, in the then
Ottoman city Salonika (in today's Greece). Now, with the military on their side, there was
virtually nothing blocking the path of the CUP to keep them from openly confronting the
sultan. In July 1908, the CUP staged a coup against Abdulhamid, which culminated into a
revolution, whose motto was “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Justice". According to
Sukru Hanilioglu, this revolution is different from other European revolutions such as the
French and Russian in that the purpose was not to replace the absolutist monarch but to
reinstate the constitutional governance as well as the parliamentary rule, which had been
dissolved in 1878. Hanilioglu notes that the CUP members did not want to eradicate the
monarchy because they wanted to "pull the levers of imperial power”. From its
ascendance to power in 1908 to the end of World War I, the CUP was the sole ruler of the
Ottoman Empire rendering the monarch powerless but left as a figure-head.49
In conjunction with their ideology, the CUP began to carry out reforms to
secularize many aspects of the Ottoman life, from education, such as mandatory foreign
language, to judiciary, by which they sought to diminish the authority of religious clergy
over the Sultan. As part of their attempt to westernize the Ottoman society, the CUP
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abolished polygamy, introduced women’s rights, and supplanted the fez in favor of
European type head gear.50
Most members of the Young Turk movement were staunch advocates of 19th
century German materialistic idea of “Vulgärmaterialismus”, which combines the
principles of materialism, Darwinism and scientism, thereby they aimed to maintain such
scientific understanding in the society. The roots of the official state ideology that we
have in modern Turkey has its roots in the Young Turks period.51 The official state
ideology of modern Turkey was shaped during the period of the early Young Turks and
to this day has continued to influence Turkey's intellectual and political life.52 It would
not be erroneous to assume that being a member of the Young Turks movement, the
founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, was heavily influenced by the policies that
were conceived and implemented by the CUP.53
It is at this point that it is important to examine how the Young Turks influenced
Ataturk and in turn how his policies created and shaped the future of the newly
established Republic of Turkey.
3.3 The Birth of the Kemalist Paradigm in Turkey
The end of World War I sealed the fate of the 600-year-old empire. Having been
an experienced and successful commander in the Ottoman ranks, Mustafa Kemal
capitalized on the power vacuum created by the implosion of the empire. Having won the
Turkish independence war against the British, French, Italians, Greeks and Armenians,
the Kemalist clique deposed the Sultan and established the new Turkish republic in 1923.
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The Kemalist triumph of Westernism marked the end of a power struggle among the
ideologies that competed to save the empire. Given his experiences in the battlefronts and
the CUP ranks, M. Kemal was convinced that it was impossible to continue with the
legacy of the Ottoman Empire hence the need for a clean slate. That is to say, to Ataturk,
this newly emerging nation-state, of which he was the architect, ought to be completely
detached from its past. Therefore, first and foremost, the Kemalists launched a
comprehensive de-Ottomanisation campaign to eradicate the Islamic/Ottoman state
institutions. The complete overhaul of state alone would not have been meaningful if the
society remained Ottoman. Thus, the extensive restructuring of the society was set to be
one of the major endeavors of the Kemalists. M. Kemal was adamant about creating a
society and a state identity based on western values. To him, the two had to go in hand in
hand because the divergence between state and social identity would create a legitimacy
problem.54
Above all, the catastrophic experiences of the past century that lead to the
impending collapse of the empire prompted the Kemalist elite55 of the newly established
republic to concede that in order to be able to hold onto the hard earned territory, a
strongly centralized state and ethnically homogenized nation was paramount. Therefore,
the Turkification efforts in the new republic went as far as changing the Kurdish or
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Armenian names of settlements in the text books. By law, every citizen of the republic
was considered to be “Turkish”.
Another prerequisite for consolidation of power was the establishment of elitism.
The justification for elitism arises out of the conviction that the majority of citizens of the
new republic were “ignorant and illiterate”, which at the same time was the elitist view
of anything Ottoman. This contemptuous view from the elite, not to mention the survival
instinct, called for a stringent implementation of the reforms, which naturally were top to
bottom.56 The disparity between the ruling elite (the core), who predominantly lived in
urban areas and the ruled, who resided in rural Anatolia (the periphery), began to
constitute a contentious matter with the latter’s gradual movement into the former’s
habitat in early 1970s.57 The gradual rise of the periphery eventually would result in the
advent of the AKP government. This situation will be extensively discussed, in the
following chapter.
The effective permeation of reforms into society as well as the eradication of the
entrenched Ottoman beliefs and state system depended greatly on the degree of their
radical character. Therefore, M. Kemal believed that the envisaged cultural, social and
economic reforms had to be radical in character. 58
Finally, Michael A. Raynolds depicts the essence of Kemalism. He says; "[t]he
conceptual matrix that provided the ideational basis of the Turkish Republic is known as
Kemalism, after Mustafa Kemal, the general who led the military campaign that
culminated in the creation of the republic and then ruled it until his death in 1938.
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Kemalism functioned as a comprehensive worldview that supplied both a historical
diagnosis of the challenges facing Turkish society as well as a vision of how to overcome
those challenges." 59
3.4 Pillars of the Kemalist Ideology
Ataturk’s view of Islam, his absolute belief in western/European ideas and the
overall state of domestic and foreign politics of the early 1920s shaped the Kemalist
ideology, which is also called “the Six Arrows”. These principles were officially adopted
in 1931 and put in the constitution in 1937. The fact that these principles were accepted
as the symbol of M. Kemal’s party, the People’s Republican Party (PRP) is a testament to
their significance. Out of these six principles, (Nationalism, Secularism, Republicanism,
Populism, Etatism, and Revolutionism)60 I will dwell on Republicanism, Nationalism and
Secularism due to the fact that they bear the most important implications for foreign
policy.
Republicanism stipulates that, as opposed to the Ottoman period where the
legitimate ruler was the sultan, in the newly established Turkish republic the Turkish
people own the sovereignty and have the legitimacy to rule. The purpose of Atataurk’s
adoption of this principle was to leave no room for the resurrection of revisionist,
imperialistic monarchy or totalitarian regimes in Turkey. This partially aims to rule out
any possibility of the Caliphate regime, which he abolished in 1924. Opposing any
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expansionist objectives, M. Kemal conceded that preserving the existing international
status quo was important.61
Nationalism is one of the pillars that has been subject to heated debates. The
origins of the controversy go back to the establishment of the republic and the way it was
initially interpreted and implemented. The type of nationalism that M. Kemal envisioned
was built upon common citizenship rather than of ethnocentric. It was argued that given
the circumstances of the early stages of nation building in Turkey, such an understanding
of nationalism was a prerequisite. According to this “individuals from many different
ethnic backgrounds but, according to the Turkish Constitution, all citizens of Turkey are
Turks”.62 Leonard A. Stone states that the Kemalist understanding of nationalism is,
unlike that of Germany, not of ethnic or racial. 63
Yet, divergent opinions about the Kemalist understanding of nationalism are
plenty. According to Aydinli, while M. Kemal strived to form an identical Turkish nation
via constitutionalism with the broad support of Turkish people, he ended up
disenfranchising non-Turkish aspects of society, particularly the Kurds.64
To Philip Robins, M. Kemal’s was inspired by the European understanding of
nationalism, which is ethno-centric. What the Kemalist nationalism doctrine envisioned
was that those non-Turkish entities of the new republic could not retain their identities,
they must be united under the banner of ‘Turkishness’. In this regards, attempts to deny,
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eradicate and change non-Turkish components of society were made as the Kurdish
language was strictly restricted and village names were ‘Turkified’.65
Aydin points out that this repression of the Kurds would eventually result in the
emergence of Kurdish consciousness in 1970s, which was followed by the Kurdish armed
struggle against the Turkish state in early 1980s.66 This is important to note because the
Kemalist elite’s perception of nationalism culminated in one of the thorniest issues of the
Republic of Turkey, “the Kurdish question”, which has had considerable implications for
both domestic and foreign politics of Turkey.
At this point, we must also note that although Ataturk’s ideas were partially
shaped during his time in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which also
pursued revisionist, expansionist pan-Turkism67 he chose not carry it over to the new
republic. M. Kemal was well aware that considering the fragile state of newly established
republic, it would have been unwise to pursue unobtainable, utopian pan-Turkism.
Instead, he restricted his understanding of Turkism within the borders of the republic, for
which he had already been trying to secure after the War of Independence. Mustafa
Aydin comments that any adventurist endeavor would greatly harm the gains that had
been made with great difficulty. Therefore, M. Kemal rejected such utopian ideas such as
pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. Consequently, his rejection of the utopian ideas of panIslamism and pan-Turkism,68 had its implications, in later decades, in the Turkish foreign
policy.
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The Kemalist ideology also called for strict employment of secularism. It was
important for M. Kemal predominantly because it was one of the strong elements of his
efforts to eradicate the remnants of the Ottoman past. To this end, he set about to
implement the daunting task of expunging the entrenched influence of Islam in the
society and state. One of the reasons for his obstinacy in this matter was his strong
conviction that it was Islam that impeded the progress in the late stages of the Ottoman
era, which rendered it lagging behind the prosperous, civilized Europe. More importantly,
the perpetuation of Islam and its sway over the masses would have spelled a predicament
for the Kemalist elite in their infliction of top-to-bottom reforms, most of which were of
Western/secular nature.69 The Caliphate represented one of the most powerful elements
of Islam in the state and over the people, thus it was abolished in 1924, along with the
religious courts.
The dress code of the public that was of Islamic was not spared from strict
enforcement campaign of reforms. Western style hats became the symbol of the
Kemalist/Western reforms and replaced the turban and fez with strict enforcement. One
radical reform was the replacement of the language of the Qur’an, Arabic, as well as the
Farsi alphabet with Latin.70 One reason for the eradication of Islam, according to
Raynolds, was that it ran counter to M. Kemal’s attempt to make the ‘Turkish’ nation
superior over other nations. The Islamic creed instructs that it is not the nationality that
determines one’s preeminence but his/her level of devotion to Allah. Due to the influence
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of Islam during the reign of the Ottomans, the Kemalists argued, the Turks had lost
conception of their ancestral roots.71
Nilufer Gole argues that M. Kemal’s reforms are the continuation of the positivist
and secularist Turkish modernity that commenced in the early 19th century and reached
its climax during the Ataturk era. She posits that positivism was utilized by the new
Turkish elite as a tool to justify the reforms of modernity. August Comte’s positivist
ideology served as guidance to the liberal elite from the Young Turks to the Kemalists.
Furthermore, ‘social engineering’, which is conceived as a natural result of positivist
approach, became an instrument for the elite to enlighten and remodel the Turkish
society. To those reformers, the positivist axiom “progress and order” and ‘national
order’ were intimately intertwined because their existence secured the consolidation of
secularism in a Muslim country.72
Scholars establish correlation between the Turkish and French secularization
attempts in that the main purpose of both was to establish the dominion of the secular
elite over the royalist and totalitarian ‘religious establishment.73
Since 1950, by which time the multi-party system had been introduced in Turkey,
secularism had been aggressively enforced by the Turkish military and it did not shy
away from staging military coups against governments or politicians that were perceived
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to be a threat to the secular foundations of the republic. Therefore, Turkish secularists
refused to accept other ideas contrary to Kemalism.74
Binnaz Toprak argues that in Turkey, the source of law and education under the
Kemalist paradigm has been rationalism.75 The Article 24 of the constitution stipulates
that individuals are not only entitled to freedom of religion but they also have protection
from religion.76
According to the European Court of Human Rights (EHRC), in their verdict for the
case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, the secular principles were added to the constitution due to
legacy of the past and the idiosyncrasies of Islam. Secularism was considered to be an
integral part of democracy and ensured freedom of religion. Moreover, secularism curbs
the state from displaying any sort of favoritism towards a particular faith, preventing any
involvement of dogmatic decrees in the process of making legislature. The court further
stated:
“Secularism is the civil organizer of political, social and cultural life, based on
national sovereignty, democracy, freedom and science. Secularism is the principle
which offers the individual the possibility to affirm his or her own personality
through freedom of thought and which, by the distinction it makes between politics
and religious beliefs, renders freedom of conscience and religion effective. In
societies based on religion, which function with religious thought and religious rules,
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political organization is religious in character. In a secular regime, religion is
shielded from a political role. It is not a tool of the authorities and remains in its
respectable place, to be determined by the conscience of each and every one...”77
Comparing the secular properties of the United States, France and Turkey, Ahmet
Kuru finds that Turkey’s secularism is of an “assertive” nature. This means that the state
enforces secular principles such that the public sphere is rendered free from any religious
footprint.78 Gole draws attention to a discrepancy between Turkish and French
secularism. Whereas in the latter the establishment was bottom up, but in the former it
was a forceful imposition of the idea that was top down by the secular elite to the bottom,
which resulted in the estrangement of the masses. Gole concludes that secularization
turned out to be a byproduct of social engineering rather than a consequence of the work
of a public collective.79
It must be noted here that while the Kemalist understanding of secularism
presupposed the strict separation of Islam and the state, it did not opt to totally eradicate
religion and espouse an “atheistic” type of application. Rather, the stringent oversight of
state in the way Islam is practiced was found to be the solution. In this regard, the
Directorate of Religious Affairs was founded in 1926 with the special duty “to execute
the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about
their religion, and administer the sacred worshipping places".80 Today, the government
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is responsible for financially supporting the directorate and its staff, including the mosque
imams.
There are certain political implications of the Kemalist ideology in Turkey. One
is “a secularized and westernized homogenous nation-state”, which is the result of the
fact that due to its preset rules, Kemalism does not really leave room for a popular debate
to establish a social contract. The second is that the dogmatic nature of Kemalism results
in its innate repugnance for alternative ideologies and way of lives for they may pose
detriment to the idyllic world that it envisages for Turkey. The third is for Kemalism,
“politics” is only a tool to establish its own dogmas. Lastly, the exclusionist nature of
Kemalism, which those who wholeheartedly adopt and promote the Kemalist principles
are entitled to political participation and promotions whereas those who resist are
excluded from public space and labeled as reactionist, old fashioned and backward. The
Turkish military was ‘appointed’ to safeguard the Kemalist principles of the republic and
is authorized to punish or ‘correct’ those who have deviated from Kemalism. This
entitlement coupled with the military might resulted in, after 1961, the creation of the
National Security Council (NSC), which serves as an advisory board to the government
in domestic and foreign policies (and before the AKP administration), Turkish Armed
Forces dominated the civilian members of it. This rendered the NSC the ultimate
authoritative body in domestic and foreign affairs. This situation virtually reduced the
civilian Parliament to an institution whose duty is to pass laws that are aimed at
protecting and perpetuating the Kemalist hegemony over the state and society. It is
important to state that the NSC was composed of the Kemalist military-bureaucracy, who

41

did not hesitate to step in and interfere should there be a perception that the foundations
of Kemalism, national security and/or territorial integrity of the republic was at
jeopardy.81
Table 3.1 Pillars of Kemalist Ideology
Pillars of the Kemalist Ideology
•
•
Republicanism

•

Nationalism

•
•
•
•
•
•

Secularism

•
•
•
•
•

Sovereignty belongs to the Turkish nation
A barrier against the monarchic and totalitarian of
government.
The state pursues the welfare and the happiness of
the nation and the country without pursuing any
expansionist desires
All citizens of Turkey are Turks
Homogenous Turkish nation state
Ethno-centric
Rejects non-Turkish entities
Opposes pan-Turkism
An undertaking aimed to remove the influence of
Islam in state and society
Goes hand in hand with positivist modernity
in Turkey
Classified as assertive secularism.
It was largely imposed as a top down elite project.
The state controls how Islam is practiced
The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established
in 1926

The nature of NSC and how it steered the politics in Turkey will be extensively
discussed in the next chapter.
3.5 Goals and Priorities of Kemalist Foreign Policy
The Turkish foreign policy during the M. Kemal era evidently was a reflection of
his personality and worldviews. First and foremost, the new republic had an existential
goal of recognition as a sovereign state in the international arena. Having realized the
fundamental relationship between the domestic and foreign policy, M. Kemal made
domestic consolidation his priority in order to succeed in foreign policy. Therefore, his

81

M. Hakan Yavuz (2003) Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 4647. http://www.questia.com/read/119118437.

42

main focus was the reforms that he embarked on to transform the Turkish people and
state.82
M. Kemal said, 'What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is
founded is the internal organization of the state. It is necessary that foreign policy should
agree with the internal organization.' Therefore, with his famous motto - 'peace at home,
peace in the world' – Ataturk emphasized the relationship between internal stability with
international peace and order, prioritizing the home front.83
The hard earned independence and the struggles to draw the borders of new
republic largely determined the official foreign policy priorities during M. Kemal’s time.
More importantly, the reality that the entire nation and the territories it rests on came, in
the WWI, to the brink of extinction was more than enough to create a severe trauma for
the founding fathers. It is because of this reason that the Turkish foreign policy was
erected on the premise that the 'physical protection of the country against potential or
actual threats endangering or violating its territorial integrity, especially those
originating in the immediate surroundings.’84 This situation has had long lasting impact
on the way the Turkish policy makers handled both domestic and foreign affairs. One
result of it was the prevalence of securitization, which will be discussed in the next
chapter.
The makers of Turkish foreign policy largely pursued the policy of upholding the
state’s security and territorial integrity. Yasemin Celik calls the Turkish foreign policy
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between 1923-1945 ‘cautious, realistic and generally aimed at the preservation of the
status-quo and the hard won victory of 1923’.85 Moreover, the Ottoman immersion in
multiple conflicts in the late years of the empire that brought the empire down to its knees
taught an important lesson to the new republican elite; the Turkish republic was to pursue
an independent foreign policy and it was only possible by remaining neutral to the
conflicts that surrounded it.86 The rare exceptions to this policy were the resolution of the
Mosul problem with the Great Britain and the Sancak (Hatay) issue with France, which
stemmed from the Treaty of Lousanne.87 This isolationists and neutral tendency in
Turkish foreign policy was later to be criticized by such statesmen as Turgut Ozal,
Necmeddin Erbakan and Ahmet Davutoglu, who put forward a more pro-active foreign
policy, for becoming an obstacle on Turkey’s rising influence in its region.
In the same vein, the newborn Turkish republic refrained from pursuing such
revisionist policies as pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. Therefore, M. Kemal opted not to
reclaim the lost Ottoman territories of the Western Thrace and the Middle Eas- although
doing so could have been justified under the then existing status quo. One exception was
the Hatay issue, which was resolved not through force but through diplomacy.88 This too
became one of the fundamental doctrines of the Turkish foreign policy; the pursuit of
international law, not resorting to forceful coercion.89
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Simon V. Mayall agrees that if the settlements of the details of the Lousanne
Treaty are held exception, the Kemalist foreign policy dictated non-expansion and nonaggression. The source of legitimacy for the Ottoman sultans was the degree of territorial
expansion. Being against the Ottoman principles, M. Kemal opposed this idea.
Furthermore, although he was pro-Turkish, he did not pursue pan-Turanist foreign policy,
which aims to unite the Turks. One reason why he did not adopt a pan-Turkist policy,
besides the absence of means was to attract the Soviet support which was part of the
essential international recognition effort. The Soviets had ascended to control much of
the Turkish world in Central Asia and the Caucasus.90
Needless to say, endeavoring to unite the Islamic world was the last thing M.
Kemal would have done. That is to say M. Kemal declined ‘romantic foreign policy’.
Instead, rebuilding the new republic from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and its
strengthening became paramount. This would have been possible by rejecting assertive
and revisionist foreign policy. What is more, a need for a strong military was justified
given that preserving the territorial integrity of the new republic was another priority.91
According to Baskin Oran, the Kemalist foreign policy can be defined as ‘proWestern’ and ‘status-quo preserving’. He says ‘maintaining the established order within
the existing borders and balances’ and ‘realization of a Western oriented foreign policy
formation’ are the fundamentals of the Kemalist foreign policy.92
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Emphasizing the ‘non-aligned’ aspect of the Kemalist foreign policy, Nur Bilge
Criss states that ‘to create a strong, modern state which could defend its territorial
integrity and political independence, without external assistance, against external
aggression; and to make Turkey a full, equal member of the Western European
community of nations’ became the fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy.93
One of the indispensable components of the Kemalist Turkish foreign policy is
that it is radically pro-western94 and has always wanted to be in the western camp.
Turkey’s NATO membership, Turkish-American partnership and the age old Turkish bid
for EU membership can all be considered as Turkey’s desire to be part of the western
camp.95 Hence, it would not be wrong to assert that the ‘the Kemalist identity and its
profound one dimensional pro-Western character was what dominated the Turkish
foreign policy, which resulted in Turkey’s utter and deliberate political, cultural and
economic negligence of the Middle East, North Africa’.96
This brings us to one of the most criticized foreign policy practices of the
Kemalist elite. The Turkish policy vis-à-vis the Middle East was largely framed by its
staunch pro-Western state identity. The notion was ‘to keep the hands off the Middle
East’. Despite the fact that the new republic established mutual relations with the Arab
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states, the rule of thumb was to ‘leave the Arabs alone’. The nature of the Sadabat Pact of
1937 that Turkey signed with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan signifies that instead of
engaging in pro-active alliance formation, Turkey chose to consolidate its noninterference/neutral stance toward its eastern neighborhood.97 Therefore, it can be said
that the early decades of the Turkish republic witnessed an utter deterioration of relations
with the Muslim world, especially with the Middle East.98
Several factors came into play in this regard. First is the presence of mutual
distrust. The perception that the Arabs betrayed the Turks in WWI was reciprocated by
the notion that the secular, pro-western nation building efforts of M. Kemal further
alienated Turkey from the Islamic world. Saban Calis and Huseyin Bagci state; “Turkish
and Arabic secular circles "sought to remove what was seen as the dead weight of Islam
and the Ottoman Empire by exaggerating the differences between Arab and Turk and
vilifying one another”99 In addition to this, the Kemalist reforms were disapproved by
conservative Arabs and interpreted as Turkey's breakaway from Islam.100
Another blow to the Turco-Arabic relations came when the Hatay province
seceded to Turkey from Syria after the plebiscite in 1939.101 A source of further
deterioration was the abrogation of the caliphate. One consequence of this move was that
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Turkey ceased all of its claims to be the spearhead of the Islamic world.102 Calis and
Bagci argue that the idea that Turkey was no longer the leader of the Muslim world was
consolidated when the removal of the caliph disappointed the hopes of people of those
territories that were under the Western colonial yoke.103
Furthermore, due to its extreme pro-western attitude, Turkey largely overlooked
the rising pan-Arab sentiments in its Middle Eastern neighborhood. For example, Turkey
was the first Muslim state to recognize the state of Israel, supported the French claims
against Algeria and gave permission to the American troops to use its Incirlik Base in
their operations to Lebanon in 1958. Turkey further openly displayed its military along
the Syrian border in 1957 after the communist military takeover in Damascus. Finally,
Ankara’s call for a western intervention to reinstate the monarchy in Baghdad in 1958
further deepened the chasm between the Arabs and Turks.104
The Kemalist ruling elite saw the Middle East and Islamic world to be the
representation of backwardness, which has persisted throughout the existence of the
republic.105 In this regard Philip Robins states that“[T]he essence of Kemalism oriented
Turkey firmly toward the West to transform it into an advanced and westernized state.
For well more than half a century under the rule of Ataturkists, Turkey behaved almost
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literally as if the Middle East did not exist. That region represented an unhappy
association with Turkey's past.”106
According to Calis and Bagci, the persistent anti-Middle Eastern/Islamic world
attitude of the Kemalist elite is identity related, mandating that the republic face only
towards the west, eradicating the religious traces of the Ottoman Empire. While cutting
ties from its oriental and Islamic past107 for a new and secular state, religion was not a
valid basis for a political relationship in international relations as well.108 This foreign
policy implementation was consistent with the radical secularization of domestic scenery.
Such a policy was "an extension of domestic law which [held] that the use of religion for
political purposes is subversive to a secular state, and hence, illegal. To use religion in
international politics would therefore be at odds with a clearly defined domestic policy.109
Another disincentive for Ataturk to develop relations with the Middle East was
the fact that the region had become a competition ground for the colonizing powers,
which rendered it chaotic. Furthermore, to M. Kemal, the Middle East represented a
mindset, which was devoid of man-woman equality, individual rights and technological
advancements. These reasons being against his understanding of modernity, M. Kemal
resorted to a complete disengagement with the Middle East. Thus, as a natural outcome,
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his foreign policy neglected the Middle East and Islamic world solely concentrating on
the west.110
To sum up, the Kemalist foreign policy aimed to perpetuate the existing status
quo, refraining from any revisionist ideals that would challenge the international system.
In 1921, M. Kemal said; "Let us recognize our own limits, Turkey does not desire an inch
of foreign territory, but will not give up an inch of what it holds."111 Turkey under M.
Kemal respected the balance of power. It is because of the legacy of the early years of the
republic that the Turkish foreign policy in principle was status quo oriented and stagnant.
This maxim was followed by the Turkish policy makers and governments in the decades
to come.
3.5.1 Kemalist Foreign Policy in Practice
The interwar period brought about important developments to the international
political system, which increased the need for security. Turkey could not remain
disengaged from these developments.112The dissolution and removal of the Ottoman
Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the international system and rapid
proliferation of politically and economically unstable states indicated further turmoil.
Once a multi-national empire, Turkey had been reduced to being a nation state. It neither
possessed the means nor aspiration for territorial expansion. What it needed was a
realistic foreign policy that would resist the dangers of the international system to the best
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means possible without jeopardizing the well-being of the newly created fragile state.113
Mustafa and Aysegul Kibaroglu state that the Kemalist answer to the emerging
international security dilemma was “to create zones of peace and security in Turkey’s
immediate neighborhood.”114
M. Kemal’s concerns were not unjustifiable. The rising aggressive stance of the
Italo-German alliance was heralding trouble for Turkey’s Aegean and Mediterranean
shores. The Balkans and the Middle East were not exemptions from the threat. Therefore,
M. Kemal set his focus on securing Turkey’s neighborhood.115
In his conversation with Joseph Grew, the U.S Ambassador 1927-1932, Tevfik
Rüstü Aras, the foreign minister of Turkey during the Ataturk era said; “Our foreign
policy is simple and direct; we seek friendship with all, alliance or groupement with
none.” Therefore, M. Kemal embarked on, what Mayall describes as, “a burst of
pactomania.”116
In January 1929, the Briand-Kellogg Pact was passed by the Turkish Grand
Assembly stating that war was not an “instrument of national policy.” Turkey signed the
pact directly after the Unites States and France even though it had already signed a
neutrality agreement with Rome seven months before. This neutrality pact bound both
Italy and Turkey regardless of third-party involvement. It also assured arbitration to be
the first plan of attack. Even though there were still unresolved issues regarding
Lausanne, The Turkish-Greek accord of June 1930 led the way for amicable relations.
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Even though Turkey has these strategic relationships with countries in their general area,
Ankara knew that strategic alliances with major world powers like Great Britain, France,
and the Soviet Union were key to national security. This led to the Turko-Soviet Treaty
of Friendship in December 1925, which assured continuous amiability with Moscow.
Ankara bettered their relationship with London by welcoming the British Mediterranean
fleet in October of 1929 leading to an official alliance in 1939.117
The encroachment of Italians in the Horn of Africa and their designs towards the
east Mediterranean got Turkey, Iran and Iraq together, with the signing of the Saadabat
Pact on October 2, 1935, in Geneva. Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu point out that the entente
should be classified as one, which was aimed at respecting each other’s territorial
integrity, internal affairs and security, rather than a military agreement.118 Kibaroglu and
Kibaroglu further state that the Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, the Middle East
and eastern Mediterranean can be viewed as a “pursuit of concerted action with
involvement of regional states against the threats emanating from outside the region.”
Turkey, as a newly established state, greatly benefited from the peace treaties. The
treaties denoted that the signatory states acknowledged and respected Turkey’s territorial
integrity, leaving a great breathing space abroad, making it easier for Turkey to focus and
consolidate the social and economic reforms, which were gravely needed to rebuild the
country from the ashes of the WWI. It can be said the successful solution of the problems
inherited from the Lausanne Treaty, except for the Mosul issue, can largely be considered
a diplomatic achievement.119
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Whereas the diplomatic maneuvers of Turkey between two world wars may imply
an active foreign policy, it was not the desire to pursue a pro-active foreign policy, but
the international system of the time required a more cautious and defense oriented foreign
policy. In a sense, the Turkish foreign policy was isolationist and neutral. Brock Millman
states that the purpose of Kemalist foreign policy in the early years of the republic was to;
“...keep the alliance and cooperation with Russia in order to have secure borders
in the East and the Black Sea, to ensure common action of Balkans in case of any
external threat, as in the example of the Balkan Entente, and lastly the rapprochement
with the West with the aim of providing security against the Italian and German threats,
and to guarantee security in his South borders with Iraq and Syria.” 120
3.6 Summarizing the Main Principles of the Kemalist Foreign Policy
If we take into account the model used by the Kemalists, we can say that his
foreign policy can be categorized as “pacifist and isolationist, legalist, pragmatist and
realist.”121 These early foreign policy paradigms are a result of several different major
events in Turkish history including the War of Turkish Independence, the Ottoman
Empire’s legacy, and the personal traits of Ataturk. Ataturk was opposed to elongated
military action as Turkey was a new nation with little financial reserve, few military
resources, and little energy left in the people to take on another conflict. These factors led
the government to believe that their best course of action was to work on reforming
themselves internally and become a passive and isolated country internationally. The
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Kemalist elite was under the impression that Turkey, like other weaker states, would
benefit from the international law given that Turkey was somewhat insignificant in
relation to large countries such as the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and other major
powers that surrounded it. Turkey believed it was wise not to resort to military action,
even for those concerning borders such as the Hatay problem and the Straits issue in
order to conserve military resources and energy. Even though it would have been easy for
Turkey to step in with force, it chose to utilize legal action to resolve these problems. It
was the Kemalist elite who led the charge on this legalist approach in order to be
considered part of the “civilized” Western world. This legalistic approach continued to be
an important strategy even after the era of Ataturk.122
Neutrality is also a cornerstone of foreign policy for the Kemalist elites due to the
reasons stated above as well as the unfortunate alliance of the Ottoman Empire with
Germany leading to disaster. This led Turkey to avoid partnerships politically or
militarily in order to keep the peace with strong countries within their region such as Italy
or the Soviet Union. The Balkan Pact and the Bagdad Pact don’t seem to align with
Turkey’s neutral stance except that they were entered into as a defensive measure and not
in relation to any particular third party. One of the strongest examples of Turkey’s neutral
stance in foreign relations was during World War II, during which time Turkey
adamantly remained neutral.123
Sedat Laciner concurs that Kemalism was a revolutionary movement with
unbendable dogmas but adds that it was a pragmatic one too. Just as the Ottoman Empire
had to play off between the great powers for its survival, exploiting their competition, M.
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Kemal too followed the same balancing policy. Whereas Turkey benefited from the
Communist Soviet Union in military and financial aid, it also pursued good relations with
the British, Italians and the French to counterbalance Russia.

124

Even at the time when

Hitler and Mussolini were rising, Turkey sought to maintain relations both with Germany
and Italy as well as Britain, the United States and France.125
3.7 Conclusion
Understanding conditions out of which the Kemalist ideology was born, the
process whereby it gained prominence as well as the course it took to consolidate itself in
the early decades of newly created republic are important to elaborate and understand for
there is a strong relationship between the aforementioned aspects of Kemalism and the
manner in which the Turkish foreign policy was shaped and implemented in the decades
during and after the time of Mustafa Kemal, the founder and the ideological father of the
Republic of Turkey.
Mustafa Kemal was a prominent soldier, who served in the ever crumbling
Ottoman Empire. More importantly he took part in the Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912,
the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, and World War I that sealed the fate of the empire as well
as the subsequent War of Turkish Independence after which he became the sole leader of
Turkey.
Several ideologies surfaced aspiring to save the empire from collapsing. The
relevance and fate of these ideologies were largely determined by the political and
military developments that took place in the last decades of the empire. For instance the
Ottomanism was proposed to create a feeling of unity among the Ottoman subjects
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(especially Muslims and Christians) by elevating the status of the latter to the former
throughout the empire. Although this idea gained prominence after the Greek
independence in 1832 to prevent other non-Muslim entities rising and declaring
independence, the increasing Russian, British and French intervention in the Ottoman
domestic affairs, (especially with regards to Bulgarians and Armenians as well as the
territories lost in the Balkans), rendered the Ottomanist ideology irrelevant. The Ottoman
statesmen turned to Islam, thus pan-Islamism, in their attempt to gain the support of the
Muslim subjects especially in the Middle East, which came to be the last remaining
territory outside of Anatolia, (today’s Turkey). However, as was the case with the
Greeks, Armenians and other non-Muslim subjects, the Muslims of the Middle East were
not immune to the European meddling. The rise of the Arab nationalistic sentiments
among the Muslims in the Middle East, especially instigated by the British and the
French and the subsequent Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire surely showed that
the efforts to promote the concept of Ummah, the unity among Muslims, was pointless.
The apparent failure of the Ottomanism and pan-Islamism justified the rise of the
pro-western, secular/positivist and nationalistic pan-Turkist ideology. Having lost the
Balkan and Middle Eastern territories, for the Ottoman Turks, Anatolia was left to be the
only remaining territorial entity on which they could survive. In other words, Anatolia
represented the maximum extent of the territorial retreat. It is this point that Mustafa
Kemal gained prominence. He and his comrades not only fought against the invading
forces of Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Russia and Armenia, they embarked on a struggle
against the Ottoman sultan, who they accused of being a collaborator and traitor in the
face of the invasion of Anatolia, the only remaining territory for the Turks.
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The end of the World War I sealed the fate of the 600 year old Ottoman Empire. It
is this point that Mustafa Kemal rose to prominence by cleaning the Turkish heartland of
the invading forces after the Turkish War of Independence and establishing the Republic
out of the ashes of the imploded Ottoman Empire. His policies in the aftermath of the
declaration of the republic were reflective of his world view as well as his experiences
when he was an officer in the Ottoman Army. For once, he wanted a clean slate and
completely detached the newly established state from its predecessor. This required
radical decisions and their implementation in the same manner they had been envisaged.
Not only was the state to be created but also the society, (which had inherited the
Ottoman past), had to be molded and modified into the newly created state and its
machinery. Therefore, anything reminiscence of the Ottoman was to be eradicated. The
influence of Islam in state and society was reduced to the lowest level possible. The
caliphate and monarchy were abolished. Secularism became one of the most important
pillars of the Kemalist worldview. This Kemalist ideology impacted the foreign policy.
The perception that the Arabs sided with the invading forces during the WWI as well as
the perception that the Middle East represented backwardness and Islam created two of
the Kemalist foreign policy principles; to remain distant from the Middle East as much as
possible and to not conduct foreign policy based on religious affiliation. The extent of
Turkey’s relations with the Middle East, therefore, was limited to establishing defensive
pacts; such was the case with the Sadabad Pact of 1937. As Larrabee put; “… more than
half a century under the rule of Kemalists, Turkey behaved almost literally as if the
Middle East did not exist. That region represented an unhappy association with Turkey's
past.”126
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This is in conjunction with another important aspect of the Turkish foreign policy;
overwhelming pro-Westernism - the new republic and its people ought to solely pursue
Western/European values, which would promote advancement and prosperity in Turkey.
The Kemalist paradigm, therefore, staunchly aspired for Turkey to be part of the West.
Turkey’s desire to become a member of the European Union and the NATO membership,
although the Soviet threat played a role to a great extent, can be cited as notable examples
of this aspect of Turkish foreign policy.
Furthermore, despite the victory in the war of independence, the newly
established republic was rather frail due to the devastation of WWI, therefore M. Kemal
focused on reinforcing its existence through international recognition, which led to a very
cautious, status quo oriented foreign policy understanding. In fact, it can be said that M.
Kemal spent most of his energy to domestically consolidate the foundations of the
republic as well as to preserve the hard earned borders of the country.
Finally, the painful experiences of WWI traumatized the Turkish policy makers
and people, which generated the perception that Turkey is surrounded, from within and
abroad, by enemies. They, who have intended to destroy the Turkish nation before, are
relentless in their aspirations and if the Turkish state is rendered weak, especially
militarily, they would not hesitate to accomplish their unfinished task of destroying the
Turkish nation. The Sevres Syndrome, in other words, led to the securitization of Turkish
foreign policy throughout the decades to come. This notion later was perpetuated by the
Turkish Armed Forces and its intervention in civilian politics was thereby encouraged
and justified by the Kemalist elite.
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All the above mentioned considered, M. Kemal and the new Kemalist elite crafted
a new foreign policy culture whereby Turkey is to be part of the west, keeps its relations
with the Middle East and the Muslim world minimum, remains reserved, status quo
oriented and reactive. Such new policy culture called for a state machine that would
ensure its consolidation and perpetuation.
The next chapter will examine the components of this machinery and how it
created and maintained the fundamentals of the Kemalist paradigm in Turkey.
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CHAPTER 4. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION of THE KEMALIST
ELITE AND THE KEMALIST BUREAUCRACY
4.1 Introduction
The discussion of the elite formation and the subsequent institutionalization of the
elite is an important part of the paradigm shift debate. As mentioned earlier, Reardon
states that paradigm shifts can be either comprehensive or sectoral. The former takes
place in such a radical manner that the new elite’s complex learning process may result in
the complete rejection of the polity adaptations embraced by the country's ruling elites.
For example in 1917 and 1949 when the Soviet and the Chinese communist
revolutionaries became the new ruling elites; they fundamentally transformed the state's
political, economic and social structures.127 Additionally, Carson et al. argue that
replacing an earlier elite to institutionalize the new paradigm may occur by relying on
force, as in coup d'état or violent revolution, through democratic process, such as
elections or nominations, societal negotiation, or generational cohort shift. A new group
or coalition with a new paradigm or model of institutional arrangements appears on the
scene and assumes a position of power, enabling it to bring about a substantial shift in the
institutional paradigm and arrangements. This may be, but is not necessarily, proceeded
by a breakdown in consensus among established power elites about the appropriate
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paradigm or about reform of the existing paradigm.128 This being said, in the following
section I will discuss about the elite formation and consolidation process in Turkey.
4.2 Creation of the Kemalist Elite
Unlike most European modernity efforts, the Turkish modernity, for almost two
hundred years, during the Ottoman and the Turkish Republic, was top-down. The
Ottoman Empire, especially in the last decades of its life, had its own elitism culture.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the newly established Turkish republic, although
having severed all ties with its predecessor, inherited this elitism culture. Considering the
fact that the military-bureaucratic elite were the spearhead of modernity in the Ottoman
Empire, they too became the new elite of the newly established republic.129 Therefore it is
vital to examine the nature of the new Kemalist Turkish elite as it had effectively
controlled the Turkish politics, military, legal system, economy and almost the entire
aspect of life in the country. I believe that the establishment and the consolidation of the
new elite created a new paradigm in the new republic, which was defined by their own
terms. However, it is the increasing friction, especially after the 1950s, between the new
elite (the core) and the rural Anatolia (the periphery) that determined the Turkish
domestic and foreign politics for decades to come. Therefore, examination of the
Kemalist elite is important to establish a solid ground in the discussion of the paradigm
shift.
Dietrich Jung and Wolfgang Picolli’s explanation of the nature of the new Turkish
elite is precise. They argue that;
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“In a clear analogy with still vivid forms of patriarchal authority, high-ranking
Turkish bureaucrats view the state as a father figure acting with compassion and justice
towards its children. Although an initiator of democratic procedures, the bureaucracy
perceives democratic rules merely juridical forms. From the bureaucratic perspective, it
is the bureaucracy itself that designates democratic structures as a formal set of rules.
Democracy therefore has to facilitate policies thorough enlightened debate rather than
organize conflicting ideas and interests through adversarial politics. Consequently, the
bureaucratic detestation of party politics resembles that of military and like the generals;
bureaucrats consider themselves as being apart from and above the rest of society.” 130
M. Kemal moved forward with extensive reforms once he knew that the elite were
the ruling party as he then had the power to redesign the way the government and society
functioned. He found no opposition and even enjoyed loyalty from all institutions. M.
Kemal instituted important societal changes to the Ottoman tradition.131
In 1925, both the religious shrines and the dervish convents were closed followed
by turban and fez from as far back as Sultan Mahmut II being prohibited and replaced
with the more Western hat or cap. The general population stubbornly resisted these
cultural changes as the shrines and convents played an important role in the Muslim life
led by a majority of the population and the Westernized hat flew in the face of Islam as
being a symbol of Christianity. In order to suppress the resistance to these changes, the
Independence Tribunals were utilized under the power of the Law on the Maintenance of
Order. This law brought about the arrest of 7500 Turks with 660 of them being executed.
M. Kemal continue to deviate from the Ottoman culture in the beginning of 1926 by
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replacing what was cultural with the European calendar, the civil code from Switzerland,
and Italy’s penal code. Several laws passed to restructure the banking sector and all
courtesy titles were done away with except for those in the military.132 The Kemalist
government instituted these changes to usher the society into Western methods, which
they considered more civilized. 133
A final attempt to stop these reforms barely made it off the ground. Those
attempting to obstruct the reforms by assassinating Kemal were arrested by security
forces. Some of those groups who were involved in the alleged conspiracy included the
Islamists. Some liberals claimed that the reports of an assassination attempt were simply
a counter-conspiracy by the Kemal regime to blame those who opposed their changes.
Whether this is true or not, M. Kemal took advantage of this supposed assassination
attempt to put down any remaining opposition to his government. Most of the Unionists
also known as the People’s Republican Party (or PRP), except Hüseyin Rauf and Adnan,
they were arrested and charged with the planning of a rebellion. Sixteen of the PRP
members were executed. Kazim Karabekir, All Fuat, Cafer Tayyar and Refet, leading
military heroes, were handed pardons to placate the masses and because they were no
longer a threat to the Kemalist regime.134
The changes made by the Kemalist government flowed into the 1930s without
much opposition. During these changes, M. Kemal strengthened the alliance among the
Party (PRP), military, government, and the intellectuals, all Kemalist groups. The
ideology set forth by Kemal was named Atatürkcülük or Kemalizm but was truly more a
132
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description of the spirit behind his ideals than a true detailed ideology.135These reforms to
modernize Turkey culturally and socially were unprecedented and were presented with
the belief that the new Kemal elite were the only and best resort for the nation.136
Due to the overwhelming control of Turkish politics by the Kemal regime,
Kemalism, the state, and the PRP became considered one and the same; thus any
opposition to any of these was considered treason. In order for the regime to convert the
Turkish nation to its Kemalist views of building a new Westernist nation, they launched a
campaign by the state, the party, the official (and only legal) press, and schools. This
attempt to bring all Turks on board utilized not only Kemal’s ideals but also heroic
images.

This campaign came to be called the Ataturkculestirme (convert people

Kemalist) and even infiltrated elementary schools. Kemal’s purpose was to create a new
nation free from religion and negativity and filled with nationalists. Through heavy
political propaganda, a new generation of Turks was growing up who would be taking
over as the country’s elite.137
The memoirs of journalist Selahaddin Gungor describes dramatically what effect
this propaganda had on the people of Turkey: `It was nighttime, and I was sleeping. I
woke up when my older brother started to shake. He was shouting `Wake up... Hurry. I
will take you to Atatürk. ‘I thought I was in a dream: `Atatürk? You are kidding me. Can
eyes see Atatürk? ‘I asked my parents, `Atatürk is God? Does he eat? Does he drink like
us? '... '' 138

135

Laciner, From Kemalism to Ozalism, p. 91
Vahram Ter-Matevosyan (2011) Republican Origins of Kemalism: The Early Phase of its Evolution
Framing the Personalizarion of Kemalism, International Review of Turkish Studies (IRTS), Winter,
Volume:1, Issue:4, p. 52.
137
Laciner, From Kemalism to Ozalism, p. 91
138
Laciner, From Kemalism to Ozalism p. 91 quoted from Selahaddin Gungor, Cumhuriyet (Daily,
Istanbul), 15 November 1938.
136

64

The group that claimed and consolidated the power were soon called the
Kemalists139 or the Kemalist elite. Laciner argues that allegiance to the state of the
Kemalist elite was not solely on ideological grounds but also stemmed from the fact that
they deemed it to be their biggest source of wealth. The party of the Kemalist elite,
People’s Republican Party, had quickly been turned into an instrument used to handle the
state funds and offered the ruling Kemalist elite a social status and a lifestyle. To Laciner,
this occurrence created a chasm between the ruling elite (the Kemalists) and the rest of
the Turks (later called the “the Anatolian people”). The difference between the two could
be seen in their lifestyle. For example, whereas the Kemalists found such habits as
drinking, dating, and wearing mini skirt acceptable, the Anatolian conservatives would
frowned upon these habits. Over time, the Kemalist elite began to perceive itself as the
guardian of the state, considering the party and the state integral. Because of this reason
M. Kamal assigned the elite the duty of protecting and perpetuating the reforms.140 In one
of his speeches he summarized the Kemalist elite's role as follows:
`The duty of these citizens [intellectuals and the Kemalist elite] is to mix the best
path to follow in order to ensure their progress and their renaissance. That is how I see
our people. The interests of different groups can be reconciled perfectly and there are no
means of dividing them into classes. All our citizens enter into the group, which we call
the People. Thus the People's Party will be the school of education in citizenship for all
our people. ' 141
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Having monopolized the governance and possessed ‘locus standi’, the Kemalist
elite differed from the European middle class, (which sought compromise between the
upper and the lower classes), in that it was ideologically oriented and tends to possess
autocratic leanings, which is very typical of the third world bureaucracy and
intelligentsia. This uncompromising nature of relations between the Kemalist elite (the
core) and the Anatolian majority (the periphery) would, in the second part of the 20th
century, become a major issue. Omer Taspinar states that the governments in this period
ruled “For the people, despite the people!”142
The party became a medium, in its conventions and meetings, where the state
ideology and policies were discussed and created. One example of the symbiotic
relations, to Laciner, was that the rural representatives of the party were, at the same
time, the governors of their provinces, who represented the state there. Furthermore, the
chief of the party was also the head of the state. This was placed in the constitution and
the party program in 1937. 143
While the party served as a means of governance, it was also used to educate the
Kemalist class. The Halkevleri (People’s Houses) and schools played a great role in this.
In addition, the party was used to make Kemalism, what Laciner calls, “a frozen
ideology”, which cannot be disputed or revised. In time, the Kemalism grew not only to
be an ideology but also it came to represent the interest of the Kemalist elite. The elite
never wanted to lose the privileges and their yoke over the state they attained through
Kemalism.144 The 1935 PRP Program stated; “the fundamental ideas that make up of the
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PRP party program are the same as the implementations of the Kemalist Turkish
revolution…and implementation of these extend well into the future.”145
Furthermore, the party officials ensured that the Kemalist ideology become a
“frozen ideology” by elevating it to such dogmatic levels so that is it not debated or
opposed. That is to say any challenging counter argument against Kemalism not only
meant a defamation of the ideology but the elite per se. The amalgamation of the party
and the state affairs created a situation where, the opposition to the misdeeds of the
Kemalist elite and the opposition to the state became blurry. Laciner argues that Ataturk
used the foreign policy to underpin his political and economic reforms at home.
Therefore, due to the autocratic nature of the Kemalist system, it would not have been
possible to “produce a pluralistic foreign policy” in which he was the sole decision maker
in foreign policy. 146
The following section discusses the nature and the development of the Kemalist
bureaucracy. The important point to be taken into consideration in the following is the
reaction of the Kemalist elite/bureaucracy147 (the core) to the rise of the opposition,
which is defined as the “periphery”. The power struggle between the two, especially after
the advent of true democratic elections in 1950 defined the political, social and economic
evolution of Turkey in the second half of the 20th century.
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4.3 The Ruling Kemalist Bureaucracy
4.3.1 Bureaucracy
As mentioned earlier, there was an intricate cohabitation between the Kemalist
bureaucracy and the leadership. The same was the case with the foreign policy
bureaucracy. This bureaucracy had been the forerunners of the westernization attempts
and reforms in the last phases of the Ottoman Empire. It did not change with the advent
of the republic. From Ismet Inonu to Tevfik Rustu Aras, the ministers were replaced but
the bureaucracy remained largely unchanged. Dankwart A. Rustow states that 93% of the
Ottoman staff officers and 85% of the civil servants had continued to occupy their
positions even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.148 This ensured the continuity and
constancy of foreign affairs bureaucracy. Moreover, the republic era foreign bureaucracy
revered M. Kemal, hailing him as a hero.149 Therefore, the foreign ministry has been one
of the staunchest advocates of Kemalism in Turkish bureaucracy. 150
Ataturk believed that the bureaucrats had a duty to control the society from
political, economic and social perspectives. Ilter Turan states that the Kemalist
bureaucracy is regulative rather than representative or mobilizational when it comes to
governance. As they are the representatives of the state across Turkey, they are
responsible for the entirety of people. In the words of Turan, `the ruled were seen not as
citizens but as subjects whose prime duty was obedience to their benevolent rulers.”151
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Ataturk adopted what J.H.G. von Justi called the machine model. According to
this, “A properly constituted state must be exactly analogous to a machine, in which all
the wheels and gears are precisely adjusted to one another and the ruler must be the
foreman, the mainspring, or the soul, which sets everything in motion.”152
Metin Heper argues that M. Kemal believed that the government should function
like a machine. Even the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which according to Ataturk
was “substratum administrative”, was no exception. The civil bureaucracy was “a lesser
part of the governmental machine, a mere instrument (kabil-i istimal bir cihaz)”. As in
the Prussia of Frederick II (1740- 1786), it should be an impersonal organization
structured on the basis of strict hierarchy and staffed by civil servants acting in
accordance with the letter of the law; these functionaries should receive a practically
oriented education. To Heper, Ataturk revived the Turkish version of Richelieu’s
commissaire- the agent of monarchical discipline. 153
Von Justi says Ataturk was not part of the machine but a supervisor of its
working.154 He wanted more than efficiency; the civil servants were to be loyal to the
Republic’s goals (Cumhuriyet Mefkuresi). For them, rationality would be defined in the
form of the Kemalist principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism,
etatism and reformism.155 Finally, Heper argues that “the bureaucratic ruling tradition
during the early republican period was similar to Plato’s government by guardians who
personified the essence of the public interest and the approved ideology and, and who
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were to be their devoted instruments.”156 As the perceived threat from the multi-party
system mounted, the bureaucracy’s reflex was to resist the change, which also threatened
their privileges and “caste characteristics”. In order to preserve it, they pursued “negative
politics”, denouncing the legislation, to which they officially were accountable.157
4.3.2 The Beginning of the Multi-Party Era and its Implications for the Kemalist Elite
As was discussed previously, the earlier years of the republic was marked by the
conception and implementation of top-to-down reforms, which turned the new regime
into a more authoritarian one. With the dominance of the single party and its intertwined
relation with the state contributed to this authoritarian role even more. The year 1946 was
a milestone for Turkish democracy. The devastating effects of WWII on Turkey,
(although remaining neutral), were excruciating. The already weak economy was on the
verge of collapse. The only immediate solution was to accept the American aid, which
was to be released on the condition that the Inonu government allows for a multiparty
democracy. Then head of PRP Ismet Inonu had no choice but to accept the American
financial aid. The dissidents from the ruling People’s Republican Party (PRP), notably
Adnan Menderes, Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, formed the Democrat Party
(DP). It was now evident that the PRP and DP were the embodiment of the ideological
fissure that first surfaced during the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), those who
advocated statist, centralized, strictly secular polity and those who advocated a more
decentralized governance, liberal economy and less strict form of secularism.158
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The first multi-party elections, although not considered fully fair, yielded 62 seats
for the DP. However, the following elections in 1950 resulted in what Feroz Ahmad calls
“A White Revolution”159 in which the DP gained a whopping 415 seats while the PRP
got only 69.160 This marked an important shift in Turkish politics in that for the first time
the change came from bottom to top, as people displayed their displeasure to the single
party regime. What was important about the overwhelming victory of DP is that it
showed that the party of M. Kemal had lost the support of the masses and when given a
chance, those masses would display their dissatisfaction.161
What was remarkable about the decisive victory of the DP was that the
governance that had been limited to the privileged elite was now open to the vast
majority of the republic.162 Furthermore, for the first time in history, the Turks
determined their government with a bottom to top approach.163
The DP government displayed considerable differences compared to the PRP. The
majority of the DP members consisted of rural youth as well as those people who had
little or no connection with the established Kemalist elite and bureaucracy. The DP
election campaigns showed the ideological differences too. The party demanded religious
freedom, support for private entrepreneurship, political and economic liberalization.
Furthermore, as opposed to the heavily centralized Kemalist type bureaucracy, the DP
advocated granting local governments more sovereignty. This created a conflict of
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interest between the elected government and the established bureaucracy. In this regard
Erik Jan Zurcher says: “In the period of PRP government, the state administration and
party organization were so bound up with each other that the party became one of means
of state only to inspect and administrate society. With the coming of DP to power,
eventually this relation was cut off. Democrats did not trust bureaucracy and army that
were inherited from the previous administration, and thus they were struggling too much
to take them under control. For this reason, there emerged a new tendency of unification
between state and party, particularly at the top of state. In addition, what was different
from the Kemalist period was that party controlled bureaucracy.”164
Until the advent of the DP, the state and political elite coexisted harmoniously
which are called ‘unity of elites’, Ali Yasar Saribay states;
“Under the Kemalist rule, the elite is said to have become accustomed to unchallenged
power and the prestige that accompanied it. Thus the PRP was bureaucratized and
bureaucratic and political power was fused to create an apparatus to impose the
ofﬁcials’ will on the public.”165
However, ‘unity of elite’ was disrupted with the DP in power. The Democrat’s
distrust toward established bureaucracy and military prompted the new government to
resort to some measures, one of which was ‘to try to separate the CHP from the state’. As
Yapp argues, the new government launched several measures ‘to try to separate the CHP
from the state’.166
In 1951, the DP closed Halk Evleri (the People’s Houses), which were considered
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to be the propaganda tools for the PRP. In 1953, the government usurped the CUP
properties including the Ulus newspaper, which belonged to the party. 167
Ercüment Yavuzalp, who served the foreign affairs in the Menderes period and
used to be the private secretary of Menderes, summarizes the foreign policy of the
Menderes era:
“When Menderes came to power, the main purpose of foreign policy for Menderes
remained behind what it should have been, and thus he believed that it needed the first
priority. In order to achieve a substantial economic development, he thought that the
security of country should be relied upon strong bases. The purpose of Menderes was to
get rid of the state as being the state of a small minority and having a few developed
centers but to make it a state which would expand from top to bottom throughout the
country and to defeat poverty. For this reason, it was necessary to abandon the most
praised past but to accept that our country was undeveloped without being in complex
and then to make effort to get rid of this condition. Thus, it was necessary to resolve the
question of security in the foreign policy, which was not only a vital priority, but at the
same times it needed an urgent action.”168
Another striking aspect of the DP government was that its support base was
composed of businessmen, tradesmen, small businesses, conservatives, Islamists,
religious people, villagers and liberals. Thanks to economic and political liberalization
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the support base of the DP became wider. This support balanced the opposition, and gave
the DP public support in foreign policy problems.169
It was clear that the DP would follow policies different from those of traditional
Kemalist. However, the members of the DP never argued that they were embarking on a
cleansing project against the Kemalist revolution, but claimed to be against the PRP. As
the anti-PRP rhetoric began to be uttered more explicitly, the threat perception of the
established Kemalist elite became more grounded. While the DP became the government
of the state, the Kemalists still had a tight grip on civil and military bureaucracy. Thus a
hidden opposition against the DP, besides the PRP, began to form. Therefore, one can say
that early 1950s witnessed the birth of the hidden opposition of the civil and military
bureaucracy against future popularly elected governments. Such opposition would in later
decades incite and/or stage military coups that would topple governments that they
perceived non-Kemalist.
Laciner argues that during the Inonu era, the Turkish bureaucracy gained its real
class-consciousness. Therefore, when an outsider with different ideology and agenda, the
DP, came to power, the civil and military bureaucracy, who had perceived themselves the
owner and the protector of the Kemalist state, considered it as a source of threat to their
privileges.
This led to a situation where the Kemalists no longer constituted the sole owner of
power but part of it. The business class and working class, which were not really
represented by the previous PRP government now found an opportunity to express
themselves. The economic and political liberalization allowed once suppressed portion of
society to have more upward mobility. One of the results was the internal migration
169

Laciner, The Democratic… p. 150

74

where those people who lived in Anatolia, which also was called “the periphery”, began
to move to the urban areas, which had traditionally been occupied by the elite. This social
movement manifested itself in bureaucracy too.170
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was no exception. Due to the inherent Kemalist
structure of the ministry, the diplomats were uneasy about the ongoing changes in the
society and the ministry. For instance, then ambassador Mahmut Dikerdem called
Koprulu, the first Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs, a koylu (villager, a pejorative
term).The established bureaucracy in the Ministry opposed Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes’ overt pro-American stance. The Ministry had been the leader of the
Westernism in Turkey, yet they were publicly against activist interventionism. The
Turkish diplomats’ memoirs prove that the Ministry was particularly against the
Democrats’ Middle Eastern policy as it was viewed as a clear deviation from Kemalist
foreign policy.171 Indeed for the Kemalist bureaucracy the DP did not take the Kemalist
foreign policy principles into consideration when it was forming Turkey’s external
relations. For them, the Democrats neglected secularism, pacifism, realism, legalism and
the non-alignment of principles of Kemalism.172
It did not take long for the DP to take aim at the foreign ministry bureaucracy. For
example, ambassadors were being replaced with those who were close to the ideology of
DP, even with the relatives of the DP members. For example, then foreign minister Fatin
Rustu Zorlu’s brother, Rifki Rustu Zorlu served as the Turkish ambassador to Cairo
between 1954 and 1957.173
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The Arabic call to prayer was once again permitted throughout the country being
reinstated in every mosque overnight and Islamic education was expanded to the point
that instead of opting in to religious education, parents had to opt out which was rare due
to social pressure. Even the number of schools for preachers was greater. More mosques
were built every day and religious literature was once again published and sold
throughout the country. The Democratic Party’s secular form of government was very
similar to that seen in the 1950’s under the PRP. Even with all of the religious freedom,
Kemal Pilavoğlu, leader of the Ticani dervish order, was arrested, sent to prison, and then
put under house arrest after leading members of the Ticani dervish order chose to destroy
busts of Atatürk after the victory of the DP’s election.174
The Democratic Party continued to integrate religion into the government and
preachers remained civil servants. Even the existence of autonomous religious
organizations like brotherhoods were accepted and validated when the DP accepted the
help of the religious Nurcu movement in the elections of 1954 and 1957. All of this came
together to support the DP’s belief that religion was compatible with development.
However, this admission threatened the ruling power of the educated elite. Civil servants,
teachers, academics, and officers who had internalized the Kemalist viewpoint owed their
elite status to the fact that they supported the positivist, Western outlook. Zurcher states
that all this led these Kemalist advocates to believe that the DP was betraying their
traditions by openly supporting the Islam religion. This mindset was particularly held by
the military, which saw themselves as the keepers of Atatürk’s heritage.175
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Its rivals saw the DP as a party bent on integrating Islam back into Turkish
politics. In actuality, the Democrats were trying to make the modernization project
acceptable to the masses as opposed to it being considered elitist. In order to aid in this,
the DP opened the secularization pillar to debate and allowed room for religion, thus
uniting the rural masses behind capitalist development, nationalism, and greater support
of Westernization.176
With the Turkish rural population moving in larger numbers into urban areas, the
relaxation of secularist policies allowed the masses to bring their Muslim faith with them
into the cities. This is considered a great resurgence of Islam within Turkey by
intellectuals at this time and later. Even though Muslim fundamentalist groups were at
work, it was truly the traditional culture of the masses that reasserted its self to bring
Islam back to the forefront.177
With the Democratic Party coming to power, Turkey experienced a new
Assembly and truly a new government as the DP members were dramatically different
from those in the Kemalist regime. For example, the average age of the DP MPs was
much younger than the Kemalists during their time of ruling. Also, their election districts
and supporters were more intimate. Because the Kemalist regime was made up of the
elite, there was a higher percentage of highly educated people than what was seen in the
DP. Perhaps the most marked difference between the governments of the DP and the PRP
was that the PRP leadership was made up of a lot of members of bureaucratic or military

176
177

Altunisik and Tur, p.30
Erci J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 234

77

backgrounds compared to the Democrats. These differences show that a dramatically
dissimilar government came to power in Turkey with the Democratic Party.178
4.3.3 The DP and Kemalist Foreign Policy Bureaucracy
American-style Westernism was the goal of the Democratic Party as opposed to
the PRP’s radical Republican Westernism based on the French Revolution. This new kind
of Westernism was a slow change as opposed to a quick and complete revolution.179
The goal of the Democratic Party was to create a “little United States” out of
Turkey due to their belief in the political and financial model of the United States. It must
be stated that the İnönü government too attempted to strengthen its friendship with the
US after World War II and even suggested changing some of the Turkish politics to
better resemble those in America. As a result, Turkey brought the multi-party regime into
their system. However, the PRP’s embracing pro-American policies was tactical.
Whereas İnönü, thus the Kemalists, were of the opinion that the pro-American foreign
policy was purely instrumental for survival under the conditions of the time and required
for American aid, to Menderes and the DP, Americanism was more than an instrument, it
was considered a goal, which was liberal, Western and democratic. The Kemalist regime
was against the Democratic Party’s form of Americanism, stating that the DP was not
aiming to Westernize Turkey but to make it truly a Western institution.180
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The Democratic Party viewed American civilization as the ultimate goal for
Turkey as opposed to the PRP who left no doubt that they were opposed to American
values. Because of this, the DP saw itself as representing the people of Turkey in their
governmental transformation into a land that is modern, democratic, liberal, and lining up
with the Western ideals. All of this led the DP to model a systematic American approach
to politics and pioneered the Americanist political regime in their country.181 Therefore,
the DP government greatly benefited from the economic boom and the ensuing rise in
prosperity in the post WWII Europe. This was one reason why the DP yet again won in
1954 with landslide. 182
The rising communist threat from its north prompted Turkey to abandon its
decade long ‘western skeptic’183 foreign policy to fully embracing the west, forcing the
DP into strong alliance commitments with the West. This solidarity among various
countries was also very advantageous for Turkish interests. Thus, the Democratic Party
supported cooperation with international allies against attacks from the Soviet Union.184
The passive principles of the Kemalists along with their policies for Middle
Eastern relations were heavily criticized by the Democratic Party. The DP sided more
with not committing to any particular position with Middle Eastern countries which was
quite different from the previous traditional policy.

It was the first time since the

Ottoman Empire’s alliance with Germany that Turkey identified national interests with
another country’s interests. We see this in Turkey’s relationship with Iraq and Syria as
Turkey came very close to involving themselves militarily in their affairs in order to side
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with the United States. This deviation from Kemalist policies challenged the original
foreign policy bureaucracy of the Kemalist regime.185
It was the induction of Turkey into the Western block seen during the Menderes
government that largely resolved its position in both the Balkans and the Middle East. US
Secretary of State John F. Dulles depended on Turkey as a key partner in the effort to
counter the Soviet threat with NATO alliances. The US first tried its hand in building
alliances in the Middle East in 1951-52 by attempting to bring together Turkey and Egypt
although neither country was very enthusiastic about the opportunity. This was soon
followed up by a treaty involving cooperation and mutual assistance between Turkey and
the Kingdom of Iraq led by Nuri al-Said in February of 1955. This treaty, called the
“Baghdad Pact,” was also entered into by Great Britain, Iran and Pakistan, but the US
simply observed the treaty.186
Similar to the earlier Kemalist approach, Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy was a
very important part of its policies of relations with the West. However, instead of the
earlier Kemalist direction of its dealing with the Middle East consisting of being
defensive and an extension of relationships with the West, Turkey was now an active
participant in Middle Eastern politics along with the West. Turkey was actually a key
component in the strategy put forth by Great Britain and the US to organize the Middle
Eastern countries against the Soviets. The Democratic Party’s policies in the Middle East
also differed from those of the Kemalists by being much more active. To prove this,
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Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü made it known that he was not happy with the former
policies of Atatürk and İnönü in relationship to Arab states while promising a change.187
As we’ve explored, the policies of the Democratic Party differed greatly from
those followed by the Kemalist regime. While the DP saw many things such as religion
as an opportunity to bring people together, the Kemalists saw many of these same things
as dangerous. While the DP never came out directly against Kemalism, they actually
claimed they were the “best Kemalists” and that they truly understood the true concept of
Kemalism which the PRP had misunderstood. Whether one agrees with this claim or not,
those who supported traditional Kemalism such as the PRP and the civil and military
bureaucracy saw the Democrats as a threat to their ideals and the whole Kemalist
revolution. Unexpectedly, history also saw that the Marxists joined in on lobbying
against the DPs stating the DP regime was undemocratic especially compared to the oneparty regime seen under Ataturk.

188

This led to a hidden opposition beginning; the government may have been under
the control of the elected Democratic Party, but the Kemalists still ruled the bureaucracy.
Under these conditions, conflict, whether ideological or even physical, between the
Kemalist resistance (the army, bureaucracy, parliament, and press) and the DP elected
was inexorable.189
4.3.4 The End of the Menderes Era
The military and its leaders began to lose their identity as a privileged group with
the advent of multi-party rule. The military also lost financial power as well as direct
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representation in the political process compared to other classes due to the DP’s antielitist policies and the inflation these policies caused. The government, which was once
made up largely of military and formerly military leaders started becoming more civilian
after the 1950 election as Menderes changed up the leadership. Semih Vaner explains the
results as, “the change in ruling elites, which derived from important social
transformations and reflected a shift in political structures, was perceived by the army as
the degradation of its own institutional prestige and a challenge to its image within
society.”190
The relationship between civilian and military continued to decline after control
was taken decisively by the Democratic Party in the 1954 elections. This worsened as the
military realized they were now under civilian authority.191
However, the perceived ‘dictatorial’ policies of the Democrats led to political
upheaval within the military and PRP elite by the mid-1950s leading them to recognize
that they were losing their authority among the bureaucrats of the regime. The DP began
to resort to more controlling methods such as investigative committees. In addition, the
leaders of the Democratic Party began to censor the press leading, as well as bringing
economic problems into the country, causing many university students and academic
personnel to join the military and civil bureaucrats in their opposition to the DP. This led
to university campuses being paralyzed by large-scale student demonstrations leading to
violent confrontation with police. Even the declaration of martial law was not able to
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restore order to the situation. On top of the student uprisings, the military forces were
also unhappy with the difference in rule from the traditional Kemalist program. With so
many groups in opposition, the leaders of the Democrats started offering special
treatment to ministry groups to foster support and increase unity.192
They also removed more religious restrictions hoping to gain support but only
causing religious fundamentalists to feel more freedom to speak out against Ataturk. This
attempt at building unity and grasping at support led to corruption in the highest levels of
government leading the military to openly criticize the DP’s economic policies. 193
Because of all of this upheaval, a majority of the military leaders asserted that
they were truly Kemalist soldiers and that the Democrats had irrevocably damaged the
Kemalist ideals. The officers believed there was no other option but to stage a coup –
which the Kemalist elite actually called a “revolution.” The Constitution Commission
was created out of the coup and claimed that the government led by Menderes was
“antagonistic to the army, courts, university, and Ataturk’s reforms.”194 This coup,
affirmed the presence of the military within the political195 arena as protectors of true
Kemalism.196 In this revolution, the DP leaders including Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Ruutu Zorlu and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan
were executed on September 16-17, 1961, by a military court with 12 more political
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leaders sentenced to death.

The Democratic Party was shut down with 200 other

governmental leaders put in prison. 197
The removal of the Menderes government in 1960 was an attempt to decrease the
political participation of leaders who were backed by the masses, who were more
conservative and traditional. With regards to the 1960 coup, Samuel Huntington states;
“In such societies politics is, so to speak, upside down rather than right side up, with the
defenders of the traditional order on the bottom rather than on the top.”198
This brings us to probably the most influential Kemalist institution in Turkey, the
Turkish Military, which was steered, directly or indirectly, the Turkish domestic and the
foreign policy until the AKP consolidated its power mid-2000s.
4.4 The Most Influential Kemalist Institution: The Turkish Armed Forces
“The Turkish Armed Forces are the most effective guarantor of the Republic in Turkey,
which is a secular, social, and lawful state.”
Ex-Chief of Staff, İsmail Hakkı Karadayı
One of the most important features of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is that it
is the only other prominent institution besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey
that is deeply pro-western, which rendered it the most trusted one for the Kemalists. M.
Kemal, who was also a general and a hero, was also considered by the Turkish Military to
be its congenial leader. Prominent founders and members of the PRP, like Fevzi Cakmak,
Ismet Inönü, Kazun Özalp, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir and Refet Bele were all
once officers. Laciner states that this situation created a situation where the military
practically was ruling. The military considered itself the protector of the Kemalists and
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Kemalist principles. What is more, the law granted TAF unprecedented duties and rights
to uphold those principles.199
The PRP party program of 1935 stated: `We especially take care that the army of
the Republic, which is the unshakable foundation of the high State organization, and
which protects and guards the national ideal, the national existence, and the Revolution,
as well as its valuable members, be always honored and respected...'200
The supra-politic aspect of the army was affirmed at the same party program:
`The Turkish army is above all political considerations and influences'.201 The 1935 Ordu
Ic Hizmet Kanunu /1935 Law of the Army Internal Service and the Constitution endorsed
this view. That the military and the single party government PRP shared the same
ideology did not necessitate a military intervention in the early decades of the republic.
Instead, the military’s main duty in those years, according to Devrim Pusat, was to repel
the domestic threats to the foundation and the unity of the newly establish republic.202
The TAF rose to prominence especially after it forcefully removed the politically
elected Menderes government in 1960. In the decades to come, it acted as either a
supervisor or as a decision maker, occasionally as ruler. These aspects of TAF were seen
in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, when it directly or indirectly stepped in and intervened in
democratically elected governments.203
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Due to its unique sovereign status, TAF represents what Ilhan Uzgel calls
“praetorian” characteristics, which denotes that the military has a self-perceived mission
to keep the civilian rule under its control. Eric Nordlinger says the upper echelon in the
military becomes praetorian when they make it clear that they may resort to force or
actually do so, in the name of overseeing the political arena.204 A political system can be
called to possess praetorian characteristics if the civilian government is perceived inept,
devoid of legitimacy, weak or unstable and if there is deterioration of the political system.
Under these circumstances military is inclined to intervene.205 An important point here is
that the Turkish Military assumed the roles of modernizing and praetorian military and it
has wielded its praetorian powers when it felt threatened that its modernizing role had
been compromised.206
The Turkish Armed Forces have utilized certain political, legal and economic
institutions to perpetuate and reinforce its interventionist agenda and influence in civilian
governance simultaneously retaining its institutional and social class sovereignty.207 In
his study of Latin American military interventions, J. Johnson observes that ‘the direct
control of government by high ranking officers or military juntas is only a crude
indication of the role that the armed forces may be playing at a given moment, for men in
uniform have sundry ways of making their will felt.’’208 Therefore, the role that TAF has
played to shape Turkey’s political, social and economic life cannot be grasped unless the

204

Ilhan Uzgel, Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign
Policy, p.180, quoted from Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments,
Englewood-Cliffs, 1977, p. 3
205
Uzgel, p. 180, quoted from Amos Perlmutter, Political Roles and Military Rulers, Frank Cass, 1981,
pp. 11-13, 19.
206
Uzgel, p. 180
207
Gerassimos Karabelias, Military Control and Perpetual State Control in Turkey, EUI Working Papers,
2002/12, Mediterranean Programme Series, p. 1,
208
John J. Johnson (1964) The Military and Society in Latin America, Stanford University Press, p. 7

86

sources of political and economic hegemony of TAF are fully understood. Equally
important is the knowledge of conception and permanence of cultural, political, legal and
financial instruments and institutions, thanks to which TAF has endured and reinforced
its supremacy in Turkish politics.209 The following section will dwell on these issues.
4.4.1 How the Kemalist Military Class Perpetuated its Supremacy
According to Murinson TAF assumed the role of the definitive mediator in
Turkish high politics predominantly because of the Sevres Syndrome/Phobia, which
derives its name from the ominous peace treaty of 1920 that aimed for partitioning of the
defeated Ottoman Empire among the Allied forces. Although the treaty was aborted and
never was implemented, its legacy continued to remain entrenched in the minds of most
Turks, exclusively the Kemalists, and the excessive concern that Turkey would be
dismembered or the territorial integrity would be compromised by domestic and foreign
enemies was used to justify military interventions, especially in 1960, 1971, 1980 and
1997. This made the Turkish Armed Forces the most important driving force of Turkish
domestic and foreign policy.210 Three most significant ideological threats to the Republic
of Turkey throughout its lifetime have been identified as Communism, Kurdish
nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. These ideological and other perceived foreign
threats were used by TAF to rationalize its intervention in politics.
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The military elite

in Turkey established a long-standing practice of institutional supervision over the
executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government. In the following section I am
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going to explain the institutions and means by which TAF perpetuated its grip on Turkish
polity.
4.4.1.1 Military Tradition in Turkish Culture: A Culturalist Approach
There are perhaps few things more important to the Turks than soldiering. As
historian, Albert Lybyer puts; "The Ottoman government had been an army before it was
anything else…in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the external purpose,
Government the internal purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men”.212
The Ottoman officers during the Young Turks period pioneered the modernizing
efforts up until their miserable defeat subsequent to WWI. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who
founded the Turkish republic out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, was a prominent
soldier. He endeavored not only to establish a Western/secular nation-state, but also he
accentuated the reciprocal relationship between the embryonic nation and its military. It
was evident to Jenkins that, Ataturk, who was an Ottoman officer, had been greatly
influenced by the beliefs of German General Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (1843–1916),
who had been assigned the duty to rehabilitate and vitalize the Ottoman officer
contingents and died in Baghdad in 1916 fighting alongside the ranks of the Ottoman
Empire against the British. His book Das Volk in Waffen (‘the nation in arms’), which
was translated into Ottoman in 1884, was prescribed as a requisite textbook for the
trainees in the Ottoman Army. Von der Goltz strongly believed that the armed forces
represent the purest core of a nation and it should solemnly assume the responsibility of
shaping the nation to which it belongs.213
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Since the inception of the Turkish Republic, the notion of “military nation” was
indoctrinated in the education system. Every Turkish child was taught that they were born
soldiers and therefore part of the Turkish Army. 209 B.C is considered by the Turkish
military as its birth date, when the Hun Emperor Mete Han first established the organized
armed forces. According to the Turkish Armed Forces, “by personally devoting
themselves to the military profession Turks have demonstrated to the entire world that
they form an army-nation.”214
The mandatory military service was first put into effect in 1927, which
consolidated the ties between the nation and military. Jenkins argues that the scope of
military service is not limited to giving military training but it also includes educational
and ‘civilizing’ undertaking to shape the ideology of new recruits with the new republic’s
principles. 215
In explaining the military culture in Turkey, Nilifer Karli draws attention to the
importance of such elements as convictions, beliefs, symbols, and certain ceremonies by
which militarism is forged. According to this militaristic perception, there is a vital
connection between the military and the society’s security, which renders the former the
most important institution. Such strong views as “every Turk is a born soldier” and
“being a martyr is the highest level of exaltation” bolster the reverence and heroic
feelings towards the military.216
Furthermore, the established conviction that “the military protects us against the
internal and external enemies” only contributed to its “mystical supremacy”. The sanctity
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of the military institution was further buttressed by calling the military “the home of the
Prophet Mohammed” (Peygamber Ocagi”), a phrase that goes back to the Ottoman times.
The militarist culture is perpetuated by the formal school institutions. On national day
celebrations such as the Independence Day of October 29 and the Victory Day of August
30, school students marched in formation as the soldiers do, (a practice which was
abolished by the AKP). Also, the school textbooks contain substances that praise the
military culture.217
4.4.1.2 The Institutionalist Approach: The National Security Council (NSC)
As mentioned earlier, the main principle for TAF to intervene in politics was to
uphold the Kemalist principles and reprimand those parties and politicians who failed to
do so.218 The 1960 Military Coup was a turning point in that it was the beginning of the
true institutionalization of the hegemony of the TAF over the civilian authority. The
quintessence of the institutionalization was the National Security Council (NSC).219
Having first established in 1933 on a legal basis, it was the 1961 constitution that
granted full scope of constitutional authority. Although its duty was, according to the
constitution, to function as an advisory board, in fact it became a medium in which the
ever-powerful military generals submitted their recommendations, which actually carried
the weight of ‘orders’ to the civilian governments and representatives. The NSC’s
functions are outlined in Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution as “the formulation,
establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the State.” 220
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The Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution defines the duties of the NSC as
follows: “The NSC shall submit to the Council of Ministers the advisory decisions on the
identification, formulation and implementation of the national security policy of the State
and its opinions on necessary coordination. The decisions of the Council concerning the
measures that are deemed imperative for the preservation of the existence and
independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and
security of the society shall be deliberated by the Council of Ministers.”221
It important to note here that national security concept of the Republic of Turkey
has passed through certain stages. In the following section I will analyze the evolution of
the institutionalized concept of the national security in 4 stages; 1933 - 1949, 1949 1962, 1962 - 1983, 1983 - 2003. I will discuss the context of NSC for the post-2003 era
in the chapter where I discuss about the policies of AKP, as considerable amendments
were made in this regard.
4.4.1.2.1 The Era of 1933 - 1949
Today’s National Security Council was first established under the name of The
Supreme Defense Assembly (SDA) by Decree No.14443 of April 24, 1933. Its members
were made up of the Prime Minister, the head of the Assembly, the Commander of the
Turkish Armed Forces and members of the Council of Ministers. The duties of SDA were
defined as “to determine the tasks of the Ministries and to prepare the necessary
guidelines concerning national mobilization”, for which, “the Supreme Defense
Assembly would hold successive meetings at given times in a year, although if necessary,
it would also hold extraordinary meetings.”222
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The Secretary-General of the Supreme Defense Assembly, who was appointed by
the Ministry of National Defense, was required to “to prepare the matters concerning
national mobilization in advance, ensure necessary coordination among relevant
institutions and draw assessments, submit findings to the Supreme Defense Assembly and
follow the decisions to be taken by the Assembly.”223
4.4.1.2.2 The Era of 1949 - 1962
The name of the Supreme Defense Assembly was changed into the National
Defense Supreme Council (NDSC) by Decree No. 5399 of June 3, 1949. The members of
NDSC were the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense and the
Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces. Per the decision of the Council of Minister on
July 1, 1949, the body of NDSC grew to include the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign
Affairs, Finance, Civil Works, Economy, Trade, Transportation, Agriculture and
Enterprises. Under necessary conditions the members of the Military Council and other
experts would be called for their opinions.224
The duties of NDSC were defined as follows:
1. To prepare the guidelines for the national defense policy to be pursued by the
government;
2. To determine the duties and responsibilities for national defense which would be
assumed by the whole government establishment, every private enterprise and entity as
well as the citizens and submit them to the competent authorities for adoption of
necessary legal and administrative measures; and monitor the implementation of these
measures;
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3. To prepare the Total National Mobilization Plan in times of peace and ensure its full
implementation when necessary;
4. To express its observations on homeland-defense-related matters as required by the
Prime Minister.225
The NSDC assembled once a month. The Prime Minister was assigned to
officially inform the related authorities of the decisions taken at the NSDC sessions. And,
those decisions that were to be implemented by the ministers were submitted to the
Council of Ministers.226
Table 4.1 National Defense Supreme Council

Source: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us

4.4.1.2.3 The Era of the National Security Council (1961-1983)
The National Security Council (NSC) was established according to the Law
No.129 of December 11, 1962, which was derived from the Article 111 of the 1961
Constitution, which was created in the aftermath of the military coup of 1960. The
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members of NSC were the President, the Prime Minister, and the Commander of the
Turkish Armed Forces, State Minister (s) and Deputy Prime Minister(s), Ministers of
National Defense, the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Transportation and Labor as
well as the Armed Forces Commanders. The Secretary-General of the NSC attended the
meetings, but did not have the right to vote.227
The duties of NSC included the following:
1. To prepare the guidelines for the national security policy as well as to amend and
revise this policy;
2. With respect to the implementation of these guidelines, to prepare national plans and
programs for each national security issue, determine intermediate and ultimate objectives
towards their realization and harmonize activities in this area;
3. To determine the services and responsibilities to be assumed by the whole government
establishment, every private enterprise and entity as well as the citizens with respect to
total defense and national mobilization and take necessary legal and administrative
measures on this matter;
4. To determine the guidelines on which the National Mobilization Plans (Civil
Emergency Plans) would be based, harmonize, monitor and evaluate these plans.
5. To submit to the Council of Ministers fundamental views regarding national security.
In order to perform its functions, the NSC convened once a month. It could also meet at
such other times, as the Chairman deemed necessary. Decisions were taken by majority
vote. In case of a tie, the side with the vote of the Chairman was considered to have
formed the majority.228
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Table 4.2 National Security Council under the 1961 Constitution

Source: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us

4.4.1.2.4 The Era of the National Security Council (1982 - 2003)
The Law No.2945 of November 1, 1983, which emanated from the Article of the
1982 Constitution, determined the nature of the National Security Council, which was a
product of the 1980 military coup. The members included the Prime Minister, the
Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, Ministers of National Defense, the Interior,
Foreign Affairs, and Commanders of the Land, Naval and Air Forces and the General
Commander of the Gendarmerie. The council would convene once a month to evaluate
the stated goals below.
The duties of NSC were as follows:
1. To formulate views with regard to taking decisions on the identification, formulation
and implementation of the national security policy and ensuring the necessary
coordination;
2. To establish the measures for the realization of national objectives as well as plans and
programs that are prepared according to the national security policy of the state;
95

3. To continuously monitor and evaluate the components of national power that would
influence the national security policy of the state and the political, social, economic,
cultural and technological situation and developments in the country; and determine the
basic principles by which the aforementioned factors could be improved in accordance
with national objectives;
4. To determine the measures that are deemed imperative for the preservation of the
existence and independence of the state, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the
country and the maintenance of peace and security of the society;
5. To determine the measures necessary for preserving the constitutional order,
maintaining the national unity and integrity and bringing together the Turkish nation
around the national ideals and values in accordance with the principles and reforms of
Atatürk; counteract the internal and external threats directed against these aspects; in
order to eliminate these threats, to determine strategies and guidelines as well as
opinions, requirements and necessary precautions regarding the planning and
implementation services;
6. To formulate opinions on the declaration of emergency, martial law, mobilization or
war;
7. To determine the duties and responsibilities to be assumed by the public and private
sector organizations and institutions as well as the citizens with respect to total defense,
national mobilization and other related issues at times of peace, war, imminent threat of
war and at post-war times and establish the guidelines for planning on these matters;
8. To determine the guidelines for ensuring the inclusion into the development plans,
programs and annual budgets of the measures and funds related to the financial,
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economic, social, cultural and other aspects necessitated by the requirements of the
national security policy and by the services for society and total defense services;
9. To formulate views on international agreements pertaining to national security, which
are already made or foreseen;
10. To submit these views, measures and guidelines to the Council of Ministers in the
form of a “Council decision” and carry out other assignments mandated by laws.229
Figure 4.3 National Security Council under the 1982 Constitution

Source: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us

4.4.1.2.5 Concluding Remarks on the National Security Concept
As seen above, the traces of institutionalized control of civilian governments by
the military goes back to 1933 when the first such institution was established under the
name of the Supreme Defense Assembly (SDA). The in the first decades of the republic,
the military did not have the need to intervene in civilian politics as the undisputed
Republican party was in the same line with it. The military, however, felt obliged to
consolidate the newly established state by upholding its Kemalist principles. This
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manifested itself, for example, the Turkish Military quell the Kurdish rebellion in the
Tunceli Province in 1937-38. It was not until the ‘compulsory’ transition to multi-party
democracy and the rise of the ‘other’, the Democrat Party that changed the equilibrium.
The ten-year period between 1950 and 1960 marked the Democrat Party rule in Turkey,
which ended with the execution of the prominent figures of DP, the Prime Minister
Adnan Menderes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rustu Zorlu and the Minister of
Finance Hasan Polatkan. Therefore, the 1960 coup signaled the rise of the Turkish Armed
Forces to the fore in regards to military-civilian relations.
The inclusion of NSC in the 1961 constitution was due to the need of military
bureaucracy to strong handedly control the policymaking in Turkey. This need was
actually triggered by the perceived threat of the military from the Menderes government,
who, for the first time in the history of republic, attempted to challenge, subdue the
Turkish military and eliminate its overwhelming influence in civilian politics. 230
The late prominent law professor, Tarik Zafer Tunaya, who was among the seven
academicians that issued a declaration on May 28, 1960 in defense of the military coup
and who was among the constitutional assembly members gives us an idea about the
mindset behind the establishment of NSC and coup:
“The NSC aimed to possess a mixture of civilians and military representatives.
The purpose of establishing such an institution was to build a “Kemalist dam”, through
which the Turkish military would prevent the principles of the Turkish Revolution (the
Kemalist Revolution) to be spent like coin in the market of politics. In the face of
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changing political environment, the Kemalism would find its unchanging protector. The
security of our nation depended on this notion.”231
It is also important to note that before 1961, the NSC had initially been named as
High Council of National Defense in 1949, given the post-world war atmosphere.
However, with the 1960 coup, the generals that staged it replaced the term “defense” with
“security”.

232

It is safe to assume that this change of name indicates the institutional

securitization of Turkish politics.
At the same time the scope of “security” as defined by the Turkish Military, is so
broad that it includes “almost any policy area, from education and environment to
defense and foreign policy.”
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But “national security” is a wide concept, subject to

interpretations that can be expanded according to personal opinions and understandings.
One definition is found in Article 3(a) of the By-Law of Secretariat General of National
Security Council: National Security: Being able to resist all external or internal attacks,
defeatist attempts, natural disasters and conflagrations. National security means to
protect and maintain the state authority and using all national strength, efforts and
activities for being victorious in a war.234
The extent of “security” understood by the Turkish Military was so vast that it
included “almost any policy area, from education and environment to defense and
foreign policy.” Therefore, the interpretation of ‘national security’ may vary by
individuals. One of the examples is in Article 3(a) of the By-Law of Secretariat General
of National Security Council: Being able to resist all external or internal attacks,
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defeatist attempts, natural disasters and conflagrations. National security means to
protect and maintain the state authority and using all national strength, efforts and
activities for being victorious in a war.
In the 1983 “Law of the National Security Council and Secretariat General of the
National Security Council” number 2945, the definition is:
National Security; The protection and maintenance of the constitutional order,
national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in
international field as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the
State (md.2/a) 235
While the Article 118 of the 1982 constitution says that the decisions of NSC
were solely of advisory nature, the way that the law 2945 defines ‘national security’
urged the government to comply with the decisions taken in NSC.236
Due to the nature of the threat perception and definition of national security, the
range of issues that NSC dealt with was not limited to politics. NSC has given
recommendations with regards to cultural, educational, social and economic issues. NSC
has, for example, discussed, especially before the 1980 coup, the massive student
demonstrations, as it perceived them as threat to national security. After the 1980 coup,
the authority of NSC was considerably increased by the regulation of 84/7706 of
February 10, 1984, by which it had effect on economic and social issues. One striking
example was that the state budget was negotiated and prepared in NSC meetings.237
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The Red Book, also called the National Security Document, in which the threats
to national security and the measures to be taken in response to them, has been produced
by NSC. Gareth Jenkins says; “In practice, the military’s informal authority is such that,
when it expresses opinion, civilian governments rarely try to implement a policy which
contradicts it.”238 One unusual exception to this was then President Turgut Ozal, who
adopted an unconditional pro-American foreign policy and supported the US-led invasion
of Iraq in 1991, although the military vehemently opposed him.239
The military wing dominated NSC not only because the chief of staff and
commanders of land, air, navy and gendarmerie forces were represented, but also the
secretariat-general position was occupied by a high ranking military, until October 1,
2004, by which time the ambassador Mehmet Yigit Apogan was appointed to be the first
civilian secretary to NSC during the first term of the AKP government.240 This date
marks a milestone in the civilianization of Turkish politics.
4.4.2 Institutional Sovereignty of the Turkish Armed Forces
The Turkish Armed Forces continued to enjoy a powerful status partially because
of its institutional privileges or what Alfred Stefan calls ‘prerogatives’. According to
him; “…the dimension of military institutional prerogatives refers to those areas where,
whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired
right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal
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governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even
to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society.”241
Certain laws and past experiences gave the Turkish military institutional
sovereignty and unaccountability, which created a perception among the upper echelon of
the military that they were not liable to civilian authority.242 Just as the Turkish military is
obliged to protect the Turkish constitution, the very constitution it protected gave the
military legitimacy to wield its power when it perceives necessary. According to the
Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Service Internal Service Code, a product of the 1960
Coup, stipulated that "duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish
territory and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the constitution."243
The privileged position of the military in the Turkish state structure can be seen in
the order of precedence.244 The Chief of Staff of Turkey comes third in protocol after the
Chairman of the Grand National Assembly and the Prime Minister of Turkey.245 In fully
democratic countries this is not the case. For example, in the order of precedence in the
United States, the joint chief of staff ranks 76th, after the Chairman of American Battle
Monuments Commission.246
To Jung and Picolli the special education system in the military, which is strictly
based on Kemalist ideology, is one of the most important reasons that TAF and the
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military elite have a sovereign status. Through education, this system creates a ‘caste
system’ and ideologically homogenous group, which keeps itself separate from the rest of
society.247
It is perceived, as elite status to be an officer in TAF and it provides individuals
an upward mobility. The way that TAF enlists new member is a reflection of ‘classical
military-bureaucratic’ elite as the new recruits mostly come from military or civil servant
culture.248
Another important indication of the autonomy that TAF enjoys is that its
education curriculum is outside the scope of civilian supervision. Furthermore,
promotions and appointments of officers in higher strata of TAF are made in the High
Military Council (YAS), which has little civilian oversight. Furthermore, out of its 15
members only two, the prime minister and the minister of national defense are civilians.
This makes the civilian presence virtually symbolic as the decisions in the council are
taken by majority of votes. Before, the 2010 constitutional amendment, the decisions of
YAS were exempt from judicial oversight too.249
This is important because between 1990 and 2009, 1,655 officers were expelled, most of
whom for religious reaction, by the decisions of YAS.250 However, after the amendment,
the Article 11 of the Law: 5982 of May 7, 2010 stipulates that all decisions of YAS,
except those of the promotion and retirement cases, can be appealed. The Article 15 of
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the same law amends the Article 145 by saying that except in the state of war, the
military courts cannot trail civilians.251
M. Ali Birand likens the contemporary Turkish officers to the Janissaries in the
Ottoman times, who had pledged their loyalty to the sultan, in that they identify
themselves with M. Kemal and his principles, which compels them to protect the republic
he founded as well as his principles he set forth.252The unconditional allegiance to the
fatherland, strict discipline and absolute obedience to commanders define the culture in
TAF, which, to Birand, is based on the Prussian principles. This and the Kemalist
doctrine make up the core of TAF character.253As mentioned earlier, TAF leads an
isolated life style from the rest of Turkish public. Its own guesthouses, restaurants, and
summer camps facilitate this. 254
It would be no exaggeration, as Jung and Picolli agree, that the unprecedented
autonomy that the Turkish Military enjoyed in political, economic and social areas
rendered it literally a ‘state within a state.255 The following section will examine the
financial aspect of autonomy of the Turkish Armed Forces.
4.4.2.1 Financial Sovereignty and Unaccountability of the Turkish Armed Forces
The Turkish Armed Forces has wielded its unparalleled influence not only over
the Turkish politics but also with little or no oversight it has created a power center that
manages economic assets that are worth a massive $50 billion.256
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Ismail Akca examines Turkey’s military-economic structure by dividing it into
three sections, all of which are controlled by the military; the Armed Forces Trust and
Pension Fund (OYAK), which has become one of the largest business conglomerates in
Turkey, the military spending,257 which totaled $14 billion in 2014 and made up 3.7% of
the state budget,258 making Turkey the 15th largest military spender,259 and the military
industry.
4.4.2.1.1 The Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK)
The Turkish Armed Forces began to assert itself in Turkish economy after the
1960 military coup. The epitome of the military dominance in Turkish economy is the
Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK)260 The Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK),261
which was established in 1961 by Article 205262 with the aim of providing social security
to military personnel has become one of the largest financial conglomerates in Turkey.
Five years into its establishment, OYAK became a focal point where those
supporters of the 1960 coup from the military, bureaucracy, intelligentsia and the
bourgeoisie find their way to the top administrative ranks. The generals in the junta
rationalize the establishment of OYAK for the reason that “retired military officers are
only provided a modest living and are unable to retain lifestyles that correspond to their
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social status; OYAK was prepared so that retired officers would no longer be worried
about their future and could enjoy financial and spiritual peace.”263 This shows the
“privileged” mentality among the officers in the Turkish military. It is also interesting to
see how OYAK has grown and spread out from a ‘retirement pension fund’ such that it
has become virtually the biggest conglomerate in Turkey.
It is not surprising that OYAK functions as a privileged entity, just as TAF to
which it belongs. Karabelias states that; “OYAK is exempt from corporation tax, from all
other kinds of income tax, from the special income tax collected from all organizations
that withhold dues and fees from members from all sales and excise taxes, from the state
stamp tax imposed on all legal transactions. Furthermore, OYAK’s assets, earnings and
accounts receivable enjoy preemptive priority vis-à-vis third parties”264
With the boost that it gets from subsidies, legal advantages and tax exemptions,
OYAK has been able to diversify its area of operations greatly. These include
automobiles, cement, iron and steel, finance, energy, mining, agricultural chemicals,
foodstuffs, construction, transportation and logistics, private security and information
technology.265 OYAK has grown so much that it has iron/steel and cement/concrete
production facilities as well as automotive/logistic subsidiaries in France, Bulgaria,
Russia and Spain.266 Finally, the fact that, in 2013, its automotive branch Oyak-Renault
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alone came in 3rd in the biggest industrial firms list of Turkey267 is enough to tell us about
the clout that OYAK has in Turkish economy.
Ismet Akca voices some concerns that arise out of OYAK’s presence. He asserts
that a military that is privately involved in economic activities “breaches the basic and
time-tested principle of the separation between power-holders with guns and powerholders engaged in economic activity in modern economies.”268 This naturally poses a
threat to development of democracy. Another issue is the claim that while it is believed
that OYAK reinforces the integration in military by extending privileges to its members,
it is a fact not all of its members can benefit from the blessings equally, there is actually a
division, especially between those high rank officers in the higher management and the
low ranking officers.

The latter have voiced their concerns that the former have

“operating outside of the immediate interests of its members” by not focusing on service
provision and in some cases they are unable to receive the compensations promised by
OYAK.269 The situation created so much resentment among the low ranking officers of
the military that the Turkish Retired Noncommissioned Officers Association (TEMAD),
having exhausted the domestic means, (the Supreme Court rejected their plea) appealed
to the European Court of Human Rights in 2007 for not being able to take part neither in
the administrative and auditing boards or general assembly meetings of OYAK or its
affiliates such as Oyak Bank. TEMAD Deputy Chairperson Galip Kaplan said:
“We have found out that Law No. 205 [relating to the establishment of OYAK] is
not in line with principles of equality and fairness. Although we are members of OYAK,
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we are not mentioned among those who will be assigned to administrative and auditing
boards. As the TEMAD Administrative Board, we have decided to go to the European
Court of Human Rights on behalf of our 75 branches and 95,000 members”270
Finally, having drawn attention that due to the nature of OYAK, it may pose an
obstacle in Turkey’s path to membership to the European Union, Akca raises an
interesting point. He is surprised that not a single EU progress report mentions OYAK.
He goes on: “While no other EU member state would tolerate a structure like OYAK, the
EU overlooked the fact that OYAK’s existence is a challenge to democratic oversight and
regulation of the military in Turkey.”271 He explains this situation with OYAK’s longstanding partnership with Renault and AXA Group as well as the fact that Turkey is one
of Germany’s largest arms importers.272
4.4.2.1.2 The Defense Industry
Domestic military industry has been the focal point for the military leadership in
Turkey. Some of the companies that have been part of the domestic defense industry are:
the Military Electronic Industries Inc. (ASELSAN), the Military Battery Industry
(ASPILSAN), the PETLAS Tire Co., the Electric Industry (ISBIR), the Sivas Textile
Industry (SIDAS), the Machinery and Chemical Industries Establishment (MKE), the
Turkish Aircraft Industries (TUSAS), the Turkish Engine Industries (TEI), the Turkish
Airspace Industries (TAI), the Turkish Electronics Industry and Trade Corporation
(TESTAS), the Taskizak and the Golcuk shipyards, the Heavy Maintenance Factories
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located in Kayseri and Arifiye Air Force complexes in Kayseri and Eskisehir and
others.273
Per the law 3388 of 1987, the Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed
Forces (TSKGV) was founded, which combined the aforementioned companies into an
incorporated defense industry. The purpose of the Law 3388 is: “to constitute the Turkish
Armed Forces Foundation in order to work towards increasing the fighting strength of
the Turkish Armed Forces by developing the national armaments industry of Turkey,
establishing new branches of the armaments industry, and purchasing weapons, vehicles
and equipment.”274 Like OYAK, TSKGV was established based on privileges. According
to the clause 3 of the same law; “The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation as established
by this Law is exempt from; a. Corporate Tax (except for Financial Enterprises), b.
inheritance tax and death duty for donations and grants, c. stamp duty on any kind of
transaction. Donations and grants given to the foundation are exempt from all kinds of
taxes and other legal dues. Donations and grants may be set off against income tax and
corporate tax.”275
With the total employees reaching up to 40,000, and with 55 joint ventures,
OYAK and TSKGV became the epitome of a symbiotic relationship between the Turkish
Army, the State and the Capital.276
The capitalistic nature that the Turkish Armed Forces expansions over the
decades not only helped the upper echelon of the officers to gain a privileged status but
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they also developed intimate relations with the leading industrial conglomerates such as
Koc, Eczacibasi and Sabanci Holdings as well as foreign entities in USA, Germany,
France, Israel and Russia.)277
The Law 3238 of 1985 founded the Defense Industry Development and Support
Administration Directorate (DIDSAC). According to this, the law 3238; “established an
institution capable of generating long term defense policies and principles and
supplementing them with a continuous flow of financial resources. The organization
founded to fulfill these functions is the Under Secretariat for Defense Industries (SSM),
assigned with the major task to constitute a modern defense industry in Turkey and to
achieve the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. In order to attain this objective,
the main principle applied by SSM is to meet military requirements through domestic
suppliers in the most technically and economically feasible way possible.”278
All these considered, the privileged position of the Turkish Military was coupled
with the fact that the military appropriations, which amounted to about 10%279 of the
annual government budget, were accepted with little or no opposition. The Court of
Accounts, the highest authority that oversees public expenditure, did not have judicial
power over the defense expenditures until 2010.
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In this context, the former vice

admiral Atilla Kiyat’s statements in January 2001 show the extent of political and
financial immunity that the Turkish Armed Forces had. Kıyat further explained the
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tremendous control of TAF over the civilian administration in regards to threat and policy
analysis. He said;
“Terror began in the Southeast in early 1980s. Now we say that we have been
very successful against terror.... It is true that under the designated strategy, we have
been successful. We have stopped the bloodshed. But it lasted fifteen years and thousands
of people died. In the future, we might face something like the Vietnam syndrome that
America had to face. Large amounts of money were poured into this conflict at the
expense of the country’s development. Mistakes were made back in the 1970s. We built
the problem on the assumption that Turkey could be divided. If we had built it on the
assumption that Turkey is strong enough not to be divided... perhaps there would have
been no need for [an armed struggle]. We could have chosen to solve this problem by
promoting freedom and not prohibitions, in which case our preventive measures would
have been different. We could have succeeded with such measures in those days. We
could perhaps have been a member of the European Union today.”281
4.4.2.2 Judicial Oversight
The Turkish Military also maintained its supremacy through the State Security
Courts (DGMs). The 1982 constitution established the DGMs to deal with the cases
involving the security of the state.282 DGMs replaced the military courts that were
established during the martial law era subsequent to the military coup of 1980. (Now,
81)283 In 1991, the law to Fight Terrorism284 was adopted and the cases involving the
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state’s security, including terrorism were now dealt with under this law. According to
this, the sessions were to be presided by three judges, one of whom ought to be an officer.
The presence of the military judge unavoidably created pressure on the civilian judges.
Glenn Sulmasy compares the SSCs to the U.S military commissions in Guantanamo
regarding unlawful command influence.285 According to Gerassimos Karabelias the
presence of military in judiciary indicated a lack of confidence of the Turkish Military on
the civilian authorities.286 However, as part of the European Union membership
negotiations, DGMs were completely abolished on June 30, 2004.287
Lastly, the Constitutional Court, which was established after the 1960 coup,
served to strengthen the military supremacy. Karabelias states that through the
Constitutional Court, the TAF gained another “legitimate” and non-partisan institution
through which it would control the actions of the elected governments, and acts as “a
watchdog of the regime.”288 Although, the constitutional courts in many countries are
considered to be the protectors of civil rights from the possible attacks of the legislative
and executive branches of the government,289 in Turkey, it has foregone the principle
rights of individuals and institutions for the sake of the perpetuation and security of the
state. The Constitutional Court has done this by aggressively defining the boundaries of
the constitution through employing the principles of Kemalism, especially the secularism
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and the nationalism aspects of it. For example, the court has closed more than eight
political parties in the post-Ozal period on the grounds that they were undermining the
Turkish secularism and territorial integrity. Karabelias concludes that the fact that
Constitutional court functioned as the protector of the Kemalist constitution gave the
military power to control over civilian rule. 290
These privileges that the Turkish Military enjoyed were established and
consolidated during the periods of the military rule (in 1960-1961, 1971-1973, and 19801983) by constitutional amendments. The civilian governments mostly shied away from
blocking or rejecting these prerogatives. However, with the decisive victory of the AKP
in 2002, the dominance of TAF began to gradually erode. In February 2010, the Security
and Public Order Cooperation (EMASYA) Protocols, which had vested the military with
extraordinary rights to deal with any perceived threat without the need for civilian
permission, was abolished. Thanks to the constitutional amendments that were made after
the 2010 referendum, the decisions of the High Military Council (YAS) were, for the first
time, opened to judicial review. Thereby, those officers who have been expelled from the
military due to the YAS decisions are now able to appeal their cases. Moreover, the
civilian courts are now eligible to try military officers, especially those who have been
involved in coup plots. 291 The law that passed in February 2011 states that the police
officers are exempt from the compulsory military service. 292
One of the most important steps to put the military under civilian rule came after
the adoption of the constitutional amendments in the 2010 referendum. As mentioned
earlier, the military spending was outside civilian oversight and not transparent.
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However, the new Law on the Court of Accounts (no. 6085) subsequent to the
constitutional amendments of the 2010 gave the Court of Accounts authority to supervise
military spending “on behalf of the Parliament.”293 However, a last minute modification
of a significant portion of the military spending was omitted from judicial oversight. Still,
thanks to the new law, inspectors are allowed to audit whether or not resources are used
effectively.294 Moreover, the way that certain military facilities, such as dining (orduevi),
night clubs and canteens was controversial in that they were said to be run inefficiently
and sources used for private purposes. For the first time, these facilities are not under the
supervision of the Court of Accountants.295
The Turkish Armed Forces kept its authority and supremacy alive by perpetuating
certain fears, which is called ‘the Sevres Phobia’, that it deemed detrimental to the
existence of the Turkish Republic. Therefore, the next part will examine these aspects of
‘the Sevres Phobia’.
4.4.3 Role of Military in Foreign Policy: The Sevres Phobia and Securitization of TFP
The Sevres Phobia gets its name from the notorious Sevres Treaty, which was
signed on August 10, 1920, between the defeated Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Greece and Armenia, who partitioned what was left
of the Ottoman Empire, which is today’s Turkey. After the successful resistance of the
Turkish nationalists headed by Mustafa Kemal, the treaty of Sevres was never
implemented and was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Because, the
293
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remaining Turks came to the brink of extinction as the result of catastrophic defeat in
World War I, and the partition of the nuclei of the Turkish homeland, Anatolia, the
Treaty of Sevres created a “xenophobic causation”

296

, which is also called the Sevres

Syndrome or Phobia.
Although the Turkish War of Independence was won and the new republic was
established in 1923, the legacy of the Sevres syndrome persisted and created insecurity in
the Turkish state and it later became one of the most important undeclared columns of
Turkish foreign and domestic policy. Karabelias and Mikelis state that this situation
created a paradox that whereas the Kemalist Turkish republic was established based on
unconditional adoption of the Western values, it was also very mistrustful and suspicious
of the very civilization to which it had turned. More importantly, this situation led to the
creation and perpetuation of a “profound security culture” or “security syndrome” as well
as the notion of “encirclement by hostile neighbors or major powers that are posing a
threat to national unity and sovereignty.297 For example, the Eurosceptic Turkish elite
believes that the EU’s hidden agenda is, through accession negations, to establish
Armenian and Kurdish states in today’s Turkey.298
The syndrome has been prevalent among the Kemalist state elite, and political
culture.299 One important feature of the Turkish political culture in the new republic era
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has, to some extent, been the belief that the foreign entities, be it small or big, are still
aspiring, overtly or covertly, to weaken and eventually finish what was left undone in the
Sevres Treaty. Enemies that are adamant about their ill aspirations towards Turkey
encircle Turkey.300
Kemal Kirisci argues that due to the Sevres Syndrome, the Turkish policymakers
saw the world from a realpolitik perspective. He goes on saying that the syndrome is also
a representation of the Ottoman Empire’s relations vis-à-vis the European power, to
which the former had constantly lost territories in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This
historical standpoint has profoundly affected the Turkish policy makers.301Although
never implemented, the articles of the Sevres became the embodiment of the Kemalist
ideology, making it vital for an understanding of Kemalist threat perception.302 More
importantly, the syndrome has been used by the Kemalist elite to manipulate and shape
the public perception of external and internal affairs. Kemal Kirisci’s following
observation is valid;
“In this manner, 'national security' becomes defined and stressed with respect to
concerns and threats, real or imagined, that might undermine territorial integrity…in
Turkey, the military plays a critical role in perpetuating the Sevres phobia. Turkish
national security culture, which is heavily influenced by the military establishment,
emphasizes thinking and analysis influenced by the Sevres phobia. Military education
and socialization is very important process for the dissemination of this culture. All men
in Turkey serve in the army and most top bureaucrats attend a training program on
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national security run by military. In this program, bureaucrats are exposed to a similar
perspective on world affairs to that which all the officers corps of the Turkish military
experience. The military perspective is very much based on the realpolitik view of world
politics that is characterized by a deep sense of suspicion and tendency to shy away from
cooperation” 303
As we saw previously, the traditional security trajectory has been determined by
the military-civilian bureaucratic elite since the inception of the republic. The Turkish
national security concept had two dominant pillars; a fear of abandonment and fear of
loss of territory.304
In this regard, Alexander Murinson calls Turkey “a lonely state”. He argues that
main tenets of Turkish foreign policy are; “the historical experience of Ottoman Empire
(the tradition of the balance of power); nationalist Kemalist ideology and the creation of
the Turkish Republic on the remnants of the Ottoman territory in Anatolia (hence,
isolationism)’ a Western orientation expressed in the policy of Europeanization and
modernization (later, NATO membership) and lastly, a suspicion of foreign powers and
interests (the Sevres Syndrome)”.305
Sedat Laciner expounds on the skepticism in Turkish foreign policy. Whereas the
skepticism is not a declared aspect of Turkish foreign policy, Laciner states, it is actually
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the most important characteristics of Kemalism.306 The Kemalist regime’s insecurity
about its political capability to maintain power internally and externally can be seen in
Ismet (Inönü) Pasha's speech to the army officers in the Inönü Wars:
`You must know the situation you are in. The Padisah (Sultan) is your enemy. The
entire Western world is your enemy. Listen, don't tell anybody, but the Turkish nation is
also your enemy. They think you are the reason of the war." 307
Among the entities that the Kemalist insecurity was directed are the former
Ottoman subjects (Arabs, Armenians and Greeks) minorities, religious groups, liberals
and all those who are perceived opposing the Kemalist principles. Laciner concludes that
the Kemalist skepticism is the result of three factors: a) the Ottoman experience; b)
Turkey's limitations and the Kemalist regime's lack of confidence; and finally c)
European biased attitude towards the Turks. 308
The roots of this skepticism and cautiousness towards the west can actually be
found during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, well before the Treaty of Sevres.
Due to the weakening nature of the Empire and the rapid rise of the west, it prompted the
Ottomans to develop the same security paranoia. What really molded the minds of the
Turkish elite with insecurity and suspicion was the rise of the minorities (Greeks,
Armenians and later Arabs) against the Sultan and their demands for independence,
which played a great role in the implosion of the Empire. Pinar Bilgin says; “the acts of
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minorities left a negative imprint on the psyche of many in Turkey.”309 Therefore, it can
be said that one reason why the Kemalist elite have been minimally involved in
international affairs and refrained from following a proactive foreign policy is the fear of
abandonment and loss of territory. 310
In the same manner, Laciner agrees that the Kemalist Turkey unavoidably
inherited certain Ottoman foreign policy practices. These are Turkish Aloofness;
Paradoxical Westernism; Skepticism towards the West; Skepticism towards minorities.311
The dissolution of the empire created far-reaching fears among the Turkish elite.
They developed the perception that the Turks are on their own and only they have no
friends but themselves. “The Muslim brothers” in the Middle East too were considered
adversaries based on the bitter experiences before and during the WWI. The former
minorities, the Armenians and the Greeks, who sided with the “enemy” and united
against the Turks for their annihilation, have become enemies too.312 This situation is
ironic in that before the rise of nationalism and the independence movements in Europe
and their catastrophic effects on the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians were considered
“millet-i sadika” (the loyal nation) as they were very loyal and attached to the sultan 313
and had a privileged position in the Ottoman society.
Finally, the Kemalist elite in Turkey conserved the legacy of the Ottoman Empire
in two ways. One is the patriarchal elitism that was used to justify a rigidly authoritarian
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state administration. The military-bureaucratic modernity, which was promoted by the
newly rising elite of Turkey, retarded the advent and the development of democracy.
Two, the Sevres syndrome that produced the paranoia that the external and internal
enemies would try to divide and eventually put an end to the newly established republic
became an integral part of the Kemalist elite’s worldview created impediments towards
the solution of major internal and external problems.
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The Kurdish issue and the

strained relations with neighbors are some of them, which will be elaborated in the next
chapters.
4.4.4 Securitization of the Turkish Domestic and Foreign Policy
4.4.4.1 The Concept of Securitization
The abovementioned traits of the traditional Turkish foreign policy making
resulted in excessive securitization of the Turkish domestic and foreign policy, which has
had enormous implications. Therefore, I am going to analyze the concept of
“securitization” and how it has been applied to the Turkish domestic and foreign policy,
which helped perpetuate the Kemalist elite’s hegemony.
In their study of the Turkish-Israeli relations, Ali Balci and Tuncay Kardas
conclude that securitization consisted of three stages. The first one is the portrayal of a
certain issue such as an “existential threat to a referent object.” This stage is not actually
securitization but a prelude to it, which they call “securitization attempt”.315 In order for
an issue to be “securitized”, the target audience ought to accept it so. Therefore, the
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second stage is the endeavor of the securitizing actor to persuade the audience that “the
referent object is existential threat.” It is important that the target audience does not
necessarily have to be the public. An array of political decision makers, bureaucracy and
military officers can be considered as target. Therefore, Balci and Kardas state that
“Hence a securitization move becomes successful when it conceives ‘a more restrictive
audience’ on the presence of an ‘existential threat’ to a referent object.” Hence, even if
the general population refuses the securitization rhetoric and deem the proposed solutions
not acceptable, an issue can still become securitized if part or whole of bureaucratic,
political and/or military believe so.316 Finally, the third stage of securitization is the
execution of certain measures to defeat the perceived threat.317
According to Barry Buzan et al., one important aspect of securitization is a
specific rhetorical structure, such as survival and priority action (because if the problem
is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure.) This
helps to find security actors and phenomena besides military-political sector. 318 In terms
of security, an agent presents extraordinary measures by greatly exaggerating and
prioritizing an issue. One of the most important things to consider here is to understand
what amounts to a threat and collective response to it. Buzan et al. argues that the process
of securitization is a “speech act”. The speech act does not necessarily contain the word
‘security’. The fundamental issue here is to create an existential threat, which calls for
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extraordinary response and to get a significant audience to acknowledge it. 319
Securitization can be divided into ad hoc or institutionalized. The emergence of
the latter depends greatly to the nature of the threat and the response given to it.
Persistent or recurrent threats will greatly lead to institutionalized security solutions. The
most discernible manifestation of this situation is in the military sector where states have
constructed bureaucracies, procedures, and military establishments in the name of a
solution to the problems. 320
One of the most important consequences of securitization is that the authorities
are inclined to repress internal opposition, resorting to undemocratic means and justifying
their actions by creating threat perceptions. 321
On the other hand, desecuritization is reversing the course and means, “the
shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the
political sphere.” Put differently, the extraordinary measures and processes are
abandoned and the security issues are restored to their acceptable courses.
Desecuritization requires the securitized referent objects to be re-politicized by
designated actors with the help of a smooth process. A successful desecuritization entails
convincing the target audience that “the referent object is not existentially threatened and
that the measures are counterproductive and that they need to reverse the outcomes of
the successful securitization.” 322
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4.4.4.2 Securitization of Turkish Politics
In Turkey, national security is perceived as the threats that may be posed against
the state sovereignty, territorial and national integrity of the republic, and the Kemalist
ideology. The definition of national security had long been defined by the military circles
thus has had a ‘military oriented’ approach. As mentioned earlier, due to the
unchallenged nature of the armed forces, the officers, especially those in the National
Security Council, would determine the national security agenda and the civilians were
obliged to implement the agenda. The Sevres Syndrome was part of the agenda set by the
Kemalist military.
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The military elite as well as their civilian counterparts would

constantly bring up the threat agenda in order to continue their legitimacy in the
governance of the country. Levon Hovsepian goes so far as arguing, “It is possible to say
that the military also became interested in sowing such perceptions with which it was
solving “the issue of ensuring national unity for confronting external enemy.” 324
One important feature of the security approach of TAF is that it sees internal
threats as extension of those of external. Therefore, they are intertwined. For example,
during the Cold War era, the socialists, far leftists in Turkey were regarded by the
military as the Soviet proxy. The Islamists and certain Islamic sects in Turkey were
considered to be the tools of Iran and Saudi Arabia that were believed to undermine
Turkey’s Kemalist/secular ideology and territorial integrity. Due to the nature of the PKK
terrorism and the damage it had inflicted for the last three decades, the military circles
consider the organization to be a tool that is used by many international actors against
Turkey. However, the last example is not far from truth. It is well documented that the
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PKK has received a great deal of support from Syria, where the PKK leader Abdullah
Ocalan found safe heaven until he was captured in the Greek Embassy in Kenya, with a
Greek-Cypriot passport.
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After his capture, Ocalan told authorities that Greece had

supported PKK by providing ‘arms and rockets’.326 Turkish authorities claimed PKK
received military training in Lavrion, which is 30 miles outside of Athens, Greece.327 One
of the incidents that confirmed this claim was when 6 members of the Greek Parliament,
Leandras Hacidimitrio, Dimitris Vunacos, Yanis Stathopoulos, Maria Mahera, Kostas
Baduvas, and Panayotis Sguridis visited the PKK leader in the Bekaa Valley training
camp in Lebanon, in 1995.328
Furthermore, Iran is said to have PKK camps in its territory. Stephan Larabee argues,
“Iran has little interest in the PKK insurgency coming to an end, since that would
eliminate one of Tehran's main levers for putting pressure on Turkey.”329
The above mentioned ‘referent objects’ were presented as existential threat to
national security especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, in the 1990s. For the
military elite, the main reference objects became territorial integrity and secularism.330
For example, then Brigadier General and Secretary to the Chief of Staff, Hursit Tolon,
who later became a very influential general in Turkish Army stated in 1989 that the threat
that came from the north (the Soviet Union and Bulgaria) had been replaced by the one
that come from the south (Syria [the PKK and the Euphrates issues], Iraq and Iran.
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He said; “The countries that lies along our southern border possess missiles
whose range exceeds 1000km. Furthermore, the fact that these countries support
terrorism against Turkey means that our country is facing a severe threat to its security.
All these developments will affect power structure, qualitative and quantitative aspect of
our military. All viable options against these threats are being evaluated and we will
continue to keep our country safe against these threats.” 331
Then Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces Ismail Hakki Karadayi
explained in 1995 the threat perception of the country in an interview. He said, “The heir
to the former Soviet Union, Russia is aspiring to revive its olden glorious days by
pursuing expansionist foreign policy in the Caucasus and the Balkans. This is against our
interest. Iran’s official state policy is to export its state ideology, radical Islamism. Syria
still could not accept that the Hatay Province became part of Turkey in 1939. Moreover,
Damascus has been trying to defame Turkey among the Arab League members due to its
uneasiness of the South East Anatolian Project (GAP). Syria has been giving the biggest
support to the terrorist organization (PKK). Greece is arming the Aegean islands, which
is against international treaties. The policies that Athens is pursuing in Western Trace
against ethnic Turks aim at assimilating the Turkish minority there.”332 Finally, the
Office of Chief of Staff declared that the Greek provocations in the Aegean Sea and a
Greek military action in Cyprus was a casus belli.333
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One of the internal threats that TAF perceives existential is irtica, religious
reactionism. Even though the issue dates back to the late 80s,334 the irtica “threat” gained
prominence among the Kemalist military and civilian elite in the mid-90s, when the
Welfare Party (RP), the first party with an openly declared Islamic agenda, became part
of the ruling coalition government in 1994. After the postmodern coup of 1997, the
military replaced irtica with the Kurdish separatism as the number one threat to the
existence of Turkey.335 Çevik Bir, the then deputy chief of the General Staff, who was a
very influential figure that shaped the Turkish politics in the second half of the 90s
named Iran a “terrorist state” and said it was exporting its anti-secular ideology to
Turkey.
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He went as far as calling on the United States to list Iran as “a terrorist

state.”337
The rising securitization in Turkey in the 90s led to an unprecedented
rapproacment between Turkey and Israel. The main driving force behind this “axis”338
according to Çevik Bir, then deputy chief of the General Staff, who was a very influential
figure, was “the circumstances in the region that dictated an inevitable cooperation of
two countries”
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Defending the mutual cooperation between Turkey and Israel, a

Turkish senior officer stated, “we are surrounded on all sides by trouble. We are in the
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hot seat. It is critical for us to jump outside this circle of chaos and find friends in the
region. Israel was the perfect choice.” 340
The top military brass saw the rapprochement as a way to deal with the threats. In
his opinion piece published by the Washington Institute, Cevik Bir said, the military
agreement signed between Turkey and Israel paved the way for resolution of the TurkishSyrian crisis and the irtica.341
Cevik Bir further stated, “Under the provisions of Turkey's constitutional system,
the military is charged with protecting the secular republican legacy of Kemal Atäturk,
the founder of modern Turkey. The army made it clear to Erbakan (the head of Islamist
RP) that it would not sit idly by and watch Turkey turn toward Islam or allow IsraeliTurkish military relations to be jeopardized. In a reaffirmation of secularist supremacy,
the secretary general of the powerful National Security Council (MGK)—a body made up
of both military and political leaders—declared that Turkey's secular society and
educational system formed basic tenets of the country's national security.”342
The extent of the security syndrome went such that in 1999, the four star general,
Nahil Seneloglu, during the opening ceremony of the new academic year, warned the
young officers that “they were there to learn how Turkey was the most lonely country in
the world and that the country was surrounded by the largest number of internal and
external enemies in the world.”343
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The Kemalist civilian elite also contributed to the continuation of the Sevres
Syrndrome. For instance, according to the former ambassador Sükrü Elekdag; “there are valid
reasons for Turkey's regarding other neighbors with skepticism and as a source of threat. Two countries
among these neighbors, namely Greece and Syria, both of whom have territorial claims over Turkey
and have supported the terrorist PKK organization” Cetin further claimed; Turkey benefiting from
NATO's collective defense should not be counted on any more. From now on Turkey has to fight against
any threat directed to her survival and security solely by her own national means.344
In 1993, then foreign minister Sukru Elekdag stated “Because its geopolitical and
geostrategic location places Turkey in the neighborhood of the most unstable, uncertain
and unpredictable region of the world … it has turned into a frontline state faced with
multiple fronts. It is at all possible for the crises and conflicts in these regions (the
Balkans, the Caucasus and the Balkans) to spread and engulf Turkey.”345 He further
argued in April 1996 that "[i]n terms of foreign relations, our nation is experiencing what
is perhaps the most problematic period of the last fifty years of the Republican era. ...
Turkey is besieged by a veritable ring of evil."346
Given the developments in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, some
experts used the concept of “Bermuda Triangle” to define the post-Cold War security
perception in Turkey.347
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Hikmet Sami Turk, the former Turkish Minister of Defense, for example, stated in
1999 that: "In the midst of destruction and reconstruction, Turkey stood and continues to
stand as an anchor of stability in its region. Geographic destiny placed Turkey in the
virtual epicenter of a ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of post-Cold War volatility and uncertainty,
with the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East encircling us."348
While Turkey’s security concerns have emanated from its immediate
neighborhood, its implications have also included the European Union and the United
States, long-term Turkey’s ally. For instance, the EU persistence in democratic reforms,
especially in the context of the Kurdish problem, perpetuated the Sevres syndrome and
contributed to many decision makers’ conviction that the EU is trying to divide the
country, compromising the territorial integrity, as they did after the WWI.349
The former president of Turkey Suleyman Demirel responded to the European
insistence of democratic solution to the Kurdish problem by accusing the EU, saying that
“West wants to involve the Sèvres Treaty to set up a Kurdish state in the region, (...) and
that this was what they meant by political solution."350 In an interview with the German
weekly Die Zeit, the then Interim Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit from the Democratic Left
Party denied that there is a Kurdish problem in Turkey but the PKK terrorism problem,
which certain external powers supported in order to divide the country.351
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This fear and suspicion about preconditions set to Turkish membership aroused a
great deal of wariness among the Turkish decision makers. The then Chief of the Strategy
and Force Planning Division at the General Staff, Sadi Erguvenc, argued that; “…while
Turkey expects its allies to give support that it deserves from them in its fight against the
PKK terror, it receives an unwarranted embargo on associated weapons sales. And,
when Turkey adamantly defends its unitary state structure it becomes frustrated when its
allies would like to see the Kurds be treated not as regular citizens but as minorities.”352
For instance, the German government in 2000 cancelled the $7.1 billion sale of some
1000 Leopard-II tanks to Turkey, citing Turkey’s human right records.353
Another example was in 1995 when the US Congress blocked the order of ten
Super Cobra AH-1 gunships arguing that they would be used against Kurds.354 Likewise
in 1996, the US Congress cancelled the delivery of three Perry class frigates to Turkey
fearing that the balance of power between Turkey and Greece would be tipped in favor of
the former. Efraim Inbar states that the success of the Greek and Armenian lobbies in
Washington played a great role in the cancellation of these deliveries.355
The above-mentioned developments and entrenched “Sevres Syndrome”
manifested itself in the Turkish society as the deep anti-American sentiments. Many
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Turks believe that throughout the history of Turkish-American relations, the latter has
most of the time acted contrary to the former’s national interests. Such incidents were the
Cuban Crisis and ensuing removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey, the 1975 arms
embargo, Economic losses incurred by the American invasions of Iraq and the U.S
support for the Kurdish autonomy and possible Kurdish independence in north of Iraq.356
Finally, the reluctance of U.S support for Turkey in its war against the PKK is one of the
biggest reasons the Turks rank among the most anti-American nations in the world,
although Turkey is a NATO member.357
4.5 Conclusion
The Turkish war of independence witnessed the rise of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. He
waged the war not only against the European allied forces but also against the Ottoman
Empire and the Sultan, who according to M. Kemal, was a collaborator with the
occupying forces. As seen from the previous chapter M. Kemal’s experiences during his
time as an officer in the Ottoman Army greatly shaped his worldview, which he applied
after his success in the war of independence. Complete rejection to the entire Ottoman
past was a daunting task and required reforms of quite radical and aggressive nature well
as determination to implement them. Having won the war and established the new
republic, M. Kemal set to implement those reforms. However, the nature of the reforms
356
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and the people to whom they were applied were not compatible. The western oriented
ethno centrist and secular reforms were to be applied to Turkish people who are
predominantly made up of people for whom religion was an important part of their life.
Moreover, the Kurds had already attained their group identity well before the war of
independence and the Turkish ethnocentric policies in post-war era created resentment
among them. The top to bottom reform agenda had to be employed by an emerging group
of few, the ruler or the center, which did not necessarily share the same worldview as the
majority or the periphery, the ruled.
It was not long before the Kemalist elite, which was made up of civilian bureaucracy,
the legislation and the military, take full control of the sources of the new republic and
see themselves as the sole owner of it and became the power center. The Kemalist
principles were engrained in the PRP party program, which also became the core of the
constitution. That is to say, PRP came to be equal to the state. It was after Ataturk’s death
and during the Inonu rule (1938-1950) that the Kemalist elite acquired its classconsciousness. During this time the elite continued to consolidate their grip on the state
and the Turkish people by using the Kemalist principles against any opposition, such as
Islamists, Ottomanist or Communists/Leftists that may have arisen. Therefore, the
Kemalist bureaucratic elite turned into a quasi-authoritarian state machine. The notion
that any entity outside of the Kemalist realm constituted a threat to Kemalism thus the
state no doubt retarded the advent of pluralistic rule in Turkey.
It was not until the end of the World War II, the subsequent grave economic
hardships and the urgent need for western financial assistance that compelled the PRP
administration to allow for an opposition. The 1950 elections and the overwhelming
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victory of the Democratic Party (DP) of Adnan Menderes proved that the top-to-bottom
reforms and the center-periphery relations failed. For the first time, an entity outside of
the Kemalist realm, although DP reiterated that it was Kemalist but was against the
interpretation of Kemalism by PRP, came to power challenging the state machine sent
shockwaves across the Kemalist elite. The “Anatolian” majority/periphery, for the first
time, began to find representation in Ankara, which was identified with the “center”.
The DP began to touch one of the most sensitive points of the Kemalist
establishment; Islam. By relaxing the Kemalist secular practices in Turkey, Adnan
Menderes continued to harvest the support of the Anatolian mass (the periphery) while at
the same time attracting reaction from the Kemalist establishment. The DP brought
change to Turkish foreign policy too. Menderes began to abandon traditional westernskeptic, static and timid foreign policy practices by becoming a staunch pro-American
and attempting to change the Middle Eastern discourse.
The elite considered the ten-year DP rule as an attempt to unravel the Kemalist
revolution, a threat to the foundation of state and most importantly defiance to their
interest and unchallenged grip on the state resources. The Kemalist elite struck back in
the 1960 by flexing its military muscle, toppling the democratically elected government
and executing its notables. The 1960 military coup was a turning point for Turkish
politics. Having understood that the periphery could no longer be contained through
civilian means, the elite began to rely on a crude form of coercion, the Turkish military,
to preserve and perpetuate their interest in the name of protecting the Kemalist
revolution. The coup also showed that the elite did not have tolerance to the rise of the
conservative/rural Anatolian majority.
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The military takeover of 1960 marked the beginning of a new era for Turkish politics;
the political hegemony of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). All through the next four
decades the Turkish domestic and foreign politics would be heavily influenced and to a
great degree steered by TAF. The military interventions of 1971, 1980 and 1997 are the
quintessence of the TAF’s potency to exert its muscles over legislation, academia,
judiciary, economy, press, and virtually all aspects of life in Turkey. Given the
‘praetorian’ nature of and the overwhelming clout it has over the Turkish politics, in this
chapter I examined the sources of and means by which TAF perpetuated its hegemony.
First of all, the embedded military culture in Turkish society, in which TAF is revered
and exalted, made it an unquestionable entity. The Turks viewed military from a sacred
point of view, calling it “the home of Prophet Muhammed”. Furthermore, the founding
father of the Turkish republic, M. Kemal, was a soldier, and assigned the military as the
protector of the foundations of the newly established republic. Therefore, the military
made it its fundamental obligation to protect and perpetuate the principles of the Kemalist
revolution.
The rise of the periphery and the subsequent 1960 coup prompted the military to
assume a more precautionary and proactive role by institutionalizing its role in the rule of
the country. The first step was the establishment of the National Security Council,
through which it held a tight grip on the civilian authority and if necessity arose,
‘corrected’ them. This enabled the generals to have control over education, academia,
foreign policy and daily life of Turks. Furthermore, TAF began to acquire a more
sovereign nature by establishing the Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK), which over
the decades, grew into a vast economic empire. TAF now became sovereign and supreme
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not only politically and socially but also economically. The growing defense industry and
military spending only helped TAF to consolidate its privileged position and hegemony.
Finally, by propagating the notion that Turkey is surrounded by enemies both externally
and from within and ensuing securitization of Turkish politics was another factor for the
persistence of military dominance in Turkey.
To sum up, the Kemalist elite (bureaucracy, academia, press and especially the
military) continued to influence Turkish domestic and foreign policy all throughout the
second half of the 20th century. The rise of the Anatolian periphery and the 1960 coup
was the harbinger of fundamental changes in Turkish society and politics. In the
following chapter, I will examine the Ozal Era Turkish politics, which is considered to be
the continuation of the Menderes Era in terms of liberalization and democratization at
home and dominance of pro-active foreign policy understanding abroad. Also discussed
is the foreign policy architects of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) who adopted
policies that were patterned after Ozal’s.
1. Goals and Priorities of the Kemalist Paradigm
• Restructuring social and state identities based on strict Kemalist/Western
principles, which requires denouncing the Ottoman past.
o Restricting Islam in society and state, adopting strict form of secularism.
o Denouncing pluralism in favor of establishing an ethno-centric and
exclusionist state and society.
o Extremely centralized state structure.
o Create and sustain the Kemalist elite to perpetuate the paradigm.
• Foreign Policy Goals
o Preserving the territorial integrity (anti-expansionist/revisionist)
o Preserving regional/international status quo (Status quo oriented)
o Seeking recognition in international system (Especially the Ataturk era)
o Radical pro-Westernism (One-dimensional foreign policy)
o Intentionally neglecting the Middle East based on cultural, religious and
perceptional reasons. (Secular foreign policy)
o The Sevres Syndrome (Surrounded by enemies)
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o Security oriented foreign policy. (Relying on hard power as the first
means)
o Isolationist
o Non-Aligned (especially the Ataturk and Inonu Era)
2.
•
•
•

•
•

Instruments of the Kemalist Paradigm
The Kemalist Elite
Turkish Armed Forces (especially through the National Security Council)
Bureaucracy
o The Presidency (Executive Branch)
o The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
o The High Courts (Judiciary)
o The Higher Education Council (especially universities)
o The Directorate of Religious Affairs (to impose state controlled Islam)
The Secular Press
The Secular Business Elite
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CHAPTER 5. RISE OF ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM; NEOOTTOMANISM IN OZAL ERA (1983-1993)
5.1 Introduction
It is important to examine the Ozal era in the context of the AKP politics because
the neo-Ottoman vision that AKP possesses has its roots in the teachings of Turgut
Ozal.358 This can clearly be seen in Ahmet Davutoglu’s, the architect of AKP foreign
policy, seminal work “the Strategic Depth”. Davutoglu states that the Ozalist approach to
domestic and foreign politics is in line with the neo-Ottomanist approach. 359 This makes
him the next important person after Menderes, who challenged the conventional wisdom
in Turkish politics in terms of structure, methodology and style. His unprecedented
activism and pragmatism in domestic and foreign Turkish policy set examples to the next
generation politicians, especially those of AKP. His worldview coupled with fundamental
changes in international politics, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, during his time
helped him transform Turkey into a much different country, socially, economically and
politically.360
Although he had been the prime minister, it was his presidential term (1989-1993)
that marked the greatest change in Turkish politics. However, the fact that his rise to
presidency corresponded with the fall of Communism and the abrupt change in global
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affairs made it difficult to discern the direction of causality. For the first time after
Menderes, Ozal challenged the orthodox Kemalist foreign policy that has been blamed
for the quiescence of Turkey in the international arena. Furthermore, he defied the
Kemalist understanding of secularism and nationalism. He openly praised the Ottoman
era domestic and foreign politics, at which M. Kemal and his revolution took an aim. His
foreign policy, on the contrary to that of Kemalism, was pro-active. He believed that
Turkey’s best interest was to extend its influence to territories which were formerly
Ottoman, for which the term neo-Ottomanism was used for the first time.361
One reflection of his neo-Ottoman aspirations was his willingness to embrace the
Kurdish identity, which completely ran counter to the Kemalist understanding of monoethnic nation state. His worldview dictated him to pursued multicultural policies.362
Being a staunch pro-American, he praised the American and Ottoman multiculturalism
and said; “Both allowed different cultures and gave people freedom to exercise their
religion, nationality and economic preferences. From this perspective, Turkey had to
desert its authoritarian official understanding, namely the Kemalist state ideology.” 363
All these considered, it is very important to thoroughly examine the Ozal Era,
which has had a profound impact on the AKP government. Therefore, this chapter is
made up of an analysis of the military coup of 1980 and its impacts in Turkish politics,
Ozal’s personality, Turkey’s changing economic and social structure of the 80s, the
Kurdish question, Ozal’s neo-Ottomanist approach, and examples of Ozal’s foreign
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policy practices. While the focus of this chapter is the Ozal era Turkish domestic and
foreign policy, I will start with examining the conditions that brought him to power.
5.2 Pre-Ozal Era: The 1980 Coup d’etat and Its Implications in Turkish Politics
As was indicated in the previous chapter, the Turkish military is probably the
single most important institution in the history of Turkish politics due in great part to the
support it receive from the Kemalist civilian elite, which also controlled the high courts,
universities, certain political parties and media outlets. This support was reinforced by the
approval of Kemalist sections of society, which are known to be weary of Kurdish
nationalism, Islamic and Communist movements.364
In the first years of the republic, those who had Islamic and Kurdish tendencies
were alienated from the state and governance due to the assertive secularism and
nationalism. Therefore, any ideology besides Kemalism was suppressed by the elite and
considered a threat to the foundations of the state formation. The post-1950 multi-party
era showed that the Kemalist elite and PRP did not really attain the majority of support
from the people. Having been concerned with this reality, the Kemalist elite resorted to
military coercion to hold their control and dominance over the state.365
The beginning of the Cold War convoluted the ideological balance of power in
Turkey. While the Kemalist elite had been cohesive in their staunch opposition against
Islamism and Kurdish nationalism, the rise of the leftist/Communist movements,
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especially in the 1960s, created another group against which the Turkish Military
fought.366
The 1970s witnessed fierce clashes between the socialist/communist leaning (the leftists)
and the nationalist and conservative Muslims (the rightists), which took its toll on
Turkish society, politics and economy. The tumultuous years of 70s ended with the
deposition of the civilian government by the Turkish in September 12, 1980, resulting in
dissolution of the parliament and arresting all political and union members. The military
indicated that it had taken over in order; “to suppress terrorism and radicalism; to restore
economic growth and stability; to introduce a new constitution and legal arrangements
that would stabilize the system and prevent anarchy; to re-establish civilian democracy
on a Kemalist basis.”367 As was in 1960 and 1971, the Turkish military again stepped in
to bring the country and society in line with the Kemalist ideology, fulfilling its main
duty.
It is important to note that although TAF have removed the civilian governments,
it did not aim to stay in power longer than necessary, eventually turning the government
over to the civilians after sufficient conditions were met.368 Laciner says that Turkish
Armed Forces (TAF) was not against the democratic political system but the results. He
states that the military would not have intervened in civilian politics as long as the system
was kept fully Kemalist. Indeed, to justify the 1980 coup, TAF resorted to the Article 34
of military by-law, which commissioned the military to defend the Republic, Kemalism
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and territorial integrity of the country.369 The commander in chief of the 1980 coup,
Kenan Evren, summarized the purpose of the coup in a press conference as; "to protect
the national unity, to restore the safety of the citizens by preventing the terror and
anarchy, to restore the state authority, to restore the secular republic and finally to enable
a functional civilian rule."

He further emphasized that the path to the success is

Kemalism and its creeds.370
Once the internal anarchy and terror was quelled, TAF set to reinstate the
Kemalist ideology. TAF held the radical leftist and rightist ideologies responsible for the
setback and declared that Kemalism could only be the proper ideology for the Turks.
Therefore, a comprehensive re-Kemalization attempt was initiated. The year of 1981 was
declared the years of Kemalism, new institution and books were initiated. Ataturk’s name
was given to streets, roads, stadiums and buildings.371
The new constitution was written in 1982 and was overwhelmingly accepted in a
national referendum, in which Kenan Evren was elected president and the National
Security Council gained even more power over the rule of the country. The NSC halted
all political activities (in October 16, 1981) and eventually banned political parties (in
October 1982), detaining their members and members of the Parliament. The Provisional
Article 4 banned those chairmen of the political parties from engaging in political
activities for the next ten years. 4).372 The next political elections were set to take place in
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1983 with the participation of those political parties that would get permission from the
National Security Council.373
5.3 The 1980s and Rise of Ozal
The reason why Ozal rose to power deserves scrutiny because it is also closely
associated with the success of the Welfare Party, (which is the subject matter of the next
chapter), and the Justice and Development Party government. That is to say, the biggest
contributing factor for success is the changing structure of the Turkish society in the 80s
and the ensuing rise of political Islam. The rise of Islam is basically the result of the
oppressive policies that the Kemalist ruling elite had imposed on the majority of
population who identify themselves as conservative.
Rasit Kasaba explains this important point in the history of Turkey;
“During the early decades of the twentieth century, the tired and defeated people
of Anatolia were in no position to debate or resist Ataturk’s radical message. Some were
even enthusiastic in supporting the national leader in his determination to remake the
Turkish state. By the 1980s, the situation had changed completely. The Turkish people,
few of whom now remembered the early years of the republic, had grown extremely
suspicious of, and downright cynical about, the latest incarnations of the promises of
‘enlightened and prosperous tomorrows.’ Instead of making further sacrifices for a future
that kept eluding them, they were starting to inquire about the histories, institutions,
beliefs, identities, and cultures from which they had been forcefully separated. This
reorientation of the social compass spread to all segments of the society, not only
affecting people’s political outlook but also influencing the way they dressed, which
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music they created and listened to, how they built their houses and office buildings, and
how they thought about the history of modern Turkey...The nature and contents of these
debates and conflicts show that as a monolithic force that tried to mold Turkish society
and mentality, Kemalism is losing its grip.”374
The above assertion “the Kemalism is losing its grip” is a significant one. The
signs of this failure are manifold. The rise of Kurdish national identity and ensuing armed
violence of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish name - PKK) against the Turkish state
further deteriorated the situation for the Kemalist elite, as the perpetuation of the Kurdish
problem meant a blow to the ‘nationalism’ principle of Kemalism. Furthermore, not only
the Kemalist understanding of nationalism, but also secularism was starting to be
questioned. It is this point that the Kemalist modernization project began to show serious
signs of failure in the early 80s.375
The goal of the founding fathers of Turkey that the new republic was going to go
through a well-organized modernity in a linear manner, which would result in the Turkish
people becoming staunchly secular and ethnically homogenous, turned out to be a
disappointment. The end result of this project was the economic backwardness, social
division, between “Muslim and secularist, Turk and Kurd, reason and faith, rural and
urban, the old and the new.” 376
One of the greatest results of the failure of the Kemalist ideology was the advent
of Turgut Ozal, who came to the forefront after the 1980 coup, and his actions during his
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tenure. Therefore, I would like to mention the coup and its impact in the Turkish politics.
The 1980 coup provided a suitable venue for Ozal’s success.377
As much as the National Security Council (NSC)/the generals banned the political
parties, it aimed at bringing new blood to the Turkish politics by introducing the
moderate right wings Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party, NDP),
whose chairman was Turgut Sunalp, a retired general, which made NDP the choice of the
Turkish Armed Forces in elections, and the moderate left Halkci Parti (Populist Party,
PP), whose founder was Nejdet Calp, Ismet Inonu’s secretary, which meant that PP was
the continuation of the People’s Republican Party. By creating two parties on the
opposite end of political spectrum, the NSC aimed at creating a stable political system in
Turkey.378 In 1983, NSC loosened the restrictions for establishing political parties albeit
making it very difficult to form them.379 The prospective parties had to receive approval
from NSC. Only Turgut Ozal’s party, the Motherland Party (MP, or ANAP) was granted
permission to enter the 1983 elections. Therefore, the race was between NDP, PP and
ANAP. To Kenan Evren’s, the coup leader, Ozal’s party won the elections by 45% of the
votes, giving his party a super majority 212 of 400 seats in the Parliament.380 Eric J.
Zurcher argues that the fact that the Army’s favorite, NDP came last in elections showed
that the Turkish people were not necessarily happy with the military intervention and saw
Ozal as the new face of politics.381
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Thus, a new era in Turkish politics began with Ozal. His premiership (1983-1989)
and presidency (1989-1993) would bring unprecedented economic, social and political
changes to Turkey. Furthermore, his novel approach to Turkish politics, the like of which
had not been seen since Menderes, was the harbinger of future revolutions in Turkish
domestic and foreign politics. The foreign policy practices he pursued would later be
called as Ozalism or neo-Ottomanism. 382 In the following section I will examine Ozal’s
personality and worldview, the changes in international system and their implications for
Turkish domestic and foreign policy practices during the Ozal Era (1983-1993)
5.4 Özal's Personality
One of Ozal’s most striking features was his diverse personality. He had
successful business practices in private industry in 1970s thus he developed a great deal
expertise and networking in business circles. This was one of the many signs that he was
an economic liberal. Ozal was also a practicing Muslim and had strong connections with
the Nakshibendi383 order of dervishes384, which helped him develop good relations with
other religious sects in Turkey. He was an internationally renowned bureaucrat. He
advised the World Bank as well as the US government and worked with the IMF. In
Turkey, he was a member of the technical Advisory Board of the Turkish Prime Ministry,
382
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and from 1967 to 1971 was under-secretary of the State Planning Organization, served as
undersecretary of the State Planning Organization.385 Laciner calls Ozal “a moderate who
could do business with everyone regardless of their social or ideological background.”386
For example, he was an Islamist candidate for the Izmir province in 1978.387
Ozal was staunchly pro-American. This was due in great part to the time he spent
in the United States after he graduated as an electrical engineer from the Istanbul
Technical University in the 1950s. His experiences in America convinced him that
liberalism was the key for American success. His time in America solidified his belief
that there were similarities between US and the Ottoman Empire. To him, both were
tolerant of different cultures, religions, nationality and economic preferences. Based on
this, he believed that the authoritarian Kemalist state in Turkey had to be revised. 388
Like Menderes, he aspired to turn Turkey into a “small” America. He went so far
as calling the Turkish bureaucracy and economy Communist for its clumsiness. He found
that the Kemalist statist understanding of economy and protectionism were the reasons
for lack of development, inefficiency and lack of competitiveness of the Turkish
economy. To him, the economic prosperity and democratic advancement coexist. He
valued individual rights, which was in contrast to Kemalist state ideology. 389
In 1979 Ozal said:
`A strong state does not mean a patriarchal state. The aim is not richness of the
state but richness of the nation. If people are rich, it means that the state is rich. In
385
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economy or political spheres the state should not compete with the people, but support
them. The people are not the servants of the state, but the state must be servant of the
people.

390

This was a different approach from the Kemalist understanding of the state

and the citizens.
Morton Abramowitz, who served as the US ambassador to Turkey between 1989
and 1991, states that Ozal needed extensive financial and political support from America
to implement his liberal economic agenda. Also, the American military aid was important
to quell the military. As will be examined, he wanted to transform Turkey into a regional
power and have a say in the newly independent Central Asia region, for which he also
needed the American support. Even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he continued to
aspire to harness the American power to realize his goals. 391
Abramowitz further states that Ozal’s perception of America went above his
politico-economic aspirations. Abramowitz says, “Ozal had become, probably because of
his time at the World Bank in Washington, somewhat infatuated with U.S and the nature
of American life. An engineer by training, he valued the dynamism, the freedom and
creativity he saw in US. On a number of occasions he talked about his hopes of
eventually seeing it emulated in Turkey. Every time I saw him but once he had TV on,
invariably CNN and he would occasionally look over to see what was playing. Ozal
valued the openness and give and take in American political life and wanted to see it in
Turkey.” 392
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5.4.1 Ozal’s Approach to Religion
Ozal’s approach to Turkish domestic politics, which is a reflection of his foreign
policy understanding, deserves scrutiny too. His approach to religion and Islam differed
greatly from his predecessors, with the exception of Adnan Menderes. His pro-Islamic
views and their application in the Turkish politics clearly run counter to the traditional
Kemalist ideology.
Ozal was known to be a pious Muslim if not Islamist. Former US ambassador to
Turkey Morton Abramowitz says Ozal was deeply religious and he did not hesitate to
display it publicly. He went to Mecca for pilgrimage along with his entourage and
regularly attended the Friday prayers, which was the first for a head of state in the history
of the Turkish republic. 393 He invited diplomatic representatives to iftar dinners during
Ramadan, which drew criticism from the secular establishment.394 He said; “I am the
Muslim prime minister of the democratic Turkey. The Republic of Turkey is secular but
personally I am not!”395
Naturally, he was tolerant of the religious orders, which are part of the religious
scenery of Turkey, although M. Kemal banned them as part of radical secularization
attempt. Ozal actually belonged to one of the orders, Nakshibendi. He gave importance to
the religious education and stated that the future bureaucrats and politicians must come
from Imam Hatips (secondary schools that educate the religious functionaries of the
future).396
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Lacin argues that Ozal’s Islam was different from either the Kemalist or the NSP
(National Salvation Party) Islam, which is more associated with Arab-Islam. His friend
and follower Cengiz Landar spelled out the difference:
`Republican secularism was inspired by French and Soviet atheism. Therefore, in
the 1920s Republican secularism became atheism. In time, Kemalist secularism became
an anti-religion and anti-Islam concept. When Turkish Islam, rooted in the Ottoman and
Seljuki Islamic cultures were suppressed by the State, Arabic Islam, which is a less
moderate, more radical version, became the leader in the world. Now when Ozal and me
visited the Turkish communities in the Balkans, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Central Asia, in
Azerbaijan, in Kazakhstan, we saw a completely different Islam from the Arab version: a
Turkified Islam - A more moderate Islam, an Islam which is suitable for liberalism and
democracy. I mean Turkish Islam is so different. Kemalists cannot accept that a country
needs religion as well, because their ideology was an imported ideology and not suitable
for Turkish cultural structure. We have to accept that Turkey is a Muslim country.397
While Ozal respected secularism, he opposed the Kemalist interpretation of it. He
favored the Anglo-Saxon secular understanding and a Turkish interpretation of Islam.
Laciner argues; “He searched for a middle-way between Islamism and Turkism, his aim
being to formulate a religious understanding which was suitable for democracy,
liberalism and capitalism.” 398
-Ozal’s view of Islam can be summarized in his word:
-“The Turk is aware that faith in itself does not affect secularism, does not
prevent him from being rational. In everyday life, there is no difference in this respect
397
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between a European Christian and a Turkish Muslim. A synthesis has been realized
between the West and Islam. The synthesis has ended the identity crisis of the Turk. I am
a believer and open to all kinds of innovations. Not having a problem of identity, I feel no
need to defend my own culture, nor attach myself to an ideology or extremist
nationalism.”399
5.4.2 Özalist Nationalism
One of Ozal’s worldviews constituted Turkism. However, Ozal’s understanding
of Turkism differed from that of Enver Pasha, who was an irredentist and that of M.
Kemal, who was an isolationist. The Ottoman Turkists aspired to establish an allinclusive Turkish empire, which would include the Turks of Russia, Iran and China. On
the contrary, M. Kemal avoided such adventurist policies and restricted his ideology with
the Turks of the new republic he founded. Therefore, Ataturk had no interest in affairs of
the Turks outside Anatolia. Laciner states that an example of this is when M. Kemal
refrained from giving support to the Azeris in the South Caucasus when the Soviets
annexed it in 1920s.400 Ozal believed that the relations with the kin states were important
but not in irredentist terms but economically, culturally and politically.
Laciner argues that Ozalist Turkist understanding, unlike that of M. Kemal, was
not a reaction to the domestic developments of Turkey. M. Kemal’s nationalism was
shaped by the secessionist movements of the minorities that created a lot of trouble in the
last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the first years of Turkey, therefore aimed at
establishing and securing the country as well as from Western aggression and Ottoman
Islamism. Ozal’s Turkism, on the other hand, embraced the diversity, Islam and it was
399
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not against the West. Laciner states that Ozal’s Turkism can be identical to that of
Americanism in the United States.401
Bilal Simsir argues that the Kurdish problem Turkey is facing today is due in
great part to the Kemalist ethno nationalism. He quotes Ismet Inonu’s speech in this
regard. Inonu said in 1925; “We are frankly nationalists… and nationalism is our only
factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of
influence. We must Turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price.”402
According to Simsir, what made things worse for the Kurdish problem was that
Islam, which held the Turks and Kurds together for centuries, was abandoned by the new
regime. 403 The Turkish modernization movement and its nationalism and secularism was
met with resistance in the early years not only among certain Muslims but also the Kurds,
who staged a series of uprisings against the new republic.

404

The Kurdish problem

resurfaced in the 1970s as the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was formed and
adopted an armed struggle against Turkey.
During

his

presidency,

Ozal

managed

to

challenge

the

Kemalist

consensus/military option and introduced new ideas and opened new realms of inquiry
and thinking. He did this almost single handedly, and often with members of his own
party opposing him. During his tenure, Ozal opposed the Kemalist policies and military
option towards the solution of the Kurdish problem single handedly. 405
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For the first time in the history of the Kurdish question, Ozal stated that the
solution would not be through military means. Ozal said: “The solution to the problem in
the South East is in freedom of speech, expression and dialogue… Not through force.
Mutual consensus, not the unilateralism, is very important if we want to solve the
problem. We need to strengthen democracy in Turkey… The key for development is
freedom. Free societies become those of productive, which eventually brings
prosperity.406
He also believed that it was thanks to these values that the U.S became a
superpower.407 His pluralist understanding went beyond the borders of Turkey as he
embraced the Kurds of Iraq when they had to flee from Saddam’s oppression during the
first Gulf War. For example he argued that Turkey would protect the Kurds as much as
the Turkomans in Iraq. He went as far as to imply a federation between the Kurds in Iraq
and Turkey.408 This certainly implied a revisionist foreign policy understanding of Ozal
when it came to the immediate neighborhood of Turkey, which for the first time brought
about the concept of “neo-Ottomanism” in Turkish foreign policy.
Özal underlined his plans for the outside Kurds in his speech in Diyarbakir, a
predominantly Kurdish region: `The people in the south east region are our brothers.
The people in the Northern Iraq are their brothers and should to be our brothers too.
Turkey just neglected the events happening in Northern Iraq in the past. For example, the
Halabje incident. We said "that's outside our frontiers; it's nothing to do with us.” This
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policy must be changed. Turkey's new policy should be as: if Baghdad commits another
barbarity there, it will find us opposing it.' 409
It is important to note that for the first time in the history of republic, a high
ranking official would openly criticize the pillars of Kemalist republic by denouncing its
perception of nationalism, and secularism. The neo-Ottomanist tone in Ozal’s policies
can be found in his speech in 1993. Ozal stated that the Turkish Republic must reconcile
with its Ottoman past. While debasing the CUP, thanks to which Ataturk was able to
establish his place against the Istanbul administration, Ozal highly praised the Sultan
Abdulhamid II. In the same speech, he also reiterated the important of freedom of speech
regarding the Islamic and Kurdish identity.410 This speech clearly underscores the huge
differences between the traditional pacific policies and Özal's activist Kurdish policy.
He emphasized that Turkey’s Ottoman past is its most precious asset. He argues
that only by embracing its Ottoman past can the Turkish republic overcome its domestic
problems and those issues that rage across its borders.411 Therefore, he criticized the
traditional National Pact “Misak-i Milli” which stressed protecting the existing borders
without giving any room for expansionist movements. Moreover, he criticized Turkey’s
highly centralized governance style arguing Turkey can best be governed with the state
system (eyelet system) where local authorities would have more administrative power.
He also proposed a presidential system, like the one in America.
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He even argued that the Ottoman heritage granted Turkey great power to control
the region.413 To Ozal, “the Misak-I Milli borders that Turkey has now sooner or later is
going to change. If Turkey remains status quo oriented, the change will be against the
Turkish interests. Therefore Turkey has to pursue a pro-active foreign policy.”414
He further implied that the only solution to the Kurdish problem and other matters
in the Middle East was a federation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, which was
considered as the resurgence of the Ottoman Empire by the leftist groups in Turkey. For
Özal, Ottoman political and cultural systems could be a perfect model for 20th century
Turkey. For example, his eyalet sistemi (state system), the localization of the
administration, and the presidential system suggestions were all inspired by the Ottoman
past.
While Ozal viewed the West an important part of modern world he believed
Turks did not need to be ashamed of their civilization, because Turkish/Islamic
civilization was not a lower civilization, but one of the many advanced civilizations in the
world: “The Turks living in this territory for a thousand years, have inherited some part
of culture of every civilization which flourished here since prehistory. They have evolved
a synthesis derived from the cultural legacy of Anatolia, from the culture they brought
with them from Central Asia, and from the Muslim religion. Their talent for synthesis and
their ecumenical character has enabled them to blend these three strands together. ' 415
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5.4.3 The Socio-Demographic Impact of Ozal
Upon taking office on December 13, 1983, Ozal promptly began implementing
his economic policies that combined economic liberalization with fiscal and monetary
austerity. His stated intention was to reduce inflation, promote economic growth through
exports, attract sorely needed foreign investment and shrink the state’s large role in the
economy. He eased some of the restraints on importing and exporting. This helped
loosen restrictions on the economy by fortifying Turkey’s stability payments. There were
new standards for imports as well as motivations for exporting.

Regulations for

importing were re-defined and unless specified on a list of prohibited imports were free to
enter.

This helped make the duty lower or removed completely. Exports were further

encouraged by making licensing easier and less bureaucracy involvement. Exporters
earnings increased by 15% and additional incentives were given for companies exporting
over $30 million. Acceptance of foreign currency at commercial banks and freedom for
the Turkish people to carry and travel with foreign currency was established. Daily
exchange rate adjustments helped keep exports competitive. Ozal recognized the need for
change in the economic structure hindered by the omnipresent role of the government.416
Thanks to Ozal’s liberalization policies, the Turkish economy began to change for
the better. The GNP increased by 5.4% in the 1980-89 period compared to 3.3% in 197580. As of 1990, the relative involvement in trade was better than those of Greece and
Spain and not so far behind that of Italy. 417
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The Turkish exports rose from $2.9 billion in 1980 to more than 20 billion dollars
in 1990, which corresponds to a whopping 350% increase in a decade. 418 The share of
export in GNP was about 20% in 1987, which was a triple increase in export share in
eight years. Also, the average annual rate of growth export earnings increased by 18.9 in
1980-88 period. 419 Imports rose from $ 7,909 million in 1980 to $ 22.5 billion in 1990,
which was a 182% increase. The tourism industry boomed in this period. While the
tourism revenues were $212 million in 1980, in 1990, it corresponded to more than 3
billion dollars. 420
At this point, it is essential to note the impact of Ozal’s economic liberalism and
its ensuing effect on the Turkish society due to the fact that this impact would in later
decades shape the domestic political outlook, giving rise of the conservative periphery,
which challenged the Kemalist elite and status quo.
5.4.4 The Socio-Demographic Earthquake and its Impact on the Turkish Politics
The economic and political reforms carried out under Prime Minister Turgut Ozal
in the mid-1980’s also contributed to strengthening the role of Islamic groups. The
Ozalist reforms loosened the state control over economy, giving rise to the predominantly
non-Kemalist masses in such cities in Anatolia as Denizli, Gaziantep and Kayseri. The
new economic environment created a new middle class called “Anatolian bourgeoisie”
who has a strong sense of Islamic identity. The new group supported liberal economic
policies, limited state intervention in economy and social spheres such as greater religious
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freedom. Thanks to theis emerging group, the Welfare Party and eventually the AKP
came to power, changing the domestic and foreign political atmosphere in Turkey
radically. 421
The conservative religious businessmen and their companies, also called the
Anatolian Tigers, were inspired from the notion that Islam and its prophet emphasized the
importance of commerce in blessed gain (helal kazanc). This movement of the rising
Anatolian elite is also called “Islamic Calvinism”. 422 The supporters of this movement
adopt the Protestant ethics of religious merit of work and the importance of saving and
education. The new rising elite contributed greatly to the changing nature of the Turkish
politics. It is important to note that the ideology of the new elite is considerably differed
from classical Kemalist ideology that prevailed in the 20th century Turkey. The
divergence stemmed from the fact that the new elite, unlike the Kemalists, harbored the
Ottoman imperial nostalgia, supported laissez faire economics, non-intervention of the
state and importance of small business. All these were combined with the conservative
values. 423
Another important result of the Ozalist policies was that the Arab capital began to
flow into Turkey. Moreover, Ozal, by nature, advocated religious freedom and allowed
for the opening of religious schools. During his time the conservative Turks gained
greater access to higher education, economy, media and politics.424 Probably the most
impacting change in the Turkish society was the influx of conservative Turks into big
421
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cities like Istanbul and Ankara and rapid urbanization,425 all of which was due in great
part to the Ozalist liberal policies. Naturally, the rural to urban influx meant the
ideological change of the cities, as they brought with them their habits, beliefs and
customs. The Kemalist elite and the Anatolian migrants began to live side by side, which
began to create social tensions, especially in application of secularism.426
Hakan Yavuz concludes that the AKP’s success in early 2000s was due in great
part to the rise of the new conservative elite, especially during the Ozal era, in which the
social mobility became available. The symbiotic relationship between the Kemalist state
and the large Istanbul-based capitalists had been based on a secular agreement and the
Kemalist ideology. The new rising elite constituted a challenge and an alternative to it. 427
Having scrutinized the conditions and events that preceded the Ozal era as well
Ozal’s rise to power and his ideology, I proceed with the implication of these on the
foreign policy of Turkey during the Ozal period.
5.5 Ozalism in Foreign Policy
The most important international event that took place during Ozal’s tenure was
undoubtedly the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The end of the Cold War and ensuing
developments in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Central Asia as well as the Middle
East, as Hasan Kosebalaban puts, “forced Turkey to face its historical, cultural and
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religious legacy in its surrounding regions”428 This was in contrast with the Kemalist
ideology. The newly emerging Turkic states, the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the
Caucasus that impacted the Muslims and the Turks living there prompted the need for a
more pro-active foreign policy. Kosebalaban concludes "no matter how hard Turkey tried
to escape from its imperial legacy, it has always come back to haunt it.” 429
As Graham Fuller reminds us, geopolitical change in post-Cold War era has made
physiological and cultural dynamics among the nations much more important and
aroused sentiments, perceptions and aspirations regarding group identity. Fuller notes;
“Without history and psychology... the Balkans is meaningless. It is language and myth,
not rivers, mountains, or raw materials that link the Turkish shores of the Mediterranean
to the shores of Lake Baikal over the rivers of Western China -- in the real political
sense.” 430
As has been seen throughout this dissertation, despite some differences, the path
all Turkish governments have chosen was integration with the West. The locus of the
Kemalist foreign policy was always pro-Western. For the Kemalists, integration with the
Western world was a matter of life and death. It was not only base of Turkish security
and foreign policy but also a security for the secular regime. Therefore the end of the
Cold War made most Turks panic. The simplest explanation was that: `Now, the West
does not need us. Hereafter they will not give any financial, political and military aid.
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Similarly, the EEC, which had implied cultural biases in its Turkey policy, will close
down its doors to Turkey. Turkey separated from the `civilized world' (the West), will be
alone with the traditional enemy, Russia, and the regional conflicts, poverty, instability.
Regional instability will undermine Turkish economy and integrity and all the foreign
powers will work to disunite Turkey. Kemalists, who believed that the end of the Cold
War threatened the Turkish economy, security and democracy, suggested returning to the
early Republican policy of isolation. They further argued that after the Cold War, the
West's aim was to disintegrate Turkey as witnessed in Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. For
the Kemalists and other isolationists, the Kurdish problem and the European refusal of
the Turkish application for the European Union were clear signs for the Western
intention. Kemalists argued that separatist Kurds were encouraged by the EU countries.
The geopolitical realignment in the post-Cold War era had the Kemalist worried.
According to this belief, Turkey, which played a vital important role during the cold war
against the Soviet threat, was losing its importance for the west, which would mean that
the West might abandon Turkey, which would be detrimental for Turkey’s westward
ideology and democracy. The new geopolitical environment in Turkey’s neighborhood
would throw Turkey in the pit of newly emerging conflicts, which in turn would wreak
havoc on Turkey financially and politically. One of the biggest concerns was that the
Kurdish insurgency would result in the Kurdish secession thus break up of Turkey; such
was the case in Yugoslavia. The solution that the Kemalist elite proposed was
isolationism.431 However, Ozal adopted a proactive approach in foreign policy.
A new sense of awareness and sympathy among several groups (those Turks who
share their culture and language in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Muslim
431
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Balkan people) have been brought to light via strong political friendships. These people
considered Turkey as a great source of support, both morally and materially, as they
transition to life after Communism. This led the leaders of those republics in Central Asia
that speak Turkic and Azerbaijan in the east plus Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania to
visit Ankara in 1991 and 1992 in order to utilize the power of the new political alliances
for their political and economic needs.432
Conflicts within the region such as Karabagh and the Bosnia crisis were the
reason for the mutual awareness leading these countries to look for support from Turkey.
Because there was no competition between communists and capitalists, superpowers
were not lending their support. In order for these nations to receive military and political
support, cultural and ethnic similarities were important. Fuller claims that “neogeopolitics” mobilized psychological and cultural dynamics among the countries. 433 Due
to this, the group identity created by relationships between countries and cultures became
crucial to international relations. Because of the areas’ multi-cultural structures, this was
even more important in the Balkans and Caucasia. If this theory is true, then it was
unavoidable for cultural polarization leading to the area around Turkey being the most
dangerous in the world. The approaches used may be correct or not, but this question is
beyond the extension of this study, yet obviously Turkey has become attractive for the
Turks, Muslims, and those considering themselves to be of the former Ottoman Empire.
We saw an example of this when Turkey served as an ally for the Muslim peoples of the
country formerly known as Yugoslavia while Greece and Russia supported the Serbs. We
also saw this when the Azerbaijanis requested support from their “Muslim, Turkish
432
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brothers” while Russia lent their support to the Armenians. In addition Ankara was the
meeting point in the midst of the Cold War for the leaders of the Turkic world, Bosnia,
Albania, and Macedonia to seek out help for their countries’ economic and political
problems. 434
One of the positive outcomes of the fall of the Soviet bloc for Turkey was the
emergence of new regimes. Once hostile to Turkey due to treatment to its Turkish
minority, Bulgaria as well as Romania and Albania revised their attitudes towards
Turkey. Not to mention the Turkic republics of former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan decided to take Turkey as their role model in their transition.
Therefore, political and economic relations between these republics and Turkey increased
dramatically.435
5.5.1 Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC)
One of the most striking examples of Ozal's pro-active and ambitious foreign
policy was the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992,
which aimed to establish institutionalized relationship between the former communist
bloc countries.436 The BSEC was established with the Turkish leadership and was Ozal’s
idea. The objective was to stabilize the region by utilizing economic incentives while
opening new trade routes for the Turkish entrepreneurs.437 The BSEC marks an important
policy endeavor of Ozal because it symbolizes the novice pro-active foreign policy.
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On June 25, 1992, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece,
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine signed the declaration of Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) citing the importance of multilateral cooperation and the
principles of market economy. Taking advantage of their geographical proximity, the
signatory parties pledged to establish constructive and peaceful relations promoting
democratic and human rights values.438 Furthermore, fight against violence, terrorism is
among other goals of the organization. 439
For Ozal, cultural dimension was also important. During his trips to respective
BSEC countries, he signed cultural protocols, which aimed at increasing cooperation in
education, language and science. Turkey further gave aid to much poorer countries such
as Georgia and Macedonia. Laciner argues that some countries used the agreement as
leverage to their adversaries. For example, Turkey became a source of credit for Albania
and a balancing power against Greece.440
Valinakis draws an interesting point to Turkey’s initiative. He argues that one of
Ozal’s goals was to increase Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the European Union and increase
its influence in the Black sea basin and the Transcaucasia. He states that Turkey wanted
to establish an alternative project to the European Union.441 However, those who oppose
this proposition argue that by endeavoring in such an ambitious project, Turkey hoped to
strengthen its prospects of full EU membership. This too was confirmed by the Turkish
under-secretary, who argued that it was not an alternative but catalysis for Turkey’s EU
438
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membership.

442

Membership of Greece, who has traditionally vetoed Turkey’s EU

membership, to the BSEC can be seen in this context. 443
Laciner argues that BSEC is the epitome of Turkey’s pro-active foreign policy
understanding. Unlike Ataturk and Inonu’s security oriented, cautious and to certain
degree isolationist foreign policies, which later came to be known as traditional Turkish
foreign policy, Ozal always attempted to be proactive, taking advantage of the new
geopolitical atmosphere. 444
5.5.2 The Balkans and Turkey: The Resurgence of the Ottoman Empire?
For Ozal, the Balkans was as much important as the Black Sea basin as once was
part of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Kosova, Macedonia, Bosnia and Albania have
significant Muslim populations, which was an incentive for Ozal to establish close
relations with these republics. Laciner states that Albania and Macedonia turned their
faces to Turkey in their transition as well as in terms of their conflictual relations with
Serbia and Greece. Furthermore, Ozal aimed to establish telecommunication and
transport systems to connect the Balkan states with Turkey, making the latter a regional
hub. 445
The crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s showed that the Turkish foreign policy
under Ozal was different from the Kemalist one in that the former was proactive.
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republic of Central Asia. In the summit, Ozal negotiated with the leaders of the Western
European countries447 and lobbied for NATO intervention in Yugoslavia to protect
Bosnians.448 Turkey sent $22 million in official aid to Bosnia and lobbied in the UN as
well.449 He pursued active policy in the Organization of Islamic Countries for Bosnia.
Furthermore, in his Balkan tour February 15-22, 1993, he tried to unite the Croats and the
Bosniaks against the Serbian forces and negotiated with Bulgaria, Albania, and
Macedonia to open their air space for the Turkish warplanes.450
It can be said that on the contrary to the Kemalist understanding, Ozal’s Balkan
policy especially that of Bosnia was based on religious and cultural reasons. Ozal aspired
to make Turkey a pivot country in the Balkans. Ozal once stated; “Turkey is responsible
for looking after the well-being of the Muslims in the Balkans”

451

This assertion of

Ozal’s clearly runs counter to Kemalist understanding, which does not establish foreign
policy on religious or cultural basis. This marks that Özal attempted to change another
column of traditional Turkish foreign policy. Finally, all Turkish initiatives in the region
of Turkey had been defensive. 452
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5.5.3 From the Adriatic to the ‘Chinese Wall’: Turkey as a Development Model for the
‘Turkic World’
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and emergence of Turkic states as
independent entities paved the way for Turkey to establish relations with them. Turkey
under Ozal pursued to become a role model for those republics. 453
One of the strongest incentives for Ozal’s Central Asian policy was pan-Turkist
aspirations. To Landau, Turkey’s grand project was to institutionalize its relations with
the “Turkic Brethren.”454 According to this, Turkey initiated Economic Co-Operation
Organization (ECO).
In his speech at the Izmir Economic Fair of 1992, Ozal said: “Turkey has gifted
geopolitics. In ten years we will have a big enough population that will help us to be a
great power. This will make us the second biggest country in Europe. The next ten years
is very important for Turkey. Those Muslim and Turkic countries that stretch from the
Balkans to the Central Asia and us ought to advance our capabilities to become stronger
and more prosperous. If we could use this opportunity well enough and advance
cooperation, we and our brothers will become stronger. These opportunities have been
granted to us by Allah. We need to realize our potential and realize our goals to become
stronger.”455
As opposed to the Kemalist isolationism, Ozal proposed that Turkey had
indispensable interests in such regions as the Balkans, Middle East, The Caucasus, the
Central Asia even as far as western China, where Uighurs, who are of Turkic origin, live.
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Turkey’s engagement with the new Turkic states marked a radical departure from its
traditional foreign policy and eased its perception of isolated position in foreign affairs.
What is more important about the new active foreign policy was that it helped Turkey to
overcome its cultural isolation and identity dilemma. Turkey for the first time felt that the
Western culture is not the only one it can turn to. For the first time, Turkey adopted
“Turkist” foreign policy, which to Kemalists was not a priority. This ‘Turkic’ opening
was surely of Ozal’s initiative but one has to take into consideration that the relations
with Central Asia only became possible after the withdrawal of the Soviet hegemony in
early 1990s.456
As Eric Rouleau put it `Mustafa Kemal distanced Turkey from Turkish-speaking
populations, abroad, arguing that Ankara should not meddle in the internal affairs of
foreign states, just as he had dissociated the young republic from the Islamic world. It
was his way of tying the young republic more closely to the West’457
Furthermore, M. Kemal completely distanced Turkey from any type of panTurkic aspirations which he deemed adventurist. He believed such policies are ‘illusions’
and ‘vague sentiments about some nebulous Turkic homeland.’ 458
This in mind, whereas Ozal was pursuing ambitious and proactive foreign policy
taking advantage of reorientation of the geopolitical structure of the new world, the
traditional Kemalist elite were still suspicious of this type of engagement.459 When, for
example, Ozal was making such statements as ‘the 21st century will be a Turkish
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century,”460 which emphasizes the prospect of the rise of Turkish leadership, the then
prime minister Suleyman Demirel, who himself can be considered as Kemalist, stated the
following: “It would be a great mistake to evaluate Turkey’s assistance as the pursuit of
a policy of pan-Turkism or a bid to extend regional influence… Turkey is not seeking a
monopolistic hegemony over relations with these states. On the contrary, its aim is to
increase their ties with the outside world. In short, Turkey believes that it can help these
republics in their long overdue attempt to integrate with the world and at the same time
help them stand on their own feet….”461
Turkism, Islamism, liberalism and American type democracy were important to
Ozal and he believed the Kemalist worldview was not compatible with these. One of the
most prominent journalists in Turkey, Cengiz Candar argues that Ozal represented
society’s discontent with certain Kemalist principles as secularism, nationalism and
etatism. While M. Kemal aspired to completely Turkify the population and keep the
religion under strict control of the state, Ozal wanted a Muslim, democratic, liberal,
capitalist society in which different ethnicities and religions are tolerated.
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he was buried not in a state cemetery. He now lies near by those who were hanged by the
state, like Menderes''.463
In October 1992, Turkey invited the presidents of Azerbaijan (Ebulfez Elchibey),
Kazakhstan (Nursultan Nazarbayev), Kyrgzistan (Askar Akayev), Uzbekistan (Islam
Karimov), and Turkmenistan (Safarmurad Niyazov) to Ankara for celebrations on the
anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Ozal emphasized the notion
of the co-operation by saying: “This cooperation of ours is beneficial for our people and
region. Therefore, it is a contribution to regional and global peace and stability. No one
should have undue worries or qualms. Let no one misunderstand us… Our policy, our cooperation is not detrimental to anyone, and will not be so in the future either. We are
only concerned about the welfare of our peoples and the region. We believe that the
closer we get to that goal the more will we have served regional and world peace. In our
opinion this is a mission in the name of humanity and as such should be applauded.”464
One of the most ambitious endeavors Ozal had undertaken was the establishment
of the Turkish International Co-operation Agency (TIKA) in early 1992, which aimed at
improving relations among the Turkic republics by promoting democratic values,
economic reforms, improving telecommunication and transportation, privatizing public
enterprises and establishing companies as well providing education. 465
Another venue for cooperation was the Turkic States and Turkic People’s
Friendship and Cooperation Group, which was established in Antalya in March 1993. Its
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motto was, 'Dilde, fikirde, iste birlik” (Unity in language, ideology and action), which
attracted criticism from Moscow for its having pan-Turkic overtones. 466
During his numerous visits to the central Asian republics, Ozal had signed
bilateral agreements from education to health. Moreover, Turkey gave credit to newly
independent Turkic states and accepted some ten thousands students to universities in
Turkey. 467
The Turkish state radio and television organization, TRT, started its broadcast to
regions under the Avrasya (Euroasia) program. The flag carrier Turkish Airlines
immediately established flights to Baku, Alma-Ati, Tashkent, Ashkhabad and Bishkek.
Turkish Exim bank and other Turkish banks gave about $7 billion in credits to
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Krgyzstan.468 Being a liberal,
Ozal encouraged bilateral private investment, particularly in the education, media, and
telecommunication and textile sectors.
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This was a turning point in Turkey's sceptic

world perception and underlined the effects of the new Turkist policies.
5.6 The Gulf War: Return of Activism and Özalism vs. Kemalist Bureaucracy
Probably the second most important development in international arena after the
collapse of the Berlin Wall was the US invasion of Iraq in 1991, which had substantial
implication in Turkish foreign policy. Not only did the invasion prove that Turkey still
played an important geostrategic role in the region, it also created a rift between the
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Kemalist policy makers and Ozal. Therefore, this section will examine the Gulf War of
1991 and its implications in the Turkish foreign policy.
As was discussed earlier, the way the Turkish state machine approached the
Muslim world in general and the Middle East in particular was indicative of the Kemalist
foreign policy approach, which had been to stay away from the affairs of the Middle East
as much as possible. However, Ozal’s approach to the region was completely off line
with Kemalism. Even before 1991, Ozal emphasized the importance of improving with
the Arab and the Muslim world.
He personally played an important role in vitalizing the Turkish investments in
the region as well in attracting the petro-dollars in Turkey. 470 The Gulf War displayed
Ozal’s pro-American foreign policy. As Faroz Ahmad puts it; ‘Ozal took matters into his
own hands and placed the country squarely behind President George W. Bush's
policy’.471 He believed that it was Turkey’s moral obligation to support the coalition.
Besides legal considerations, Ozal wanted to show the world that Turkey still was a
strategic western ally in the post-Cold War era. What is really controversial about Ozal’s
foreign policy during the Gulf War from the Kemalist perspective was that he did not shy
away from making revisionist remarks about the future of Iraq. He believed; ‘The Middle
East was in the midst of irreversible change and it was, therefore vital for Turkey to be in
a position to take full benefit from future opportunities.’
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be the same after this crisis...I also mean geographic borders... If there is a better place
for us in this changing world then we must take this.'473
Oktay Eski, a prominent journalist, stated; "(Ozal) had two objectives. The first
was to include Kirkuk and Mosul within Turkey's borders and the second was to establish
a federation between Turkey and the northern Iraqi Kurds. He had convinced himself of
this so much that he had said `I will not be reluctant to send soldiers and warships to the
Gulf if necessary.'474
Although, Ozal was determined to pursue such a foreign policy, the traditional
policymakers and foreign ministry bureaucrats in Ankara were reluctant about his
policies and perceived adventurist and risking Turkey’s national security by dragging the
country into the war. He bypassed them in his communication with the White House. 475
Erdal İnönü, Ismet Inonu’s son, a staunch Kemalist, who served as the deputy
prime minister between 1991 and 1993, accused Ozal for being a revisionist and
criticized Ozal’s desire for a cross-border intervention into North Iraq. He said in the
parliamentary session on August 12, 1990 that: “We are against such actions no matter
what. We cannot launch a military action against another country unless attacked. The
entire foreign policy concept of the Republic of Turkey is based on this principle. I see
that Ozal aims to change this. He slipped it out of his mouth. The fundamental issue when
the republic was established was the preservation of the existing borders and it was the
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right thing to do. Ozal hints that the War of Independence is long over, it was then, it is
now. This notion is wrong.”476
Inonu’s following remarks bear the classic status quo preserving nature of the
Kemalist foreign policy. He goes on saying: “Don’t you remember how the WWI brought
calamity to our nation? We entered the war hastily. A few people dragged the nation to a
catastrophe without the consent of the parliament of that time. Those few may have done
it out of good intention and their intention may have been to ‘regain the losses’. But, the
result was evident. What is happening now is not much different from what happened
then. Hoping to make gains and elevate Turkey’s position in the west, Mr. Ozal wants to
make Turkey part of the invading coalition, which I believe is an action that will bring no
good to our nation.”477
The remarks of Suleyman Demirel, who was the member of the parliament and
later the prime minister and the president of Turkey, reflect a more cautious, traditional
foreign policy making. Like Inonu, he criticized Ozal for being adventurist and
lampooned his desire to regain Mosul and Kirkuk. “The world will not reconcile Mosul
and Kirkuk in Turkey’s favor when the rest of the world is trying to save Kuwait from
Saddam. The oil in this area is worth 20 billion dollars. Do you think they would let
Turkey sit on this wealth? Let’s not be duped by this. Such changes occur in much larger
system changes (conjuncture changes) and the world is not ready for this… I would not
ask the parliament for a motion for a cross border military operation.”478
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The member of the Kemalist Republican Party (PRP), Kemal Anadol’s statement
is also an important reflection of the Kemalist foreign policy. He said: “The founder of
this parliament Mustafa Kemal Ataturk says ‘the decision to go to war must be made out
of grave necessity. Otherwise it is akin to suicide.’ And, he established the republic’s
foreign policy on this premise. If the motion for the cross border action is to be accepted,
it means we are leaving this traditional Ataturkcu (Kemalist) policy. Turkey will then be
remembered as the invader. The very members of parliament, which was established by
Ataturk don’t have the right to violate his policies, we cannot commit this crime. Our
peace-seeking foreign policy would be the thing of the past.”479
What really was the straw that broke the camel’s back among the Kemalist circle
in Ankara was Ozal’s executive order to cut off the oil pipelines that carried oil from the
north Iraq to Turkey’s Mediterranean shore in Adana. Upon this decision, then foreign
minister Ali Bozer resigned on October 12, 1990,480 which was followed by the Defense
Minister Sefa Giray’s on December 18.481 The actions of these individuals demonstrated
the friction between the two ideologies in Ankara and that although Ozal occupied the
executive office, the bureaucracy largely remained loyal to the Kemalist principles.
While the civilians opposed Ozal, so did the Kemalist military. Ozal did
something unprecedented at the National Security Council (NSC) of August 3, 1990, in
which the Gulf crisis was the main agenda. He openly went against and criticized the
Kemalist leading politicians and the military officials and blamed them for being too
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cautious. He believed that Turkey had to send boots on the ground in Iraq along with the
United States. The following statement of Ozal can be considered as his overt criticism to
overly cautious and sometimes ‘timid’ Kemalist foreign policy. He said that ‘Many things
have changed in Turkey…In foreign policy the days of taking a cowardly and timid
position are over. From now on we’ll pursue an active policy based on circumstances.
This is a totally apolitical choice.’ 482
One of the most striking results of Ozal’s defiance to the resisting Kemalist bloc
in Ankara was the Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay’s resignation on December 3, 1990.
Torumtay vehemently criticized Ozal for being an adventurist.483 The Turkish public met
the resignation with a great deal of bewilderment as this kind of occurrence had never
happened before in the history of the republic.484 A civilian politician for the first time
trumped over the ‘mighty’ military. According to Özal, the generals were resisting the
change: `Some generals are not keeping in step and are acting to preserve the status quo.
While we are taking brave steps forward, they are trying to put the brakes on. '485
The president Özal declared Turkey's new foreign policy position as follows:
`Many things have changed in Turkey... In foreign policy the days of taking a cowardly
and timid position are over. From now we will pursue an active policy based on
circumstances...486 My conviction is that Turkey should leave its former passive and
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hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy... The reason I made this call is
because we are a powerful country in the region. Let me also point out that there are
conservatives who prefer that no change should be made to these passive policies. The
reason these circles accuse me of dragging the country into an adventure is because I
generally prefer to pursue a more dynamic policy for our country.’ 487
Ozal defended his Gulf policies by saying that “we are going to bet one and get
three!”488 In spite of Ozal’s eagerness, Turkey did not send troops alongside the US to
invade Iraq mostly because of the reluctance of the public opinion. However, Turkey
contributed effectively via the Incirlik Air Force base.489 This in turn can be considered
as Ozal’s failure to win over the Kemalist bureaucracy and establishment in Ankara.
Robins noted that Turkey's importance was underlined by the war, and
particularly the Americans understood that Turkey was a vital country for American
interests in the Middle East. He said: `The action of President Özal in helping to isolate
and confront the Iraqi regime greatly endeared him to the US administration and the
White House. This in turn brought benefits on a wide front - from greater access to
American markets for Turkish textiles to help in improving the quality of military
hardware possessed by the armed forces. The US now appears to place greater value on
the importance of Turkey than before.’490
Although the Gulf War once again proved that Turkey still continues to be an
important player in the region,491 it had detrimental effects too. One striking result was
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the exacerbation of Turkey’s Kurdish problem. Not only one million Iraqi-Kurds, who
fled from Saddam’s repression, put a burden on Turkey but the no fly zone that was
imposed north of 36th parallel in North Iraq created a safe haven for the PKK terrorists.
The PKK began to establish training bases in North Iraq, from which it had orchestrated
terror attacks within Turkey. The fact that the PKK problem had spilled into another
country made it very difficult for Turkey to solve the problem, as it became an
international issue. Furthermore, the PKK issue began to contribute to the securitization
of Turkish politics.492 Over the next decade, Turkey had conducted numerous crossborder incursions into Iraq in order to destroy the terror camps only to no avail.
Furthermore, with the invasion of and the subsequent destabilization of Iraq, Turkey lost
one of its trade partners in the region, which cost Turkey billions of dollars in trade
damages. 493 While it can be said that in the aftermath of the Gulf War Turkey had lost
more than it gained economically and politically, what it showed is that Ozal pursued a
very unorthodox foreign policy, abandoning traditional Kemalist approach to issues.494
5.7 Conclusion
Ozal, besides Menderes, was probably the most unconventional figure in the
Turkish politics in the 20th century, Ozal pursued policies, both domestic and foreign, that
ran counter to the traditional Kemalist worldview. His unprecedented activism and
pragmatist approach to domestic and foreign affairs was one of the most striking features
of Ozal. He repeatedly criticized the stagnant and reactive nature of the Kemalist
paradigm. While his personality and worldview played a great role in his active foreign
492
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policy understanding, what really facilitated Ozal’s active pursuit of foreign policy was
the end of the rigid Cold War international system, which he openly deemed an
unprecedented opportunity for Turkey to wake up from almost a century long
‘hibernation’ and be active to bring back the ‘glorious days’ of the Ottoman Empire, thus
the Neo-Ottomanism.
The collapse of the Communist bloc and the independence of the Turkic republics
in Central Asia and the Caucasus as well as the developments in the Balkans were
important defining factors in Ozal’s foreign policy making. He believed that the newly
independent Turkic republics needed Turkey for guidance in their transformation from
Communism to Capitalism in social, economic and political life. Clearly, what motivated
Ozal was the shared history and culture with those states, which is the reminiscence of
pan-Turkist ideals. This type of policy understanding ran counter to the Kemalist foreign
policy, which interestingly prompted criticism from the Kemalist establishment, who
often opposed foreign policy that is based on culture and religion. Whereas the implosion
of the Soviet Union sent shock waves across the members of the Kemalist establishment
with the perception that Turkey’s no longer an important entity for the West, it actually
excited Ozal as he considered it to be a once in a life time opportunity.
Ozal was not an Islamist but he was a practicing Muslim. His reactions to the
sufferings of Muslims in Bosnia, Azerbaijan and Chechenia were different from those
Kemalist bureaucrats and politicians, who were more cautious towards the conflict prone
zones in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Although never was able to materialize help, he
did not hesitate to use military rhetoric towards the Bosnian and Azeri-Armenian conflict
hoping to take important part in the prospective solution that would favor the Muslims.
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This clearly was not something that the isolationist and cautious Kemalist foreign policy
makers would entertain.
Another important aspect of Ozal was his staunch pro-American stance. He
believed that adoption of American type political and economic liberalism, nationalism
and American understanding of secularism would solve Turkey’s domestic and foreign
problems and boost Turkey in the world arena. This once again created friction between
him and the Kemalists, who by nature are elitist, ethnic nationalists and rigidly secular.
For example, his solution to the Kurdish problem was the American type multiculturalism, which recognizes the cultural differences for peaceful coexistence as
opposed to the Kemalist nationalism, which rejects cultural pluralism in favor of ethnocentric Turkish nationalism.
One of the most striking manifestations of the Ozalian pro-Americanism took
place during the Gulf War of 1991. It also reflected his view of Turkey in the post bipolar international system. According to this, the US was now the sole superpower and
siding with America in its invasion of Iraq will be in Turkey’s favor. His unconditional
support for America once again exposed the gap between the Kemalist establishments.
He overtly stated his intentions to annex Mosul and Kirkuk, which once were Ottoman
cities, in the wake of the collapse of the central government in Iraq. Although it never
materialized due to considerable resistance from the Kemalist military and bureaucracy, it
clearly showed that Ozal would not hesitate to pursue revisionist policies vis-à-vis the
neighbors, a concept the Kemalists have adamantly avoided. Subsequently, for the first
time in the history of Turkey, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Necip
Torumtay, resigned in opposition to Ozal’s pro-American Iraq policies.
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With his worldview, personality coupled with the new world order in the postCold War, Ozal clearly brought an unprecedented change to foreign policy by reorienting
Turkey’s priorities, which included incorporation of such new dimensions as liberal
politics and economy, democracy, Islam, Turkishness. He was very comfortable with
Turkey’s Ottoman Islamic and Turkish past and did not hesitate to accept them as
Turkey’s assets in her pursuit to be a member of the European club. For the first time the
concept of Neo-Ottomanism was introduced to denote the Turkish foreign policy. He
introduced a multi-dimensional, proactive, more economy and culture oriented foreign
policy.
While Ozal had criticized Kemalism for being inefficient for the needs of the
country in a new era, he did not take on the institutions and bureaucracy due to the fact
that there was still a power disparity between him and the Kemalist establishment in
favor of the latter. For example, he had failed to have the Turkish high ranking officers
agree with him to enter Iraq. He complained about the clumsiness of the foreign
bureaucracy. Therefore, although wanted, Ozal could not bring a paradigm shift in
Turkish foreign policy.
However, Ozal’s rise to power heralded the impending triumph of the
conservative/Islamic periphery over the Kemalist ‘core’. However, his premature death in
1993 resulted in Turkey going back to the status quo. The immediate aftermath of the
Ozal era was marked by political leadership crisis, corruption and increased PKK
terrorism. It was this atmosphere that gave rise to Necmeddin Erbakan, a staunch Islamist
and representative of the periphery.
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Goals and Priorities of the Ozalist Policies
• Neo-Ottomanism
o Aspiration for Turkey to become a leading state of the Muslims in the
former Ottoman territories such as the Kurds in Iraq, Bosnians in the
Balkans and the Azeris in the Caucasus.
o Pro-Ottomanist Rhetoric
• Pro-Islamic (More emphasize on the Turkic-Muslims in the Balkans, the
Caucasus and the Central Asia, rather than the Middle East)
• Revisionist
o Intention to annex Mosul and Kirkuk
• Proactive Foreign Policy
o The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Balkan Policies
(Especially in Bosnia)
• Pan-Turkism/nation building
o The Central Asia and Caucasus
• Aspiration to make Turkey a regional power
• Pro-Western (especially America)
• Pluralist/inclusive (Proposed solution to Kurdish problem and the approach to the
Kurds in Iraq)
• More emphasize on the economy (Liberal domestic, pro-EU policies)
• Aspiration to implement de-centralization in local governance.
Instruments of the Ozalist Foreign Policy
• The Executive Branch (The post-1989 Presidency of Ozal)
In the next chapter I will examine the Erbakan era Turkish foreign policy and its
contribution to the rise of the AKP government.
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CHAPTER 6. THE ERBAKAN ERA (1996-1997)
6.1 Introduction
Necmeddin Erbakan’s (1926-2011) rise in politics in the early 1960s was the rise
of political Islam in Turkey. While the pro-Islamic and conservative circles in Turkey
hailed him as the leader of the Muslim world and the leader of the Islamic struggle
against the Kemalist/secular establishment in Turkey, the Kemalist elite, especially the
military, demonized him and his supporters as menace to the foundations of the republic.
Like Ozal, he pursued policies that ran counter to the established Kemalist paradigm.
During his short lived tenure as the prime minister, Erbakan embarked on an
unprecedented activism in Turkish foreign policy, although it was generally limited
towards the Muslim world, which created unsurmountable friction with the secular
Kemalist establishment. His pro-Islamic/anti-Kemalist rhetoric and policies prompted an
uproar among the Kemalist elite and subsequently the guardian of the state, the Turkish
Military ousted him by, what was then called, the post-modern coup as the generals did
not take over the governance but used the National Security Council and the secular press
to create pressure on Erbakan, forcing him to resign. The postmodern coup taught some
of the Erbakan’s followers a lesson that it was impossible to go against the almighty
Turkish military under the banner of Islamic ideology and they decided to become
“moderate” and established the Justice and Development Party.
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In this chapter, I analyze the implications of Erbakan’s background, his rise to
prominence in politics and his interaction with the Kemalist bureaucracy, (especially the
secular Turkish Military), on the Turkish foreign policy.
6.2 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
The emergence of Erbakan in the Turkish politics took place in the 1960s. Having
been a prominent professor of engineering who studied in Turkey and in Germany, he
contributed greatly to the development of German Leopard Tanks.495 He then became
involved in politics and was elected as an independent member of parliament in 1969
from the religiously conservative central Anatolian town of Konya, which reflects his
worldview. The most striking element of his worldview was that he believed that due to
the western influences, the Turkish society has been in a moral downfall and departing
from the Islamic values, which should be restored. He was heavily influenced by Sayyid
Qutb’s ideology, especially his call for the rural Muslim intelligentsia to organize itself
and eventually take control of government from the urban elite. Thanks to the
encouragements from Mehmet Zahit Kotku, who was the leader of the Naksibendi order,
Erbakan established the first Islamic oriented party, the National Order. With Kotku’s
spiritual leadership, Erbakan became the head of the party. Among Kotku’s adherents are
Ozal and the most influential figure of the first decade of Turkey, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan.496
Because the National Order Party was closed by the Constitutional Court in 1971
on the grounds that it had violated the secular principles of the Turkish constitution,
Erbakan founded the National Salvation Party the next year. In 1974, his party became a
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part of the coalition government which was founded by the Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit,
who was known for his social democrat leftist, pro-Ataturk views. For the first time in the
history of Turkey, a party with an official Islamic agenda became part of the government
in Ankara. This was important because it marked the rise of political Islam in Turkey.
Now, Erbakan began to help his party members rise in the government positions and
institutions of the Turkish secular state.497
Those Turks who immigrated to Western Europe during and after 1960s,
especially those in Germany, have always made up the important supporters of Erbakan.
In 1975, Erbakan declared the National View (Milli Gorus) manifesto calling the
European Turks to identify themselves as Turkish-Muslims and avoid being assimilated.
The most important part of the manifesto was the call for a “just order” (Adil Duzen) in
Turkey and among the European Turks, according to which real justice, development and
prosperity in society can only be achieved through political and economic teachings of
Islam. This constituted a stark contrast with the secular foundation of the republic. This
inevitably created troubles in the coming decades for Erbakan in his relations with the
Kemalist elite. 498
Not surprisingly, the NSP was among the abolished parties after the 1980 military
coup. With the easing of political party laws in 1983, Erbakan founded yet another party
named Refah (Welfare) Party. The realities of the Cold War prompted the generals to
come up with the idea of “controlled Islam”, which would counter the rising threat of
Communism in Turkey. The invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of the Soviet threat
only exacerbated this concern. Therefore, the junta adopted a policy of “controlled
497
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Islam”. It aimed not only to counter the Communist movements in Turkey but to prevent
radicalization of pious Muslims in Turkey. This concern became serious after the Iranian
revolution in 1979.499 Part of implementation of this policy, the government restored
mandatory Sunni religious education at schools, broadcast religious programs from the
state owned Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), greatly increased the number of Imam
Hatip schools from 72 in 1970 to 382 in 1988.500 These schools educate clergy personnel
that are employed in the mosques by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri
Baskanligi), which is under the government control. Baran argues that the same policy
could be seen in Pakistan where the President Zia ul-Haq, with the encouragement from
Washington, resorted to the Islam opening to counter the Soviet and Iranian threat.501
One other contributing factor to the rise of political Islam in Turkey in the 1980s,
as discussed in the previous chapter, was the liberal policies of Ozal that paved the way
for the rise of small scale provincial businesses and industries. As opposed to the
republican business elite of Istanbul, who benefited greatly from the state subsidies, the
newly emerging small businesses of Anatolia did not want government intervention in
favor of economic liberalization. These entities resorted to Islamic values, symbols and
ethics to garner the support of conservative Anatolian rural Turks. In 1990, they formed
the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD),502 an
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association of Muslim capitalists to defend their interests against the Istanbul elite.
Yavus states that the ideology of the emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie, while socially
Islamic, was economically liberal.503
Islam became a symbol of legitimization of business connections and profit. The
alienated Anatolian periphery felt, for the first time, that they would have a chance to
become an important player in Kemalist Turkey. In short, the Turkish society began to
experience social and economic changes, the results of which would be profound for the
Turkish politics in the coming decades.504
6.3 Rise of Erbakan: The Islamist Victory of the Mid-1990s
The unexpected death of Ozal in April 1993 marked the beginning of political
instability. The weak coalition governments, a number of corruption scandals, endless
political quarrels only rendered the Turks weary of politics and politicians.505 Erbakan’s
Welfare Party managed to capitalize on this increasing dissatisfaction of the citizens and
emerged as the victor in the 1994 local elections. The WP was able to gather the support
of more than 5 million of 28 million voters. That the mayors of the two biggest cities,
Istanbul and Ankara, were now WP members made it an even bigger victory for WP.
Istanbul’s new mayor in 1994 was Tayyip Erdogan. The widespread corruption in
Turkish politics made it easier for Erbakan to sell his ‘just order’ doctrine to larger
masses.506
The Erbakan’s ‘just order’ denounces capitalism and communism alike. The
former contains “microbes”, which cause diseases in society. These are the interest and
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the banking system that perpetuates interest, unfair taxes, the mint and the exchange
system. Capitalism is responsible for hunger, poverty, inflation, corruption, moral decay,
wars and exploitation. Communism has not brought prosperity and happiness during its
70 years of rule either. The solution to these problems is the Just Order, which is “an
order of harmony not discord and in it there is a congruence of interests between workers
and employers, government administrators and the people, doctors and patients, and
lawyers and clients.507
Table 6.1 Population of Turkey from 1950 to 2000
Year
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000

Total Population
20,947,188
27,754,820
35,605,176
44,736,957
56,473,035
67,803,927

Rural Population
15,702,851
18,895,089
21,914,075
25,091,950
23,146,684
23,797,653

Urban Population
5,244,337
8,859,731
13,691,101
19,645,007
33,326,351
44,006,274

To Erbakan, the Just Order will be realized by the cooperation of seven major
'armies': (1) the devout people; (2) religious authorities and leaders who will be the
architects of a greater Turkey; (3) scientists and university professors; (4) engineers and
economists who will prepare the projects to turn natural resources into developed
industries; (5) businessmen who will implement the projects; (6) guilds; and (7) labor,
including workers, farmers, and white-collar workers. Thanks to these seven ‘armies’
Turkey would attain a powerful position in the world and be a capable leader of the
Muslim world.508
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According to Baran, while such promises are nothing new in Turkish politics,
urban voters found these views more credible because they were uttered by a political
party whose official identity is Islamic. This came to place as the rural to urban
immigration became rampant especially in the late 80s and early 90s.509
The WP played a role in the political socialization of pro-Islamic groups in
Turkey by, for example, actively organizing voter registration drives and election
campaigns, providing free transportation to polling stations. These practices were
overseen by other political parties in Turkey in the 90s. This way WP aimed at
integrating the marginalized, Islamically oriented “periphery” as well a large segments of
the Kurdish population510 into the political arena. 511
The December 1995 general elections marked an important point in the Turkish
political life. The WP came as the 1st party out of the elections by 21% of the 28 million
votes cast, grabbing 158 seats in the 550 seated parliamentary. Erbakan formed a
coalition government on June 28, 1996, with the secular True Path Party (DYP) he
became the prime minister. This was significant as “for the first time, the secular Turkish
Republic had a prime minister whose political philosophy was based on Islam” 512
This sent shock waves to the Kemalist elite. This meant that the control of budget
expenditures and audits, as well as the recruitments of public civil servants would be
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determined by the Islamist. Being cautious of any Kemalist repercussion, especially the
military, Erbakan pledged in his oath of office that he would remain loyal to the
democratic, secular foundations of the Turkish republic, although he had in many
occasions lampooned the Kemalist revolution and its outcomes in favor of the Islamic
values.513
No doubt, the historic victory boosted the morale of pro-Islamic circles in Turkey
and consequently led to the rise of political Islam in Turkey. One of the biggest sources
of friction between the seculars and the pro-Islamic circles was the head scarf issue. By
this, the secular constitution of Turkey banned the display of religious symbols, here the
head scarf in public spaces such as universities. The Erbakan era witnessed the rise of
anti-scarf ban demonstrations. Moreover, perception that Turkey was being Islamized
grew bigger as alcohol was being phased out from certain public spheres, the brothels and
prostitutes were being cracked down as well as some statues in public spheres were being
removed on the grounds that they were indecent.
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The ideological battle was at its

height in the state controlled Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), by which the
secular state would keep Islam under its control. The Kemalists accused the WP of
staffing the Diyanet by employing some 6000 pro-WP clergy. This was called by certain
Kemalist circles as the Islamization from above.515
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6.4 Turkish Foreign Policy during the WP Era
6.4.1 Neo-Ottomanist Elements
Erbakan and WP’s foreign policy reflected their worldview as well. He defined
his foreign policy as “respectable foreign policy” (sahsiyetli dis politika), which aimed at
elevating Turkey to a respectable position in international affairs. Part of this identity
laden foreign policy was made up of taking Turkey to the leadership of the Islamic world
and subsequent attainment of respect in global affairs. This meant the adoption of a proactive foreign policy. 516
The Islamic political identity shaped the WP’s view of and relationship with the
rest of the world. One of the main aspects of the WP foreign policy making is its neoOttoman characteristic.517
Oliver Roy states, “the Islamic movement in Turkey is first and foremost a
nationalistic one. Islam is interlinked with the idea of homeland in Turkey, but this also
includes the Turkish workers in Europe. The Turkish workers remain Turks and maintain
their connection with Turkey.” 518
The history and the Ottoman legacy played a great role in the evolution of the
Turkish Islamic movement.519 Abdullah Gül, who played a leading role in formulating
WP’s foreign policy positions, and later became an AKP member and then the president
of Turkey, said:
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Turkey is neither Luxembourg nor Bangladesh. History, geography and reality
require Turkey to carry and fill a mission regardless of our desires. This mission or role
may be the role of the Ottoman Empire. We therefore cannot remain indifferent to the
developments in Palestine, Yugoslavia, and Albania due to our national interest. He
concluded that Turkey is “the cultural center of Islamic civilization in Europe. We
[Turkey] therefore have to involve ourselves in the developments in the Balkans.” 520
Hakan Yavuz argues that neo-Ottomanists tend to enthnocize the Ottoman state
by calling it ‘a glorious achievement of the Muslim Turks’. At the WP’s fifth convention
in 1997 Erbakan declared the party’s foreign policy goal to be the “creation of the
Greater Turkey just as the Ottomans did”.521 To Tanil Bora, who is a prominent analyst
of Turkish foreign policy, Erbakan pursued a foreign policy that was the “continuation of
Ozalian neo-Ottomanism.” 522
Although, the WP separated itself from nationalistic parties by emphasizing the
Islamic identity, its foreign policy practices showed that Turkey was a central element.
For example, the WP policy makers insisted that the Muslim world can only be united,
which is the official goal, only under Turkey’s leadership.523 Erbakan justified this by
asserting that Turkey is the heir state of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey’s geopolitics,
economy and strength dictate it.
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It is important to note that Erbakan aimed at eliminating intra-Muslim conflicts by
all embracing aspect of Islam. Therefore, to him the cure for the ominous Kurdish
problem was Islam as ‘all Muslims are brothers and sisters.’524 In this regard, Erbakan
argued at the WP’s fourth congress in 1993 that Turkey’s socioeconomic problems could
only be resolved by recognizing the Kurdish identity in the context of umma (the nation
of Islam), establishing the Just Order, and by allowing each community to govern
themselves by its own laws and norms.525 These ideas were clearly in stark contrast with
the Kemalist principles.
As far as nationalism is concerned, the WP’s stance can be summarized as: ‘the
most important and worthy base of people’s identity in Turkey has been Islam. The
secular-nationalist Kemalist elite has promoted other sources of identity (e.g.
Turkishness) as a counter force against Islam; this trend had to be stopped.” This too
posed an overt defiance to the established Kemalist ideology of Turkey. 526
Nazir Ozsos, who was the chief press adviser of Erbakan and who wrote in the
party’s semiofficial newspaper Milli Gazete stated: 'the people of the Southeast have
always been considered as a threat by the (Republican) Westernists simply because of
their strong commitment to their faith (Islam) and their traditions and of their resistance
to the integration with the West'.527
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Likewise, the WP deputies criticized the ethno-centric nation building process of
M. Kemal for he destroyed the prospects of the formation of ummah and depriving the
Kurds of their identity. They argued “the outcome is the Kurdish nationalism that has
been created by the Marxist PKK to constitute a reaction to the prevailing racist Turkish
nationalism.” Therefore, reviving the brotherhood among Muslims, regardless of their
ethnicity would cure the problem. 528
Erbakan said in a public meeting in 1994 that; “The people of this soil (Turkey)
started everything with Besmele (in the name of Allah). What you did was to replace it
with ‘I am Turk, I am righteous, I am hard working.’529 This gave our Kurdish brothers
the right to say; I am Kurd and I am more hardworking, more righteous than a Turk. This
way, you alienated people against each other.”530
The WP stressed that; Turkey has not been very successful in “the race of
civilization” due to the Kemalist revolution. According to this; “The real reason of
foundation of the WP is to end [...] the backward position of Turkey in the contemporary
race of civilization. It is saddening for all of our people who love their homeland and
nation that while world nations quickly progress in the technology and civilization race,
we are still very far behind of them in economic social and political terms.”531
The following section will examine Erbakan’s foreign policy practices.
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6.4.2 The EU, UN and NATO
The WP adopted a strong anti-Western, anti-European foreign policy rhetoric in
favor of willingness to get close to the Muslim world, which naturally concerned the
Kemalist elite. Erbakan argued that the real reason why Turkey has been excluded from
the European Union was its Muslim identity. The following statement made by Hasan
Dikici, a member of the WP, at the Turkish Grand National Assembly on July 6, 1993
underlines the WP’s philosophy:
“The EU is an integration model based on a Christian-Western culture; it is a
political integration; it is an effort to create a European state. It is a Catholic European
Union established according to a Christian ideology. Turkey is a Muslim country. With
the aim of increasing [the] material welfare of the Turkish people, to try to have a place
in the European Union means to abandon our political, social, and cultural values. If
Turkey joins the EU, our sovereign rights will be transferred to the Catholic EU. The
decision to be a member in the EU was made against the will of our nation and the
application should be withdrawn for the future of our nation.532
Necmettin Erbakan expressed similar views about Turkey’s secular foreign policy
and indicated the very different future role that he had in mind for Turkey. Erbakan
argued, “Turkey should cooperate with Muslim countries through which it can realize the
goal of being a leader, instead of being a servant in the EU”.533 For him, “to become a
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member in the EU by leaving the community of Muslim countries means to lose the very
essence of our identity and to accept the Sevres”534
Erbakan opposed any western based intergovernmental organization. He claimed
the United Nations was a tool of Western imperialism. For example, when the Bosnian
conflict was raging in the early 90s, he viewed it as genocide against Muslims and added;
“the major catastrophic event of the century is taking place at the heart of Europe. The
double standard of the West became clear. What did they do to stop this carnage? The
West only observed the massacre! They therefore want this carnage to go on because
those who are killed and raped are Muslims. I want to know where is the United Nations,
which was established on the principle of no forceful acquisition of territory? What
happened to the principles of the United Nations? The UN implements its principles only
against the Muslims. If Muslims suffer, these principles have no value whatsoever. The
UN has no moral face any more.535
Erbakan strongly believed that 1.5 billion strong Muslims of the world had to
form their own version of the UN and NATO. He argued, if the Muslims of the world had
been united Serbs could not have massacred Bosnians and Armenians could not have
won against ‘our Azeri brothers’ in the early 90s. 536
As one RP official put it in an interview:
“When compared with the West, the Islamic nations are far behind today in income and
living standards. But we represent a great potential. A human potential of 1.5 billion
souls. We can increase current living standards ten times or even one hundred-fold if we
534
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can come together and work for our own market. This is not enmity towards the West.
We don't hate anyone. It's just that that's what we want to do.” 537
And, according to another party official: “The same as the West unites to serve its
interests; the Islamic nation should unite for its own good. This is both logical and the
reasonable thing to do. This will save us not only in this world, but also in the one to
come.”538
As has been discussed, Erbakan believed that the Islamic revival and unity of the
Muslims would be possible with Turkey’s leadership and thought that the Kemalist
ideology was an obstacle in this regard. He said; “The Western civilization that prioritizes
the might ought to be replaced by the new one that cherishes the ‘justice’. It is impossible
to fulfill Turkey’s mission when the current order in Turkey prevails. It has to be replaced
with the ‘just order’.”539 Erbakan sought to fly “the WP flag to unify 1.2 billion Muslims
all over the world.” 540
6.4.3 Erbakan and Israel
The epitome of Erbakan’s anti-Western stance was in the form of anti-Zionism
and he frequently accused America for being Israel’s unconditional supporter. He
repeatedly stated that while America responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by
occupying and pounding it with thousands of tons of bombs, it has remained silent to the
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Israeli invasion of the West Bank and the Gaza. He argued; ‘it should not be surprising to
see America disintegrate, like the Soviet Union that had acted like a bully.’ 541
It would not be wrong to say that the degree of Erbakan’s effectiveness in Turkish
foreign policy during his premiership was tested via the Turkish-Israeli relationship in the
90s. In other words, the Turkish-Israeli relationships in that decade showed who was
really in charge of Turkish politics. The 90s marked the rise of strategic relations between
Turkey and Israel and in Turkey the driving force was the military. The military was
eager to develop relations for several reasons; to reinforce Turkey’s secular image, to
counter the rising threat from Syria and Israel, both of whom supported the Kurdish
separatism and Islamism against Turkey, to win the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington and
to have access to military technology unrestricted due to human rights concerns. 542
After the formation of Erbakan’s coalition, the military used Turkish-Israeli
relations to embarrass the government by exposing its powerlessness to halt an alliance it
openly had opposed. Not only did the military totally ignore the government in dealings
with Israel, but also in May 1997, the military engaged in a massive military operation in
northern Iraq without notifying the civilian government in advance. The friction between
the Erbakan government and the Kemalist military was evident. During Erbakan’s tenure
as prime minister, the military adamantly ignored Erbakan’s anti-Israel rhetoric and to
‘embarrass’ Erbakan, the military deepened the relations with Israel.543
The Turkish-Israeli relations had become a battle ground between the WP and the
military. One of the starkest examples of this was ‘the Military Training and
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Cooperation’ agreement with Israel, which provided mutual military visits and the
acquisition of military know-how. Although opposed to it, Erbakan bowed down to the
pressure of the military and had to ratify it.544 What made it unusual was the Deputy
Chief of Staff Cevik Bir, not a civilian representative from the government, signed the
agreement while on the Israeli side it was the defense ministry director David Ivry who
signed it. Moreover, while all agreements have to be presented to and approved by the
Parliamentary Committee of foreign relations, this one was signed secretly without the
knowledge of any government representative. The military later justified its action by
arguing that it did so due to the security and stability of the state, which showed the
distrust of the military against the civilian government. Surprisingly, the Turkish side
publicized the agreement, a move that befuddled Israel.545
Erbakan would later admit the government had to approve the agreement due to
the pressure from the Turkish Military. In January 1997, Erbakan expressed his dismay
on the issue as such; “I wanted to approach to the U.S but the Americans told me to go to
Israel. Americans dictated the agreement with Israel. I could not oppose the
establishment of the common air force base in Anatolia because ‘the soldiers’ would
have made Mesut Yilmaz (the then opposition leader in the parliament) the prime
minister, establishing a coalition government.”546
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The then Minister of State Abdullah Gul expresses the situation as; “…Americans
had forced us to sign the agreement…We had two choices; either we would forget about
the F-4 renovation project that would cost 600 million dollars or we would have had to
sign the agreement with Israel. Unfortunately, Israel exploited this situation
disseminating the idea in the region [the Middle East] that Israel and Turkey are getting
close…”547
While the Turco-Israeli military rapprochement was met with resistance in
Turkey, so was it in Israel. In 1998, the Israeli foreign minister was said to have some
concerns with regards to the relations with Turkey. He arguably warned that the close and
intensive relations with Turkey would become detrimental for Israel’s relations with
Syria, Greece, Cyprus even Russia, which supplied arms to the Greek Cypriots. Others
have blamed David Ivri, who was considered to be the architect of the rapprochement, for
jeopardizing Israel’s larger interests in the region. 548
Finally, Erbakan argued that Turkey’s financial and banking system had been
taken over by Jews and Israel. He said; of the price of a loaf of bread, one third goes to
the IMF via interest payments, which in turn goes to Israel and the Israeli banks.549
He criticized the 1993 Oslo Agreement claiming that it was a result of Zionism’s
desire to penetrate into the Muslim world, eventually dividing them (citing the friction
between the PLO and the Hamas). 550 Erbakan also rhetorically asked on one occasion of
America: “Are you a slave of Israel? You claim to be a superpower. What happened to
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you! You are a toy in the hands of the Jewish lobby. . . You are a servant of Israel, your
situation is very clear.”551

Figure 6.1 Turkish-Israeli Trade in $ million (1994-2013)
Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr

As seen in the above chart, despite Erbakan’s staunch opposition, the Turkish-Israeli
bilateral trade rose during and after his tenure. Finally, the fact that Erbakan was not able
to retard the Turco-Israeli rapprochement proved that the real driving force behind the
Turkish foreign policy was the Turkish military and the bureaucratic elite.552
6.4.4 Third Worldist Foreign Policy
Another important aspect of Erbakan's foreign policy practice was his "Third
Worldist" critique of the international system, seeing it dominated by and serving the
interests of the Western world. The solution to this, to Erbakan, was for the Muslims of
the world to organize, unite and establish an independent system, rival to the existing
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Western dominated world. He repeatedly advocated the establishment of an Islamic
common market with its common currency, the dinar. The first concrete attempt to this
end came on October 22, 1996, when Erbakan led the formation of the Islamic D-8
(Developing 8), which clearly imitated the group of 8 developed economies553and an
association of Muslim countries-the Economic Cooperation Organization, all of which
were based on pan-Islamic ideology. The D-8 was Erbakan’s most aspiring venture and
clearly aimed at changing Turkey’s traditional foreign policy direction, which is Western.
The D-8 included Turkey Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and
Pakistan,554 to which he paid numerous visits.555
Furthermore, Erbakan foreign policy practices upset secular Turks and Turkey’s
Western allies as they perceived Turkey drifting from the West towards the East.556 The
new prime minister’s first meeting was with the leader of the Muslim brotherhood, the
son of the late Hasan al-Banna.557 This created concern in Egypt and Hosni Mubarak
visited Ankara to express his ‘concerns’ about the perceived intervention in Egypt’s
internal affairs. This vexed the secular governments in the Middle East, who feared the
rise of Islam. His visit to Libya’s Qaddafi later turned out to be a political disaster for
Erbakan for Qaddafi humiliated Erbakan and accused him of being too pro-Western and
oppressing the Kurds in Turkey.558 Erbakan visited Iran and signed the oft criticized
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natural gas agreement with Iran in August 1996. Abdullah Bozkurt, a journalist at
Today’s Zaman of Turkey, sums up the displeasure about this Erbakan’s endeavor;
“It was Erbakan's unreciprocated love affair with Iran that landed Turkey an
unfair natural gas deal in August 1996, an agreement that Turkey pledged to purchase 10
billion cubic meters of gas annually from Iran for a quarter of century. It was his deal
that made Turkey dependent on Iran for one-fifth of its gas imports, an unnecessary
leverage that Iranian hawks never fail to bring up every time they talk about Turkey's
reliance on Iran. Did we get a fair shake from this supposedly lucrative trade deal? I do
not believe we did, judging from the past hiccups on the volume and quality of Iranian
gas.”559
Bozkurt concludes that unlike with Russia, Azerbaijan and Algeria, Turkey has
continued to experience problems with the Iranian gas delivery due in great part to the
poor Iranian infrastructure, which caused the gas supply to be interrupted especially in
severe winter condition, during which Iran simply cuts the supplies and diverts it to its
domestic consumption.560
The fact that the deal was signed at the very moment when President Clinton was
signing into law the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act to impede foreign investment in both
countries was interpreted by many analysts as a deliberate slap in the face of the U.S.
administration. However, this act prevented a U.S. company from supplying critical
compressor units needed for the completion of the Turkish side of the deal. In January
2000, a crisis erupted when Iran sought financial compensation from Turkey on the basis
of the 1996 agreement. There is thus a major conflict of interest between Turkey,
559
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desperate for additional supplies of natural gas to meet its growing demand and reduce
dependence on Russia, and the U.S. strategy. The gas deal with Iran was not only
economically problematic it also created political tension with Turkey’s western allies.
The gas deal with Iran came almost exactly at the same time when the President Clinton
was signing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The timing of the agreement was perceived in
Washington as a deliberate act of defiance of the Erbakan government towards
America.561 To make matters worse, because the Turkish side of the gas pipeline could
not be completed because supply of critical compression units needed to build pump
stations in Turkey was banned due to the Iranian sanctions, Iran sought for financial
compensation in January per the 1996 agreement, which created crisis between Turkey
and Iran.562 Kemal Kirisci concludes that this situation proved that there is a major
conflict of interest between Turkey, who wanted to diversify its energy sources to reduce
dependency on Russian gas and America, who wanted to punish Iran.563
Quoting Richard Perle, a former senior Pentagon official, Tom Friedman wrote in
the New York Times that Erbakan 'stuck his finger in America's eye,' and '…suddenly
Turkey's government, a longtime pillar of U. S. policy at the crossroads of Asia and
Europe, is becoming, under Mr. Erbakan, an unreliable ally at best and a threat to U. S.
interests at worst.”564 Friedman concluded; ''But it was a result of the fact that the proU.S. faction inside Turkey has been shamed into silence, because of the indifference with
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which the Clinton Administration has treated Turkey. The Congress has not been helpful
either, but previous Administrations fought for Turkey's interests in Congress in a way
this Administration has not. I don't see Dole giving a major foreign policy speech without
mentioning how Turkey has been mishandled.''565
As much as Erbakan was courting Iran, he failed to attract Iran’s support in the
fight against PKK. It is a well-known fact that there are PKK camps in Iran from which
the PKK launched attacks against targets in Turkey. However, Erbakan admitted his
failure in this regard. He said;
“In spite of the D’amato’s Iran-Libya Sanctions Act566, I went to Tehran. I signed
with them the gas deal of $25 billion for the next twenty years. Yet, the Iranians did not
cooperate in regards to the PKK issue. If they [Iranians] had agreed to collaborate, I
would have stood stronger against the soldiers [the Turkish Armed Forces]. I asked
Rafsancani at the Sadabat Palace to curb Ocalan’s terrorist activities in Iran. He said ‘it
is not possible. Because there is not one PKK member within Iranian borders. If you
don’t believe me you can go there with my helicopters and see for yourself.’ The Head of
Turkish Police Forces, Aladdin Yuksel told the Iranian Deputy Head of State Hassan
Habibi that ‘we know every PKK camp, facility in Iranian soil. We know the telephone
numbers and addresses of the Kurdish separatists in your country.’ As you see, Iran is an
important neighbor but they are not sincere in their relations with Turkey.”567
Erbakan continues to confess how he was weak against the state bureaucracy. He
said; “After I became the prime minister, I wanted to go to Syria after my visits to Iran
565
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and Libya. I have a good rapport with Hafez Assad [the then president of Syria]. We need
to solve the PKK problem. Our military is losing 5-10 of its members every day. For the
sake of solution, I even proposed the abolishment of the Turkish-Syria border. But, the
Office of Chief of Staff and the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) did not let me to go to
Syria. Therefore, Assad did nothing.”568
6.5 The WP’s Islamic, Anti-Kemalist Rhetoric
Erbakan repeatedly charged against M. Kemal and the Kemalist establishment in
Turkey. And he did not shy away from implying his desire for a regime change in
Turkey. On April 13, 1994, Erbakan said; ‘‘…Refah (WP) will come to power and a just
order [adil duzen] will be established. The question we must ask ourselves is whether this
change will be violent or peaceful; whether it will entail bloodshed. I would have
preferred not to have to use those terms, but in the face of all that, in the face of
terrorism, and so that everyone can see the true situation clearly, I feel obliged to do so.
Today, Turkey must make a decision. The Welfare Party will establish a just order, which
is certain. [But] will the transition be peaceful or violent; will it be achieved
harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens] must make up their minds on
that point.”569
In a public speech on March 14, 1993 and a television interview first recorded in
1992 and rebroadcast on November 24, 1996, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, Refah MP for the
province of Ankara said; “Our homeland belongs to us, but not the regime, dear
brothers. The regime and Kemalism belong to others. ... Turkey will be destroyed,
gentlemen. People say: Could Turkey become like Algeria? Just as, in Algeria, we got
568
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81% [of the votes], here too we will reach 81%, we will not remain on 20%. Do not
waste your energy on us – I am speaking here to you, to those ... of the imperialist West,
the colonizing West, the wild West, to those who, in order to unite with the rest of the
world, become the enemies of honor and modesty, those who lower themselves to the
level of dogs, of puppies, in order to imitate the West, to the extent of putting dogs
between the legs of Muslim women – it is to you I speak when I say: ‘Do not waste your
energy on us, you will die at the hands of the people of Kırıkkale.” (a city in central
Anatolia)
“... the army says: ‘We can accept it if you’re a supporter of the PKK, but a
supporter of sharia, never.’ Well you won’t solve the problem with that attitude. If
you want the solution, it’s sharia.”570
Yavuz states that the RP sought to distinguish between Westernization and
modernity. Westernization, in the Turkish context, was a process of alienation from one's
own cultural values and history and its replacement by an empty shell that only could be
a pale shadow of the other that it aspires to be. This weakness, in turn, was viewed as
causing underdevelopment, the lack of political independence, the erosion of moral
values, and the subjugation of the Turks in their own historical regions. Modernity, by
contrast, was viewed as a necessity for survival, and its technological, scientific,
democratic, and industrial elements were not seen as being incompatible with Islam. In
having this view, the RP ideologues were very close to Ottoman liberals like Namlk
Kemal, who also thought that a prudent incorporation of Western attributes, such as
democracy,

liberalism,

and

industrialization,
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compromising essential Islamic customs and values. The promotion of a liberal political
and economic agenda, in fact, was cleverly used by the RP to assail the authoritarian
aspects of the Kemalist tradition while increasing their popularity and credibility with
those who were dissatisfied with the present system.
To sum up, Erbakan believed that westernization does not necessarily mean
modernization. The Turkish modernity with the Kemalist revolution had alienated
cultural values and history. What was left was a hollow body. Erbakan was of the opinion
that due to the nature of the Kemalist modernity, the development of Turkey and the
Turks were retarded, morality easily eroded and Turkey lost its ties with its historical
hinterland that was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. While Erbakan viewed modernity as a
necessary element for political, economical and industrial development, he also believed
that these could be achieved without sacrificing Islamic values; therefore they are
compatible with Islam. Yavus states that Erbakan’s view of modernity is identical to that
of Namik Kemal, an Ottoman liberalist, who believed democracy, liberalism and
industrialization could be achieved through Islamic values. Yavuz concludes’ “the
promotion of a liberal political and economic agenda, in fact, was cleverly used by the
RP to assail the authoritarian aspects of the Kemalist tradition while increasing their
popularity and credibility with those who were dissatisfied with the present system.” 571
6.6 The Kemalist State Machine Steps in: The ‘Post-Modern’ Coup
Erbakan and members of WP’s anti-Kemalist and pro-Islamic rhetoric had already
disturbed the Turkish military, who perceived the duty of protecting the secular
foundations and the Kemalist principles of the state, even before the ascent of the party to
power, the activities of religious groups began to rise and became more public.
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The incidents that prepared the unavoidable fall of the WP continued to occur.
One of them was when the Aczmendis, an Islamic order in Turkey, staged a highly
publicized ritual in the largest mosque of Turkey, the Kocatepe Mosque, which is only
several kilometers away from the Turkish Parliament, on October 6, 1996. With TV
cameras present, the members of the order clamored for Sharia in Turkey.572 On January
11, 1997 invited the leaders of religious orders in Turkey to a dinner at the official
residence of the prime minister.573
Then came the straw that broke the camel’s back. On January 30, 1997, one of
Erbakan’s aides and the mayor of town of Sincan, which is outside the city of Ankara,
Bekir Yildiz574 organized an evening rally named ‘the Jerusalem Day’, which was
proclaimed by the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomenei in Iran in 1980s. The spectators
filled the arena to capacity chanting for the advent of jihad as small children staged a play
that depicted the victory of Islam. Moreover, the VIP guest was Mohammed Bagheri, the
Iranian ambassador to Turkey, for whom the crowd cheered in excitement. While
clamoring for Sharia, the crowd cursed Israel and Arafat. Furthermore, Bagheri came to
stage to speak and called for the victory of Sharia in Turkey. He said: “On behalf of
Muslims all over the world, I say that we can wait no longer! Do not be afraid to call
yourselves fundamentalists! Fundamentalists are those who follow the words and actions
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of the Prophet! God has promised them the final victory!”575 The pictures of the
prominent Shi’a clerics Musa al-Sadr and Abbas al-Mousavi were hanging in the
background on the wall.576
The Sincan incident was really unacceptable for the Kemalist establishment as it
trampled on the major sensitivities of Kemalism. The Jerusalem Night organized by the
RP mayor of Sincan, Bekir Yıldız, at the end of January 1997 increased the already high
tensions between secularists and conservatives. The participation of the Iranian
ambassador and his speech at the event over lapped with one of the grand narratives of
secularists in Turkey: the “Iranization” of Turkey.
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around Sincan reached a crescendo with a procession of tanks on the main street of
Sincan. Ismail Saglar said: “The tanks were considered a warning to the WP or an early
sign of a coup d’état, as Turkish people, most of whom had seen at least one military
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However, the military officials announced that the procession was a previously organized
regular training move. 578
However, the military showed their real intent at the February 28 meeting of the
National Security Council. The meeting and the subsequent press release was significant
in that the military threatened the Erbakan government with “sanctions” if it did not take
immediate action to curb the “religious reactionary movements.579 Erbakan refused to
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National Security Council; laws are made in Parliament." In the end, he had to ratify the
decisions. 580
The generals made it clear that they did not want a classical military coup but a
political solution to the ‘problem’. Therefore, the coalition partner Tansu Ciller was
pressured to pull her party out of the government.581
Defections had already begun from Ciller’s True Path Party. The Minister of
Industry, Yalim Erez and Minister of Health, Yildirim Aktuna582 resigned from their
positions. However, the military found the process too slow.583
Meanwhile, the military’s displeasure with the Erbakan government climbed to
unprecedented heights so much so Osman Ozbek, the Chief of Staff of Gendarme in
Erzurum Province went so far as to call Erbakan “a pimp” for going to pilgrimage in
Mecca with his family as the guest of the king of Saudi Arabia.584 Although, Erbakan
asked the chief of staff of the Turkish Military for the punishment of Ozbek, it never
happened. 585
The lack of trust between the military and the government went up so much that
the military staged one of the largest cross border incursions into Iraq in May 1997 with
50,000 troops to eliminate the PKK targets without the foreknowledge of the
government.586 A senior military officer conceded that the government was informed of
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the incursion twelve hours after its commencement for fear that the classified operation
might have been leaked to the terrorists.587
The crisis between the conflicting parties further escalated when on May 11,
1997, the Erbakan supporters staged a 100,000 strong demonstration in Istanbul against
the army’s February 28th demands.588
At the National Security Council meeting of May 1997 Erbakan took extreme
pressure from the generals to ‘do his bidding at once’.589 Unwilling to concede to the
military, Erbakan came up with a solution that he would switch positions with Ciller,
making her the prime minister. He assumed that if his secular coalition partner would
take over premiership, the military would relax the unrelenting pressure on him.
However, the generals saw no difference as long as Erbakan remained in government.
Chief of Staff Hakki Karadayi personally demanded all high ranking officers to remain in
their posts throughout the summer in case an emergency meeting was needed. 590
Different from preceding coups, where the military physically took over and ruled
for a certain period of time, this time the military pursued a different method. The
generals embarked on giving a series of briefings to officially inform and convince the
ruling elite of WP’s ‘unconstitutional’ deeds.
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represented the Kemalist elite, were given briefings at the Turkish General Staff
headquarters in Ankara for days.592
Furthermore, the military resorted to any means possible to eradicate the traces of
Islamism in Turkey, including economic, legal constitutional and political. For example;
the military officially boycotted the Islamic oriented companies and stopped buying
merchandise from them. For example, certain food brands and newspapers were banned
in the military facilities. Also, the NSC continued to expel certain officers from the
military on the grounds of religious reactionary and anti-secular activities. 593
The anti-Islamic, pro secular front continued to organize mass demonstrations in
large cities of Turkey. The large-business association TUSIAD, the then president
Suleyman Demirel and civil society organizations were among the supporters of these
demonstrations. 594
In the face of relentless pressure from all spheres of the Kemalist elite, Erbakan
made the expected move and on June 17, 1997, he submitted his resignation, marking the
end of the Welfare Party-True Pathy Party coalition. Subsequently, the president refused
to give Ciller, who owns the second largest majority in the parliament, the duty of
establishing the next government as, by law, it is the president who decides about the
person to form a government. 595
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Demirel, under pressure from the military, called on the main opposition leader,
Mesut Yilmaz, who then formed a right-left coalition government. Therefore, the new
government included no Islamic elements.596
For the military, the mission was accomplished. Without damaging further the
country’s image with a traditional military coup, the generals were able to force
democratically elected Erbakan to step down. A new secular administration was erected,
which would carry out the decisions made by the soldiers with no reservation.597
The influence of the military grew even stronger as the government was now in
compliance with the generals. The West Working Group (Bati Calisma Grubu), a
clandestine group within the military, which had been established before February 28 to
report any anti-regime, Islamic activities, continued to check on the media, businesses,
academia and other parts of the society.
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Turkey’s foreign policy and they indicated that they would continue to do so citing the
national security. Now, instead of acting alone, they would work with the ministry of
foreign affairs and its bureaucracy. As an example, when some Nordic countries openly
declared their support for PKK members in their countries, the military pressed the
ministry of foreign affairs to ‘take necessary steps’ to stop this. 599
The 1997 military intervention is known as the “soft coup” because of the way the
military carried it out. Major business associations, media outlets, academia, judiciary
and other pro-secular, pro-Kemalist fractions of the society were mobilized with the
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encouragement of the military, which resulted in the forceful resignation of Erbakan and
his government.600
Burak Bilge Ozpek states that what made the coup post-modern was its
methodology, because the military managed to eliminate the Welfare Party without
suspending the whole political system. Still in 1999, the military continued to enjoy the
‘absolute kingmaker’ status, as Ozpek puts it. The leader of PKK was arrested in Kenya
with a Cypriot passport and the organization declared a ceasefire. Like the case with
previous coups, those who were affiliated with WP and pro-Islamic ideology were
banned from politics, the conservative way of life, such as the headscarf in public official
spaces, was kept under control. 601
6.7 Conclusion
Necmeddin Erbakan and his Just Order (Adil Duzen) represent the decade’s long
disenfranchised conservative and Islamist portion of the periphery thus the epitome of
political Islam in Turkey. According to this, the adverse effects of Western influence,
such as European culture, secularism, Western banking system, Zionism etc. have plunge
the Islamic world into a spiraling decline and these are responsible for the persistent vices
that have befallen the Muslims. Therefore, the only way to salvage the Islamic world is a
spiritual, moral, political and economic awakening based on the tenets of Islam.
Therefore, one of the most important elements of the Erbakanian worldview consists of
the unity of Muslims all across the world under the banner of ummah. (the Community of
Muslims) It is important to note that although he advocated the unity of Muslims, he
believed that it ought to be under the banner of Turkey’s leadership.
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While the actual rise of Erbakan to prominence came in mid-1990s, the seeds of
the National Order ideology were sown in late 1960. Several factors contributed to the
rise of Erbakan. First of all, the adherents of the National View have always been known
to be devoted to their cause and well organized not only in Turkey but among the Turkish
diaspora in Europe, especially in Germany. The symbiotic relation between the European
and the Anatolian wings of the National View would then contribute to the economic
revival of the latter, which brings us to the second factor.
The relative liberalization of Turkish economy and general life in Turkey under
Ozal throughout 1980s helped the birth of what was called the Anatolian Tigers, a term
coined for the business entrepreneurships outside of the Istanbul establishment. After
decades of economic, social and educational deprivation, the periphery began to rise
against the Kemalist establishment. Finally, the death of Ozal in 1993 coupled with the
rising PKK terrorism, corruption and bribery that plagued almost every level of state
offered a perfect opportunity for Erbakan and his “Just Order” rhetoric. The election of
Erbakan to prime minister in 1996 marked a historical point in the history of Turkey in
that for the first time an individual with overt Islamic rhetoric became the head of the
government. Whereas this was an unprecedented accomplishment for the political Islam
in Turkey, it raised concerns among the Kemalist establishment, particularly in the
Military.
Having ascended to the top of government, Erbakan began to implement policies
that ran entirely counter to the traditional Kemalist understanding. His aspiration to create
a Muslim version of European Union with the membership of mostly Muslim developing
countries as well as his admiration for Iran drew criticism from the Kemalist cycles.
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Turkey’s relations with Israel under Erbakan, who was anti-Israeli, became a
battleground between him and the military, which saw Israel the only viable option in the
region to counter both the rise of political Islam and the Kurdish terrorism. Unlike
Kemalists, Erbakan was a steadfast anti-westernist, who repeatedly denounced almost
every aspect of Western world. This in turn strained Turkey’s relations with the US and
EU.
With his worldview and policy implementations, Erbakan clearly attempted to
challenge the Kemalist establishment, desiring to create a complete paradigm shift in
Turkish foreign policy. However, the Kemalist establishment with its strong military,
bureaucracy, higher education, legislation and secular socio-economic circles, prevented
it from happening with an unprecedented “postmodern coup”, where the military
removed the government without physically taking over the governance. Erbakan and his
government simply did not have means and power to subdue the Kemalist establishment
primarily because they were part of a coalition government, which kept Erbakan from
fully materializing his ideals, molding the state machinery with its military and
bureaucracy into his own worldview. Erbakan neither withdrew Turkey from the
“Christian club” European Union and NATO nor was he able to sever the relations with
Israel. In fact, perhaps it was Erbakan’s stubborn anti-Western attitude that deprived him
of the most viable partner against the military dominance; the European Union, which has
long urged Turkey to implement civilianization reforms that would render the military
less influential in state affairs.
The monumental collapse of the Erbakan government in 1997 once again proved
that taking the Kemalist establishment head on would always mean failure for the
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political Islamic movements in Turkey. It is this perception that set the stage for the
creation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The founding members of AKP,
who had decided to distance themselves from Erbakan’s establishment, conceded that a
serious reform in their ideology was required if they wanted to be successful in Turkey’s
political atmosphere.
Goals and Priorities of the Erbakanist Foreign Policy
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Pan-Islamic (Desire to build the Muslim unity in the world; Ummah)
Third Worldist (the D-8 project, unification of the Muslims)
Neo-Ottomanist (Aspiration to make Turkey a regional power and the
leader of the Islamic world)
Anti-West (Opposition to the European Union based on identity)
Anti-Zionist/Israel
Pro-Iran
Pluralist/inclusive (Recognizing the Kurdish identity based on the
Ummah concept)
The Just Order (in regards to the Turks in Europe)

Instruments of the Erbakanist Foreign Policy
•

The Office of the Prime Minister

The 18 Directives of NSC of February 28, 1997602
According to NSC decision no. 406, the Erkaban government was instructed to
implement the following 18 directives:
1. The principle of secularism should be strictly enforced and laws should be modified for
that purpose, if necessary.
2. Private dormitories, foundations, and schools affiliated with Sufi religious orders must
be put under the control of relevant state authorities and eventually transferred to the
Ministry of National Education (MNE)
3. An eight-year uninterrupted education system must be implemented across the country
and necessary administrative and legal adjustments should be made so that Qur’anic
courses, which children with basic education may attend with parental consent, operate
only under the responsibility and control of the MNE.
4. National education institutes charged with raising enlightened clergy loyal to the
republican regime and Kemal Atatürk’s principles and reforms must conform to the
essence of the Law on Unified Education
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5. Religious facilities built in various parts of the country must not be used for political
exploitation and such facilities must be built in coordination with local governments and
relevant authorities.
6. Activities of religious orders banned by law no. 677, as well as all entities prohibited
by said law, must be ended.
7. Media groups that oppose the military and depict its members as inimical to religion
should be brought under control.
8. Personnel expelled from military service because of fundamentalist activities,
disciplinary problems, or connections with illegal organizations must not be employed by
other public agencies and institutions or otherwise encouraged.
9. The measures taken within the framework of existing regulations to prevent infiltration
of the military by the extremist religious sector should also be applied in other public
institutions and establishments particularly in universities and other educational
institutions, at every level of the bureaucracy, and in judicial establishments.
10. Iran’s efforts to destabilize Turkey’s regime should be closely watched and policies to
prevent Iran from meddling in Turkey’s internal affairs should be adopted.
11. Legal and administrative means must be used to prevent the dangerous activities of
the extremist religious sector that seeks to create polarization in society by fanning
sectarian differences.
12. Legal and administrative proceedings against those responsible for incidents that
contravene the constitution and laws of the Turkish Republic should be concluded in a
short period of time and firm measures should be taken at all levels not to allow
repetition of such incidents.
13. Practices that violate the attire law and that may give Turkey a backward image must
be prevented.
14. Licensing procedures for short- and long-barrel weapons, which have been issued for
various reasons, must be reorganized on the basis of police and gendarmerie districts.
15. The collection of (animal) sacrifice hides by anti-regime and “uncontrolled”
(unregulated) organizations and establishments for the purpose of securing financial
resources should be prevented.
16. Legal proceedings against private bodyguards dressed in special uniforms and those
responsible for them should be concluded speedily and all such should be disbanded.
17. Initiatives that aim at solving Turkey’s problems on the basis of the concept of
“ummet” [religious worldview] rather than the concept “nation” [or a secular
worldview] and that encourage the separatist terrorist organization [meaning the PKK]
by approaching it on the same basis [means the Islamization of Kurdish nationalism]
should be prevented by legal and administrative means.
18. The law (no. 5816) defining crimes against Atatürk, including acts of disrespect, must
be fully implemented.
In the next chapter, I will examine the AKP government.
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CHAPTER 7. THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY ERA
7.1 Introduction
The first part of this chapter will analyze the social, economic and political origins
of the ascension of the Justice and Development Part (AKP) to power, the party’s
struggle with the Kemalist state institutions to remain in power. The second part will
scrutinize the foreign policy ideology of the party (neo-Ottomanism) and explain the
implications of the victory of the AKP over the Kemalist bureaucracy as well as the
party’s neo-Ottomanist approach on the Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s relations with
other state and non-state actors under the AKP will also be analyzed in the context of
neo-Ottomanist foreign policy understanding.
7.2 The Rising of the Alternative Elite: “Islamist Calvinists”
As discussed in the previous chapters, increasing political and economic
liberalization in Turkey gave way to the upward mobilization of the “other Turkey”,
which also was called “the periphery”. This section of Turkish society grew into
prominence in financial and economic sector especially late 90s also called the
“Anatolian Tigers”. One of the striking features of the Anatolian Tigers is that they are
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successful, conservative businessmen, who are inspired by the Qur’an and the Prophet
Muhammed, who encouraged commerce and development.603
This concept of entrepreneurship was then named as “the Islamic Calvinism”. 604
Those who follow this ideology value the importance of merit of work and savings and
advanced education. As a result of increasing awareness in education and urbanization,
the new elite began to greatly impact the Turkish politics and its discourse. It is important
to note that the values and ideology of the new rising elite showed considerable
differences from the Kemalist ideology, which is represented by the Ankara
establishment. The new conservative elite stress the importance of small business,
laissez-faire economics, and reduction of state intervention. 605
For example, in the 1990s, Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s
Association (MUSIAD) created a guideline in which it encouraged the idea of profit
maximizing individual, which is not necessarily in contrast with his/her moral or
religious values. It created its own version of homo economicus; homo Islamicus. This
ideology was legitimized by resorting to the life of Prophet Muhammed, who was a
merchant during his lifetime. Therefore, homo Islamicus is characterized by having
appropriate morals and minimal state intervention. In other words, it is the ideal Muslim
business type similar to homo economicus with respect to capitalist economies. The
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difference between homo Islamicus and homo economicus is that the former’s adoption
of ‘moral capitalist economy’.606 For example, according to this; “God-fearing pious
employers would take care of their employees, and in turn, the employee would work with
great enthusiasm knowing that they serve God as they do work, and their work is part of
their devotion. Both employer and employee would know that they work with the same
objective of serving Islam.”607
Prominent religious figures have stated that the search for profit for Muslims is
considered to be equal with prayer and fasting. Esad Cosan, former leader of one of the
largest wings of the Nakshibendi order, strongly encouraged his followers to study and
learn foreign languages, engage in computers and travel abroad to increase their
knowledge.608
One of the prominent examples of the “Islamic Calvinists” that played a great role
in the success of the AKP government is the Gulen community, also known as the
Cemaat (Community in Turkish). The movement is led by the cleric Fethullah Gulen,
who currently lives in Pennsylvania, USA and is distinct from other such religious
leaders in terms of its geopolitical and imperial aspirations. The community’s most
striking indication is their educational institutions in the thousands, ranging from primary
education institutions to private universities that are located not only in Turkey but in
more than 110 countries around the world. Especially before 2014 in which time the
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relations between the AKP government and the Cemaat hit rock bottom, the Cemaat’s
influence in Turkish politics and economy was substantial. 609
Fethullah Gulen has objected to the Kemalist-secular system that excluded Islam
from the public sphere. Gulen argued that the Kemalist modernization confined
spirituality to a private space. In one of his sermons he stated:
“Now it is a painful spring that we live in. A nation is being born again. A nation
of millions [is] being born one that will live for long centuries, God willing...It is being
born with its own culture, its own civilization. If giving birth to one person is so painful,
the birth of millions cannot be pain-free. Naturally we will suffer pain. It won’t be easy
for a nation that has accepted atheism, has accepted materialism, a nation accustomed to
running away from itself, to come back riding on its horse.”610
Gulen glorified the Ottoman past and it’s all-inclusive ‘millet system’ in
opposition to the Kemalist nationalism which is exclusionist. 611
The community has supported the Turkish membership of the EU. As opposed to
Erbakan, whose focus was the Middle East and the Islamic world, Gulen has focused
more on Central Asia and the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union. He believed
Turkey’s rise to global power also goes through establishing hegemony over the brethren
of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Through education communities and institutions
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throughout the world and especially in Central Asia, Gulen has aspired to engage in PR
of Turkey and Islam.612 This evidently is in contrast with the Kemalist worldview.
7.3 The Islamic Calvinism and Turkish Politics
As studied in the previous chapter, the rise of the ‘periphery’ played a great role
in the success of the Welfare Party. The support came basically for two reasons. The first,
of course, the same world view, the second is to counter the pressure they were getting
from the Kemalist establishment. The WP offered the new rising conservative sphere an
alternative by which they would lead their life as they wish. 613
The disappointment and pessimism set in on the conservative ‘other Turkey’ with
the removal of the Erbakan government by the military after the February 28 process.
The process caused a fundamental shift in the Turkish political Islam, which eventually
resulted in the formation of AKP.614 As Cizre and Cinar argue; “[t]his process has
profoundly altered the formulation of public policy and the relationship between state
and society. No major element of Turkish politics at present can be understood without
reference to the February 28 process.”615
The inability of Erbakan to counter the military in the mid 90s and his eventual
forceful resignation subsequent to the 28th process led some members of the Welfare
Party to come to the conclusion that it was almost impossible to win over the military
with the existing structure of the party and the long advocated worldview that had
attracted the wrath of the Kemalist bureaucracy and the military. The crack between the
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conservative and those members of the National Outlook, who advocate the change,
could not be hidden from the public in the newly established Felicity Party, the successor
to then abolished WP, Congress, where Abdullah Gul, one of the prominent reformists
ran for the chairmanship of the party against the traditionalist candidate Recai Kutan.
Though the race ended with Kutan’s victory, it became evident that the reformists were
now made up of a considerable percentage of the movement. 616
Those who split from the Felicity Party officially formed the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) on August 14, 2001 and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had
become a prominent figure in Turkish politics in the early 1990s as the successful mayor
of the largest city in Turkey, Istanbul,617 was elected as the chairman of the party. One of
the most important aspects of the AKP was that it not only was formed by those who
seceded from the Erbakanist movement but also those who represented different
ideologies of the political spectrum of Turkey. For example, among the founding
members were Cemil Cicek and Abdulkadir Aksu, who were the members of Ozal’s
Motherland Party, Cemil Cicek and Koksal Toptan, who were members of the
Democratic Party. Kursad Tuzmen was a member of the Nationalists Movement. The left
ideology was represented in the founding by Ertugrul Gunay. The wide array of
ideological make-up of the founding members of the AKP shows that it was founded
aiming to embrace large segments of Turkish society as opposed to limiting it to the
conservative-Islamists.
The AKP was founded with conservative values in mind but at the same time it
accepted the existing regime’s secular principles. According to this, although Islamic
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values made up an important aspect of the foundation, the goal was not to politicize Islam
or Islamization.618 It was evident that the February 28 process was a big lesson for the
advocates of political Islam in Turkey, which was that overhauling the existing status quo
regime in Turkey and replacing it with an Islamic one was not an option, given the
tremendous strength and influence of the Turkish military and Kemalist bureaucracy.
Therefore, navagating through the system, the reformists accepted the Kemalists
principles of the state while retaining their conservative background. Therefore, AKP was
founded to be a part of the system, not against it.619 However, as will be discussed
shortly, as soon as the AKP came to power with a super majority it began to charge
against the Kemalist institutions and mechanism of the state, using the European Union
reforms as leverage.
While the scholars conceded that the new party was established on the basis of
moderation and change, the point of contention was about the nature and the level of the
change. For example, Hale and Ozbudun argue that the AKP could not be called Islamic
due to the fact that the founding members overtly rejected their allegiance with the
National Outlook movement and should be accepted as center-right party. 620 The AKP
defines itself as a “conservative democratic party”.621 Ziya Onis defines the AKP as
“Islamic Liberal” while its predecessor Welfare Party was “moderate fundamentalist”.622
Hakan Yavuz states that AKP’s rejection of the National Outlook was part of a
worldwide moderation trend among the Islamic movements. Yavuz calls AKP “Islamic
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Liberal”. To Yildiz Atasoy, the AKP represents a successful “marriage” of Islam and
neoliberalism. 623
Ihsan Dagı summarizes all these assessments with the following quote;
“The transformation of the national view movement from the early 1970s to the
late 1990s has given to a new political party (the AKP) with a liberal, democratic and
pro-Western orientation and political agenda. A movement that embraces modern
political values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, which advocates
integration with the EU, and manages to get votes from all segments of society, can
hardly be called Islamist. It is a case demonstrating that a discursive shift may be
followed by an identity change under certain circumstances. The Islamists’ recent
departure from their traditional anti-West and anti-Westernization position seems to have
transformed the Islamic self in Turkey, opening up new possibilities for the coexistence of
Islam and the West.624
7.4 Prelude to AKP’s Electoral Success
About one year after it was established, the AKP won the November 2002
elections with an exceptional victory, gaining 34.3% of the votes. The Republican
People’s Party got 19.4%. Because of the ten per cent threshold, the remaining parties
were not represented in the parliament, making the AKP a single party government,
gaining 363 of the 550 seats, and the PRP the opposition party. Erbakan’s FP received 2.5
percent of the votes, which is considered to be a heavy defeat.625
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It is important to note here that the success of the AKP could not solely be
attributed to its adoption of new values and declared change in ideology. It is widely
agreed that among the contributing factors to the AKP’s historic win were the financial
and economic crisis of 2001, which was one of the biggest. The financial crisis was
preceded by the massive earthquake of 1999 that rocked the Marmara Region, the most
populated area of Turkey. The failing banking system in Turkey and the gloomy reports
of the IMF about the Turkish economy as well as the massive corruption and nepotism
allegations that involved the aforementioned banks and the politicians only exacerbated
the economic and social devastation of the 1999 earthquake. 626
The flimsy coalition government of the DSP (Democratic Leftist Party), MHP
(Nationalist Movement Party) and ANAP (Motherland Party) led by Bulent Ecevit failed
to meet the demands of the IMF and the crisis in the banking sector combined drew the
Turkish economy to the brink of collapse. The 2001 growth rate was a mere minus 7.5%.
The Turkish Lira lost more than 110% of its value against the dollar, more than fifty
thousand small and medium size businesses had filed for bankruptcy. The unemployment
rate climbed up to 10%. The gravity of the economic and political situation prompted the
General Staff to warn that it might lead to a social explosion. 627
There is no doubt that the AKP’s success in the 2002 elections was due in great
part to the Turkish people’s dissatisfaction with the existing coalition government and its
utter failure in socio economic affairs. The 2002 election proved this. The total
percentage of votes that the coalition parties gained fell from 53% in the previous
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elections to 14% in 2002. One third of the entire constituents voted for AKP. Among the
supporters of the AKP in 2002 were the residents of the shanty towns of Ankara and
Istanbul (Gecekondular), the new rising “Anatolian elite” and the Kurds. 628
Finally, Erdogan’s charismatic persona and the perception that he was unfairly
barred from politics and jailed by the State Security Court of Diyarbakir on April 22,
1998 because of a poem with religious tones he recited played a role in the success of the
AKP in 2002 elections. Therefore, not only his Islamic past but also the financial crisis
and the desperation of the citizens for a fresh start as well as his personality brought the
AKP to power with it forming a single party government,629 which had not happened
since Ozal’s 45th (1983-1987) and 46th (1987-1989) governments.
7.5 The Path to Consolidation of Power
Fuat Keyman and Sebnem Gumuscu state that the AKP was able to successfully
exert its dominance in Turkish politics by pursuing democratization, modernization,
globalization and Europeanization at the same time taking on the complications that
originated from the reactions from different powerhouses that countered the AKP
policies. Keyman and Gumuscu argue that the AKP’s strategy for success and
consolidation of power was established on four principles:630
The first one is proactive, market-oriented and reform based conservative
democracy, which is also ‘caring’ and acquiring a supervision role in its relation with
economy. Therefore, AKP implemented policies in its governance such that they would
result in a change in the existing structure of politics and economy, which had alienated
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the society, neglecting their needs and demands. This, to AKP, had created an
undemocratic system rule.
The second principle is growth oriented ‘philanthropic and regulated liberalism’.
According to this the AKP government adopted free market economy, which created
sustainable growth and contributed to further industrialization of Turkish economy.
These ensured consolidation of financial stability and robust economy.
The third principle is service based politics, which was established based on
distribution of wealth and welfare services whereas the social elements in Turkey were
not discriminated against for their cultural identity. With this principle, the AKP
government focused on the poverty and aimed to reach to different parts of the society,
who were in need of help. This helped AKP in its successive elections.
The fourth principle is proactive foreign policy, which indicated that the AKP
would pursue multidimensional and constructive politics abroad. This would emphasize
Turkey’s soft power capabilities. 631
The initial success of the AKP in economics was greatly attributed to the policies
set by Kemal Dervis, who was a prominent economist at the World Bank and had been
invited by the Ecevit coalition government to save the crumbling Turkish economy and
financial sector. Added to this was the expansion of exports markets to which Turkish
businessmen would do business and attracting foreign investment in great proportions as
well as pursuing aggressive privatization, which totaled a whopping 34 billion dollars.
All these policies resulted in sustainable growth in and consolidation of the economy.
Turkey became the seventeenth largest economy in the world. The economic success
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resulted in increased volume and diversification of exports goods ranging from
automotive to household durables and textiles to food. During the AKP government
tenure, the per capita income passed the ten thousand dollars threshold. The consolidation
of market economy propelled the AKP to focus on modernization of bureaucracy,
infrastructure, education, health and housing, which required intense investment in the
technological infrastructure of public sector, expanding highway, railroad and airport
networks. 632
In the same initial stage of its rule, the AKP widened and consolidated its
domestic and foreign legitimacy. One of the most important instruments that the AKP
used for this purpose was aggressive pursuit of European Union reforms, which led to
more civilianization of Turkish bureaucracy and politics. The transformation of
bureaucracy, economy and politics under the AKP government, which demonstrated that
modernity was possible with conservative/religious values and the fact that the AKP
represented the ‘other Turkey’ or ‘periphery’ with its distinct economic, political and
social worldview, and that it rose to power of great proportions, began to disturb the
Kemalist state machinery and secular elite or ‘the traditional center’. 633
In the following section, I will focus on the AKP’s interaction with the Kemalist
state machinery, which is comprised primarily of bureaucracy, military, judiciary,
legislation and higher education.
The extent of the AKP’s adoption of democracy was generally measured by its
policies to civilianize/democratize the government in the form of removing the military
tutelage and the Kemalist monopoly over the Turkish politics and democracy. Ertugrul
632
633

Keyman and Gumuscu, p. 38
Keyman and Gumuscu, p. 39

230

Tombus states that AKP was evaluated “within the binary opposition” of military versus
civilian politics as well as center versus the periphery, authoritarian versus democratic,
appointed versus elected.634
Tombus analyzes AKP’s path to power consolidation in two phases. The first
phase is the polemical phase (2003-2007) and the second is the ruling phase (2007today). In the first phase, the AKP was perceived as a political entity that endeavored to
counterbalance the establishment and the status quo. The degree of AKP’s
democratization was generally measured by its policies and rhetoric to disapprove and
challenge the authoritarian military. Therefore the AKP was considered to be the opposite
of the Kemalist establishment, which was defined as possessing “exclusionary politics,
monolithic national identity, and assimilation of differences, authoritative or assertive
secularism, and extra-political control over democratic politics”.635It is this stance that
AKP had that granted it legitimacy both at home and abroad, especially in Europe. This
also widened the support base of AKP. 636
The AKP’s populist rhetoric in this stage was that “the Kemalist establishment
and its minority and privileged elite alienated the real owners of the republic”. This way
AKP found a reliable connection with a wider popular base. As a result, the Turkish
politics under the AKP’s initial rule became reduced to a “binary opposition” such as
supporting AKP versus the military.637
In the polemical phase the AKP rulers expressed their commitment to and need
for democracy but it was solely established on the premises to combat with the Kemalist
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establishment, especially with the military. In this phase, the election of Abdullah Gul, a
very prominent figure in the AKP, as the president of Turkey in 2007 marked an
important point. Beginning his election, the AKP captured all institutions and
mechanisms that the Kemalist paradigm put in place to establish its supremacy over the
masses and to control the governance of the country. With this stage, the polemical phase
came to an end.638
The end of the polemical phase, which began with the ascension of Abdullah Gul,
one of the founders of AKP, to presidency in August 2007 ushered in an era where the
AKP acquired its unchallenged power status. By this, the AKP became no longer bound
by the Kemalist establishment and further consolidated its power.639
7.5.1 The Initial Reform Period: 2002-2007
Having won a historical victory in 2002, the AKP became a single party
government for the first time in more than twenty years. This undoubtedly gave AKP
considerable power and leverage compared to flimsy and often uncompromising coalition
governments. This did not mean, however, that although the AKP was able to ascend to
be government it did not really mean it had the full control of the state. Historically, the
governments, especially those that had agenda outside of the Kemalist realm were
contained by the Kemalist state apparatus, which was made up essentially of the military
and then the Kemalist bureaucracy, i.e. the higher courts, higher education, and foreign
ministry bureaucracy. The single party AKP government was no exception. Having
learned a hard lesson from its predecessor, Welfare Party, not to challenge the Kemalist
establishment with the delusional feeling of substantial electoral victory, the AKP
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adopted a different means to tackle the Kemalist establishment; it was to play the game
with its rules!640
Therefore, the initial AKP period was marked with Turkey’s aggressive and
unprecedented pursuit of the European Union membership. Therefore, the pro-EU
discourse helped AKP in two ways; first thanks to the EU reforms the AKP was able to
garner the support of a wide array of the Turkish public, which also further legitimized
the government. The second, the EU reform process was used as a legitimate tool to
‘civilianize’ the governance and reduce and later completely remove the supremacy of
the Turkish military.
In the following section, I will examine the process through which the AKP
developed its strategy to tackle the secular, Kemalist establishment. Therefore, I will
examine the civilian-military relations as well as the AKP’s relations with the most
important guardians of the Kemalist establishment of the state, namely, Higher Education
Council (YOK), the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and the
Presidency.
7.5.1.1 The EU Reforms Aimed at the Military Tutelage and the Kemalist Bureaucracy
Ismail Akca and Evren Balta-Peker argue that the transformation of civil–military
relations in Turkey in the first decade of the twenty-first century is related to three
factors: the presence of international conditionality, a decrease in the level of internal
threats, and the emergence of a domestic political actor with the capacity and will to
challenge the military establishment. Regarding international conditionality, civil–
military relations have been transformed, not only in Turkey but also globally, since the
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end of the Cold War. This trend has affected Turkey directly through the EU accession
process. The European Council granted Turkey candidacy in 1999 in Helsinki and stated
that ‘Turkey is a candidate country destined to join the EU’ (Presidency Conclusions,
Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999). However; the EU clearly stated that
accession negotiations could only begin if Turkey is resolved to fully satisfy
certain political conditions. According to the Commission:
“The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of
fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively
addressed... The independence of the judiciary, the powers of State Security Courts and
military courts and compliance with rulings of the European Court of Human Rights
remain matters of concern.641 The extent to which the constitutional amendment will
enhance de facto civilian control over the military will need to be monitored.642 Hence,
the EU requirement that the role of the military be reduced in civilian politics was the
initial trigger for reform in civil–military relations. However, international conditionality
would not have created a similar effect if Turkey had continued to experience a
significant level of internal threat as it had in the 1990s.643
It is this point of the EU negotiations that the AKP government took earnestly in
order to challenge the supremacy of the military. The AKP was willing to win the game
by playing it by the rules! Added to the advantage of the AKP was, as mentioned
previously, the lessened threat from abroad in 2000s, which rendered the military less
relevant in Turkish politics.
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The Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 were important factor for the AKP to push
through the EU accession reforms to curb the military. Accordingly, the AKP passed the
seventh harmonization package on August 7, 2003644 [Law No. 4963], which brought
significant changes in the composition, role and functions of the National Security
Council (NSC) and the Secretariat General. As previously discussed, the NSC was the
main driving body for the military hegemony over the civilian rule. By the new law, the
NSC was reduced from being an executive body to a mere advisory board. Furthermore,
substantial changes were made in the formation of the members of the NSC.
Accordingly, the majority of the members were to be civilians rather than high ranking
officers. The secretariat general was to be a civilian, for the first time in the history of the
council, and was to be appointed by the president out of the list proposed by the prime
minister.645 Subsequently, Mehmet Yigit Alpogan, a career diplomat who had served as
the ambassador to Greece, was appointed to be the first civilian secretary general of the
NSC.646
One of the signs that the military was out of reach of the civilian control was the
military expenditures that were not transparent and not audited by the Court of Accounts
a Turkish body similar to the U.S. General Accounting Office. The package amended the
1967 Law on the national audit bureau, which drew criticism from the military. Therefore
the Court of Audit was to act ‘on behalf of the Turkish Grand Assembly and its inspection
committees’ – to scrutinize the revenues, expenditures and property of all public sector
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institutions ‘without any exception and without exempting any institute from being
accountable’. The Court was also held responsible to report to the relevant parliamentary
committees. 647
In another attempt to reduce the military influence on the civilians, the NSC was
to meet once every two months, as opposed to every month. The NSC had had the
authority to nominate military personnel to the boards of the Establishment of, and
Broadcasting by, Radio and Television Corporations, Wireless Communication, and the
Protection of Minors from Harmful Publications. This was annulled. The authority of the
General Staff to appoint a representative to the board of the Higher Education Council
was also revoked. Finally, the state of emergency that had been in effect in the thirteen
south eastern provinces since 1987, due to the PKK terror, was also abolished. This was
due in great part to the new policy approach to the Kurdish problem, which has aimed to
resolve it.648
From 2003 until 2005, the AKP pushed through some reforms related to the
Kurdish problem, including abolition of the death penalty and a clampdown on the police
use of torture, the release of political prisoners, greater freedom of expression and
protection for the media, and some cultural, educational, and language rights albeit very
limited for the Kurds. An amendment to Articles 4 of the Law on the Establishment of
Radio and Television Enterprises lifted the restrictions on broadcasting in the different
languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives, such as
Kurdish. Although, the AKP was not able to create a Kurdish policy of substance during
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this period, it sought to find a pragmatic solution to the Kurdish problem. This solution
would not include military confrontation, which would have given the army the
opportunity to reassert itself further in Turkish politics.
The AKP government took bold steps for the solution of the Kurdish issue. These
included greater freedom of expression and the freedom of press. Although limited,
important steps were taken to restore the cultural, linguistic and educational rights of the
Kurds.649 Therefore, the Article 4 of the Law on the Establishment of Radio and
Television Institution (RTUK) was amended and the restriction to broadcast in different
languages other than Turkish was abolished.650 These steps showed that the AKP
approach to the Kurdish issue was pragmatic. 651
7.5.1.2 The Reaction of the Turkish Armed Forces
It was evident that the AKP government targeted the military hegemony in Turkey by
pursuing pro-EU policies. However, a beacon of western values and westernization, it
would not have been expected that the military oppose and react to the
Europeanization/civilianization/ democratization attempts by the AKP government. It
soon was revealed that the military hardliners had been trying to undermine the AKP
government due to the reforms that aimed at weakening the power projection of the
Turkish military. As was the case in the second half of the 20th century, the military had
been planning to overthrow the government.
On March 29-April 4, 2007, the weekly political news magazine Nokta published
a sensational issue that was titled “We were saved from two military coups in 2004; the
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Golden Coin and Moonlight! Stunning details!” The following excerpts from the
magazine are remarkable;
“January 20, 2004 – I attended the force commanders meeting at the Air Force
Headquarters. Since the National Security Council's pre-meeting was rescheduled from
Thursday to tomorrow, a new coordination was needed. … During the conversations,
Gendarmerie Commander Gen. Şener Eruygur was talking with desire for a coup and
asking ‘Let's do it as soon as possible.' Today, he repeated it many times…”
“February 6 2004- I directly headed to the Gendarmerie headquarters in the
morning; three of us got together there. We evaluated the situation one more time. The
Gendarmerie commander was insisting ‘Let's make a coup”… We convened in the
morning to review the options in the Cyprus issue. However, we pushed this aside and
engaged in whether or not we will make a coup. It is really difficult to convince
Gendarmerie Commander Gen. Şener Eruygur. Although I knew that it would be
pointless, I tried to convince him. But I cannot say that I was successful…”A bunch of
previous notes: There is another one dated December 6, 2003. It reads: “... We have
decided to prepare an action plan.652
It was revealed that the head of the land, naval and air forces of the Turkish
military had attempted to intervene in civilian government four times, which later called
Ayışığı (Moonlight), Yakamoz (Bioluminescence), Sarıkız (Blondie), and Eldiven
(Glove). Those officers who supported the coup attempts considered the AKP

652

Cengiz Candar, The ‘Coup Diaries’ are Ergenokon’s Background, Hurriyet Daily News, 4/7/2008.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-coup-diaries-are-ergenekonsbackground-2008-07-04

238

government as a threat to the foundations of the republic and were threatened by the rapid
and decisive EU reforms that apparently targeted the military. 653
These coup attempts were unsuccessful for several reasons. First of all, hardliners
in the military relied on the possibility of ratification of the Annan Plan in Cyprus as the
most forceful justification for a coup. Thus, the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek
Cypriot part of the island deprived them of necessary public support. While Gen. Özkök
resisted the coup from the start, it could not be realized due to the subsequent emergence
of divergent opinions between the four commanders (Navy, Land, Air and
Gendarmerie).While explaining in his diary the coup plans, Örnek also describes
outgoing President Ahmet Necdet Sezer as a man supporting the commanders' views in
their efforts to do something against the AK Party, Nokta magazine said. Former Land
Forces Commander retired Gen. Aytaç Yalman has also accused Gen. Özkök of being
timid and someone incapable of doing anything. Örnek briefly mentions the second coup
attempt, codenamed Ayığışı. This coup attempt, or memorandum, was later planned by
now retired Gen. Eruygur alone when all the other top commanders had withdrawn from
the plan. Due to its limited character, Ayışığı also failed to be staged.
Akca and Balta-Peker argue that the coup attempts failed to come to fruition for
several reasons. One of them was that the military was hoping the Annan Plan of 2004 to
be put into effect in Cyprus, which would have created a legitimate pretext for the
military to step in arguing that the territorial unity of Turkey was compromised. Because
the plan was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots, it was not put into practice,
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which ceased the hopes of the military.

654

Diaries of the then Naval Admiral Ozden

Ornek, revealed that although the then president Ahmet Sezer, a staunch Kemalist,
supported the views of the land, navy and air force generals, the opposition of then chief
of staff Hilmi Ozkok (2002-2006) was one of the biggest reasons for the coups to fail. 655
Furthermore, the coups failed because unlike the previous military interventions,
the generals were not able to gather the support of the big businesses and media tycoons,
who were sensitive to political and financial instability in Turkey. Also, Turkey was
enjoying a great deal of recognition in the west due to democratization reforms. The
generals, therefore, lacked external support too. To sum up, the political and economic
reforms that the AKP undertook in the first years of governance resulted in the
diminishing support of the general public for the military. 656
The very fact that the AKP government was not strong enough to penetrate into
state institutions had the members take a low profile vis-à-vis the military. This stance as
well as deceleration of the EU reforms and remilitarization of the PKK problem paved
the way for the generals to strike back against the AKP government.657 The Turkish
military was relentless in its quest to prevent the AKP from fully controlling the state.
The following section focuses on the civilian-military relations and their implications
leading to the presidential elections of 2007, which marked the final battle between the
military and AKP, which resulted in the AKP’s consolidation of power against the
foundations of the Kemalist status quo.
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7.5.1.3 The Military Strikes Back
Upon the rejection of the EU constitution in France (May 29, 2005) and the
Netherlands (June 1, 2005) and the increasing tendency among the European Union
representatives for a “privileged membership for Turkey” rather than a full membership,
as well as the overt opposition of the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social
Union, and the Left parties against Turkey’s membership began to create “Eurofatigue”
in Turkey.658
The diminishing Euro-excitement among the Turks and unfavorable atmosphere
of the EU-Turkish relations meant that the AKP’s most important weapon against the
military tutelage was getting weaker. On April 20, 2005, the chief of staff Hilmi Ozkok
spoke at the War Academy in Istanbul drawing attention to the increasing PKK violence
and the European Union. He blamed the EU for the PKK activities as the terror
organization has found safe haven in different countries in Europe. He added that “it will
not be the end of the world if Turkey stays out of EU. 659
The remilitarization of the PKK problem in southeastern Turkey began to increase
especially in late 2005 and early 2006. The bomb attack at a local book store in Semdinli
showed that the perpetrators were members of the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight
against Terrorism (JİTEM), while the other was a PKK informant.660 In a bold move, the
chief prosecutor of the Van Province Ferhat Sarikaya drafted an indictment for those
members of the Turkish Armed Forces involved in the attack.
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However, the general chief of staff Hilmi Ozkok reportedly asked the then prime
minister Erdogan to take measures to prevent this indictment attempt from
materializing. 661
The disappearing pro-European sentiment allowed the military to press the
government in regards to the PKK problem. According to this, the AKP government
amended the Law on the Fight against Terrorism (Act No. 3713), which had previously
been created in 1991. The amendment broadened the definition of terror related crimes
and toughened the penalties.662 Inadvertently, the freedom of expression, the press and
the media was affected negatively in this process. 663
Between 2002 and 2005 the TAF gave concessions to the AKP government but
the setbacks in the EU process had the military charge back. This opened up more space
for the military to maneuver against the government. 664
Umit Cizre states that the military strategy that started on the February 28 process
deepened in 2005. According to this, the military’s strategy shifted from a “state-centered
strategy to establish hegemony to a more de-centered, individual-based and informal
practice of power in society.”
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That is to say, the failed coup attempts of the 2002-

2005 era was replaced by a more informal means of pressuring the government. This
included public pronouncements by the TAF representatives, public commutations at
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universities or graduations of military academies. These venues were used by the military
representatives to give message to the government and incite the public against it. 666
The appointment of a secular hardliner Yasar Buyukanit to the general chief of
staff in August 2006 reinforced the military’s role to be ‘the guardian of secular state’. As
reminiscent of the process that led to the February 28 process, the headscarf issue began
to be a hot topic in Turkey. Part of the new strategy, under the TAF leadership, a secular
public front was established. This front included the representatives of the Kemalish
establishment, namely CHP, certain NGOs, presidents and deans of the higher education
institutions, and print and visual press. According to Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, this
coalition presented “the Islamic headscarf as a sign of the hidden agenda of the AKP. The
implication here is that the AKP will eventually replace the secular republican regime
with an Islamic one.”667
The friction between the government and the military reached its peak before the
presidential elections in 2007. The military perceived the AKP’s presidential candidate
Abdullah Gul, one of the prominent founders of AKP and then minister of foreign affairs,
to be a threat to the secular/Kemalist state and embarked on blocking him. The then chief
of staff Buyukanit at a press conference on April 12, 2007 warned that the presidential
elections and the nature of the president was extremely important as the president is the
commander in chief of the Turkish Armed Forces.668 He said: “I hope someone who is
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genuinely dedicated to the fundamental values of the Republic, and the unitary structure
of the state and democratic/secular aspect of state is going to be the next president.”669
In what turned out to be one of the largest displays of public opinion in Turkey,
the secular front under the leadership of Ataturkist (Kemalist) Ideology Association
(Ataturkcu Dusunce Dernegi) and retired general Sener Eruygur staged demonstrations in
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other cities of Turkey in defiance to the AKP government
and its candidate Abdullah Gul. The main message that the hundreds of thousands of
demonstrators wanted to give was “Turkey is secular and will remain so!” As the
demonstrations were raging, the chief of staff of the Turkish Military posted on April 27,
2007, a statement on the military’s website, which then was known to be the “e-coup”
attempt. 670
The General Chief of Staff statement was as follows:
Press Release
It has been observed that there is a part of society that is in an ongoing struggle
to undermine the basic values of the Turkish Republic, secularism being at the forefront,
and those activities have increased in the recent period. The following ongoing activities
have been submitted to the relevant authorities under suitable conditions: the desire to
redefine basic values, and a wide range of activities, which extend as far as to arrange
alternative celebrations of our national holiday, which is a symbol of our nation’s
coherence, the independence of our state and our nation’s unity.
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Those that attempt to carry out these activities exploit the sacred religious
emotions of our people without shame, transformed into an open challenge to the
government in the guise of religion, in an attempt to conceal their actual purpose. By
bringing activities that draw attention to women and children, these actions resemble
those that attempt to destroy the unity and integrity of our country.
In this context;
In Ankara, a Koran reading contest was scheduled on the same day as the April
23 National Sovereignty and Children’s Day celebrations, but the contest was cancelled
due to a sensitive media and public pressure.
On April 22, 2007 in Şanlıurfa with the participation of groups from the districts
of Mardin, Gaziantep and Diyarbakır, a choir was created and young girls were forced
to sing religious refrains at a time when they should have been in bed and in oldfashioned costumes not suitable for their age. Additionally, the attempts to remove
pictures of Atatürk and the Turkish flag in the middle of the night revealed the true intent
and purpose of the organization of such activities.
Furthermore, all school principals in the district of Altındağ in Ankara were
ordered to participate in the “Holy Birth Celebration”; at an event organized by the
District Mufti of Denizli with the cooperation of a political party, elementary students
sang religious refrains with their heads covered; in spite of having four mosques in the
town of Nikfer, in the county of Tavas ijcrb.webs.com in Denizli, Atatürk Elementary
School women were forced to listen to presentations about preaching and religion, and
similar news has been heard.
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The National Ministry of Education has determined the events that will be
celebrated in schools. However, it has been established that such celebrations were
realized upon instructions that were not regulated in directives. Also, it has been
observed that although the General Staff had informed the authorized institutions, no
preventive measure had been taken. The fact that an important part of the related
activities had been realized with the authorization and within the knowledge of civilian
authorities, which should intervene to such events and prevent them makes the matter
even graver. It is possible to further demonstrate more examples.
Those that are anti-Republican, with no other purpose than to erode the basic
characteristics of the state with this retrogressive approach, have expanded the scope of
their activities over the past few days with the developments and discourse of the last few
days with courage.
The developments in our region reveal many examples, which might result from
playing with religion and abusing beliefs for a political rhetoric and purpose from which
lessons should be drawn.
It is possible to observe in our country as well as in other countries that a
political rhetoric or ideology, which is tried to be built on a sacred belief, suppresses the
belief and turns out to something else. It can be argued that the event, which occurred in
Malatya, is a stunning example of this. There is no doubt that the only condition for the
State of the Republic of Turkey to live in peace and stability, as a modern democracy is to
protect the essential characteristics of the State determined in our Constitution.
As a matter of fact, such behaviors and implementations are totally in
contradiction with the principle “Being committed to the regime of the Republic not in
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words but in deeds and reflecting this with acts” stated by the General Chief of Staff in a
press conference held on the 12th of April, 2007 and they do violate the basic
qualifications and provisions of the Constitution.
In recent days, the outstanding problem in the Presidential elections has been the
discussion of secularism. This situation is observed with concern by the Turkish Armed
Forces. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces is not neutral in these
discussions and is the absolute defender of secularism. Furthermore, the Turkish Armed
Forces is definitely against the ongoing discussions and negative comments and would
reveal its attitudes and behaviors clearly and transparently when necessary. No one
should ever doubt about it.
Briefly, whoever is against the philosophy of the Great Leader Atatürk ”How
happy is he who says I am a Turk” is the enemy of the Republic of Turkey and so will he
stay. The Turkish Armed Forces still maintains its firm determination to fully carry out its
clear duties assigned to it with laws in order to protect these qualifications and its
commitment and faith in this determination are absolute”. Announced with respect to the
public.” (General Chief of Staff, April 27, 2007)671
The defiant proclamation of the military was met with an even harsher statement
by the government, which was swift in doing so. The next day on April 28, the AKP
government released the following:
"Yesterday a declaration expressing the opinions of the General Staff on various
subjects has been served to media organs at midnight and has been published in the
website of the General Staff. This declaration has been perceived as a clear attitude
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against the Government. There is no doubt that in a democratic environment, even
thinking about this is unaccustomed. We would like to express that, the fact that the
General Staff which is an institution associated to the Prime Minister uses an expression
against the Government in any subject is unthinkable in a democratic State of law. The
General Staff is an institution under the command of the Government, the functions of
which are determined with the Constitution and the related laws. According to our
Constitution, the General Chief of Staff is accountable to the Prime Minister regarding
its duties and authorities. The fact that this text has been served to media organs and its
timing in the website are meaningful. First of all, it is extremely remarkable that such a
text comes out in the process of the presidential election of the 11th president which is the
supreme authority of our State and, moreover, in the middle of the night. That this fact
happens in this fragile period when discussions are ongoing on the Constitutional Court
would be perceived as an attempt aimed at influencing the supreme justice. It should be
clear to everyone that our Government is more supporting and fragile than anyone else
in what concerns the principal and indispensable common values indicated in articles 1,
2 and 3 of the Constitution, the unity and integrity of our country, the notability of our
nation and the qualifications of Turkey as a secular, democratic and social State of law.
Turkey’s national unity and integrity and the welfare of the Turkish Nation is possible
with the protection of those values.
It is not possible to approve any behaviors and acts that are revealed from time to
time by real and legal persons against the basic qualifications of our Republic, the
Constitution as well as the laws. Anyway, in such situations, starting from the public
prosecutor, the investigating authorities hold the authority to make the necessary
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investigations without taking any permit from anyone. Doing the necessary in these
matters is their duty.
Furthermore, it is out of question that our government and the associated units
remain insensitive to the implementations that are declared by media organs or are
expressed in various environments and are in contradiction with the basic values of our
State.
Therefore, it has been very regrettable that certain statements regarding the
relations between the Government and the General Staff which are very inaccurate took
place in the related text.
For the healthy functioning of the process aimed at strengthening Turkey,
modernizing it and increasing its democratic standards, it is compulsory that all the basic
institutions of our State be more prudent and attentive on these subjects Otherwise
unrecoverable damages would have been given to the strengthening of our State, the
peace and wealth of our country. The primary duty regarding the protection of the basic
values of the State belongs to the Government. Since the Government is
uncompromisingly a supporter of this subject, the fact that all the institutions associated
to the Government be also supporting in this direction is after all natural.
Each problem of Turkey would be resolved within the rules of law and
democracy. An adverse thought and attitude shall on no account be accepted. The
mission that everybody and each institution shall fulfill is to ease the functioning of this
process. The damage given to our country and our nation by being in other searches has
been experienced with enough sorrow in the past.
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Our government is firmly committed to further strengthen our Republic, which is
a democratic, secular and social State of law and to prevent our democracy from being
damaged. Our Republic and democracy is an irrevocable, unalienable acquisition. Today
we should struggle to find out how we can walk stronger to the future in harmony and
cooperation to protect the basic qualifications of our State.
Instead of consuming our energy with internal discussions, we should struggle in
order to further strengthen our country in global competition and increase the wealth
and happiness of our nation. In this context, we should defeat the efforts of some
malicious persons to put the Turkish Armed Forces against our Government.
All the persons having a sense of responsibility should avoid behaviors that
damage the respectability of Turkey in the international community, harm our position in
the modern world, threat the stability of the Turkish economy, are against democracy and
inflict a deep wound in the Turkish conscience. Those who harm trust and stability should
know that they would carry the responsibility of the negative results this would generate
for our country and our nation.”672
7.5.2 The Attempts to Close down AKP
Having felt defeated but still relentless, the Kemalist state machine continued to
resort to every bit of remaining means to contain the AKP. Like its predecessor the WP, it
was going to be the “anti-secular” argument that was going to be put forth against
Erdogan and his teammates in an attempt to remove the party from the government. That
the new president appointed conservative leaning, pro-AKP Professor Yusuf Ziya Ozcan
as the head of the Higher Education Board, one of the fundamental institutions that the
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pro-seculars deem important, created uproar among the Kemalists. What really triggered
the Supreme Court to initiate the process to close down the AKP was the headscarf issue.
On February 9, 2007, the motion that AKP proposed to amend the head scarf ban
in public spaces, including universities was overwhelmingly (411 yes - 149 no) passed in
the Parliament. The president Gul ratified the amendments immediately. In February
2008, the opposition parties CHP and DSP filed suit in the Constitutional Court to block
the headscarf law. On March 14, the chief prosecutor of the Court of Appeals asked that
the Constitutional Court ban the AKP and 71 members, including Erdogan and Gul, be
banned from practicing politics. The pretext was that the party had become “focal point
of anti-secular activities.”673 AKP argued that the move was to expand freedom and
democratization in society.
The prosecutor did not seek indictment for the Nationalist Action Party (MHP),
which had joined with the AKP to form a supermajority to pass the headscarf legislation.
The seven of eleven votes of the Constitutional Court was needed to impose the
maximum penalty on AKP. On July 30, the AKP literally escaped from being closed
narrowly when six members of the Constitutional Court voted to ban the party. Still, the
AKP was given financial penalties, which was better than facing the same fate as the
Welfare Party. No AKP members were banned. 674
Carol Migdalovitz argues that the reason why the members of the Constitutional
Court refrained from closing the party altogether was that there was a great concern in the
political and financial circles that the shutdown would create instability worse than the
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2001 crisis. Furthermore, it would mean a blow to Turkey’s struggle to become an EU
member. 675
AKP reaffirmed its commitment to EU membership even stronger after the legal
battle was over. President Gul asked for more empathy and common sense saying “in
looking at our own errors, we at the same time have to place ourselves in the position of
those opposed to us and try to understand the thinking and feelings of those
against us” 676
In the following section, I will examine those institutions and mechanisms of
tutelage, which were put in place by the Kemalist establishment and the interaction of the
AKP with them. They are; the Higher Education Council (YOK) and the president’s
authority to appoint university presidents, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors
(HSYK), the General Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Analyzing AKP’s
interaction with these institutions is important because the nature of relation will
determine to what extent the AKP wanted to change the current Kemalist paradigm in
Turkey. These intuitions are the “engines” and the protectors of the Kemalist ideology.
7.6 AKP Takes on the Kemalist Bureaucracy
While it was perceived that the Turkish military constituted the biggest obstacle in
realizing its agenda, the other Kemalist institutions also became the target of the AKP as
the state functioned as a whole, supporting each other, to protect and perpetuate the
Kemalist tutelage and principles. The following will be an in depth examination of how
the AKP gradually eliminated the dominance of Kemalism from the Higher Education
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Council (YOK) and The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), the two
important institutions that steer the higher education and the legal matters.
7.6.1 Higher Education Council (YOK) and the Education System in Turkey
The YOK has drawn much criticism since it was established by the military in
1981 on the grounds that it prevents the academic freedom. It was devised to centralize
and to hold the universities and higher education intuitions under the state control. It has
the authority to appoint, promote academic administrative staff in higher education.
Therefore, the YOK was one of the most important tools of the establishment to dictate
its ideology.677
The AKP opposed the YOK on the grounds that the institution had ultra-secular
tendencies imposing the headscarf ban citing the freedom of religion. The AKP also
criticizes the pro-Kemalist president Ahmet Nejdet Sezer for appointing like-minded
rectors to universities. 678
The first battleground between the secular establishment and the government was
the YOK Legislation Proposal (YOK Tasarisi). The AKP justified this proposal citing the
EU reforms. According to this the EU argued that: “… under YOK’s control the
universities lack academic, administrative and financial autonomy. YOK has been
accused over the years of being an authoritarian institution that has satisfied Turkish
thought and interfered excessively in university life. Acknowledging such criticism, Isa
Esme, deputy head of the YOK, said the institution today wanted to hand more autonomy
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back to the universities, adding that an over-centralized structure was hampering
initiative and change.”679
Although the AKP had criticized the YOK establishment and its policies in higher
education, it never attempted to completely abolish it and grant universities considerable
academic freedom. One criticism that has been directed to AKP is that it is doing exactly
what the Kemalist establishment did; using YOK in favor of the respective ideology. 680
The election of Abdulah Gul as the president in 2007 virtually ensured the AKP
control over YOK. During his tenure he sometimes chose not to appoint those
academicians who were elected by their universities as the president of their respective
institutions, the practice that the AKP had criticized when Ahmet Sezer was the President
of Turkey. The AKP continued to erase the traces of the military tutelage in the education
system by removing the mandatory national security classes from high schools. The
national security classes used to be given by military officials. The classes were offered
between 1926 and 2012. 681
Furthermore, one of the iconic elements of the military tutelage, the massive
stadium-commemorative rituals and ceremonies of important dates such as May 19- the
Youth and Ataturk Holiday, were ended by the government decree. These rituals were
criticized for being reminiscent of their former communist counterparts. Then Minister of
Education Omer Dincer claimed that the reason behind the abolishing these rituals and
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ceremonies was the financial burden although it was evident that it was one more step to
civilianize the society. 682
The head of the Union of United Educators of Bursa Province Numan Seker
stated that the decision to end the ceremonies was a right decision since it would take
more than a month for the students to prepare for it and it would be detrimental to the
academic success of those students who participate in it. 683 The CHP and secular circles
criticized the decision and blamed the AKP for eradicating the heroic sentiments from the
Turkish people. 684
7.6.2 The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK)
The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) is one of the most
important institutions that contributed to the perpetuation of the Kemalist status quo by
imposing and protecting Kemalist principles via the judicial system. Mustafa Akyol
states; “the high judiciary was designed to work in a system of “co-option,” where jurists
with similar views appointed each other to powerful seats.” 685
Given the history of the Kemalist judiciary engaging in pro-Islamist parties, and
the narrow escape of AKP of being closed down in 2008, the AKP began to restructure
HSKY in 2010. The key moment for the AKP came when the constitutional amendments
were put to referendum in October 2010. Before the referendum, the structure of HSKY
had been determined by a regular system of appointees from other judicial bodies, such
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as the Council of State or the High Court of Appeals. Not to mention, the members of
these influential judicial bodies were predominantly of Kemalist worldview. The
referendum was accepted by the Turkish people by 58%.686
As a result of the referendum, HSKY was made to be more representative,
increasing the number of members from seven to twenty two. Four of them are now
appointed by the president, six chosen by other judicial bodies and ten are elected by
some 12000 judges and prosecutors from all provinces of Turkey. The Justice Ministry
fills the remaining two seats. 687
While the Kemalist autocracy over the judiciary had been criticized for preventing
fundamental freedoms, Senem Aydin Duzgit contends, what was about to happen is the
“the replacement of one form of ideological favoritism with simply another that rests on
the power of the executive.”688
Like it was with YOK, the AKP was criticized for not making the HSYK an
independent and executive body by retaining the Ministry of Justice in the board. This is
a clear indication that AKP intended to control the judicial body by appointing the board
members from likeminded judges and prosecutors.689 To sum up, the AKP has now the
control of the highest judicial bodies in great part due to Erdogan’s “inclination to think
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that a party enjoying a parliamentary majority should reign unconstrained other
institutions.” 690
7.7 The 2007 Onward: The AKP Consolidates Its Power; the Ruling Phase
The main issues that dominated the 2007 general elections were secularism, the
military-civilian relations, and the presidential elections. The result was the decisive AKP
victory. The AKP secured 62% of the seats in the parliamentary. The party came stronger
out of the elections. With this confidence, the AKP re-nominated Abdullah Gul as the
presidential candidate. 691 The election of Abdullah Gul as the president meant that the
last prominent Kemalist institutions, the executive body, was now occupied by someone
from the AKP and finalized the party’s attempt to eliminate the Kemalist dominance.
Akca and Balta-Peker summarize this process as following: “The success of the
AKP in parliamentary and presidential elections signified a turning point, firstly in civilmilitary relations by eroding the power and credibility of the Turkish military, and
secondly on the Kurdish question. Between 2002 and 2007, the AKP government had
been able to penetrate—albeit limitedly—the judiciary and begin to exert a more
extensive influence over the police. During the new period, this increasing control over
the police and judiciary would become crucial as the AKP began to launch an offensive
against the military based on the evidence of military-inspired plots to overthrow the
government.”692
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7.7.1 The Ergenekon Trials
The electoral victory and the election of Gul as the president gave impetus to
AKP to stage the final blow on the military, which came in a series of trials that were
then called “Ergenekon”. In these, numerous military figures were put in jail, which
marked the victory of AKP over the military.
The uncovering of certain arms and documents in Istanbul set the stage for the
Ergenekon Trials which became the biggest legal onslaught against the Kemalist
establishment. On October 20, 2008, the trial began and continued with the arrest of high
ranking retired military officers, journalists, lawyers and businessmen. They were
charged with “membership of an armed terrorist group, aiding and abet-ting an armed
terrorist organization, attempting to destroy the government of the Republic of Turkey or
to block it from performing its duties, inciting people to rebel against the Republic of
Turkey, being in possession of explosives, using them, and inciting others to commit
these crimes, acquiring secret documents on national security.” 693
The charges against the defendants covered the alleged illegal military actions
during the PKK conflict in 1990s, the February 28 process and finally the 2003-2003
coup attempts against the AKP.
The Ergenekon process yielded in the emergence of such coup plots as
the Kafes Eylem Planı (Cage Action Plan)694 (March 2009), İrtica ile Mücadele Eylem
Planı (Action Plan to Fight Religious Fundamentalism) (dated April 2009), and claims
about an assassination plan against a leading figure of the AKP, Bülent Arınç. 695 Twenty
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military officers including the retired heads of land, navy and air force were formally
charged with creating a chaos atmosphere and eventually overthrowing the government
in what is called the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) coup plot.696
This process surely created tension between the military and the government,
which peaked at the August 2010 session of the Supreme Military Council meeting, the
government vetoed the promotions of eleven generals on the grounds that they were part
of the alleged military coup attempts. This was a first in the history of Turkey not only
for the first time a civilian government intervened in the military promotions, which
traditionally were handled by the military upper echelon only, but also it was a bold
defiant move from a civilian government to attempt the alter the organizational structure
of the Turkish military.697
For example, the 1st Army Commander Hasan Igsiz, who would have been
promoted to the land forces commander, was declined by the Prime Minister Erdogan and
President Gul. Therefore, on the contrary to the normal process, the YAS did not
announce the promotions on the fourth day of meeting. Gul and Erdogan retained their
approval of the chief of staff until the commander to the land forces was determined.
Atilla Isik, who was the head of the Gendarmerie Forces Atilla Isik was slated to be the
chief of the land forces, who by tradition becomes the chief of staff of the armed forces.
The government declined his appointment to which he reacted by resigning. Necded
Ozel, who is known to be in good terms with the government, then became the next chief
of staff of the armed forces. 698
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Migdalovitz asserts that the Ergenekon trials and prosecutions intimidated the
military and thus the military reluctantly accepted the civilian dominance. Furthermore,
increasing popular disapproval for a military intervention virtually removed the hopes of
certain circles for the overthrow of government by the TAF.699
The last phase of the civilian dominance and the waning of the military influence
was the abolishment of the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order
(EMASYA), a February 28 Process byproduct, which granted the military the right to
intervene unilaterally in domestic events. This was the end of the February 28 process.700
7.8 The Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP
The next part examines the foreign policy understanding of the AKP as well as
the implementation of it referring to cases. The fundamentals of the Turkish foreign
policy under the AKP predominantly were determined by Ahmet Davutoglu, who is an
academician as well as served as the minister of foreign affairs and now is the prime
minister of Turkey.
7.8.1 Neo-Ottomanism Revisited: The Davutoglu Factor and Strategic Depth
As discussed early in this chapter, a new reality and new elites emerged in Turkey
in the last decade. The public participation in governance and foreign policy has resulted
in the advent of a new stream of ideas in Turkish politics. Perhaps the most important
embodiment of this new reality in foreign policy is Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of the
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP.701 Therefore, it is vital to analyze the
fundamentals of the new Turkish foreign policy and Davutoglu.
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The “strategic depth” concept, also the title of his influential book, is one of the
most important aspects of the Davutoglu Doctrine. He posits that the strategic depth
possesses geographical and historical characteristics. The historical aspect of it is
characterized by the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, spanned for six hundred years, and
the areas to which the Ottoman influence was extended (the Balkans, the Middle East and
North Africa and the Caucasus) makes up of the geographical aspect of the doctrine.
Davutoglu argues that Turkey, being the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, has the
opportunity to harness this unique position through diplomacy and trade. He also
suggests that Turkey’s historical and cultural commonalities grants it a geo-economic
influence. Therefore, Turkey is a “central country” historically, politically and
economically702 and has geographical and historical dept.
Davutoğlu states; “In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a
large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central
country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character.
Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or
culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition
lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it
controls an area of influence in its immediate environs.” 703
The strategic depth that Turkey possesses has granted Turkey with excellent
opportunities not only regionally but globally and this is possible if Turkey is willing to
pursue a more proactive foreign policy. 704
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Due to Turkey’s geo-cultural central position, according to Davutoglu, the
country cannot afford to pursue a passive, defensive foreign policy. Thus, Turkey must be
proactive in shaping its neighborhood in order to ensure security and prosperity at home
and in the region. 705 Davutoğlu’s creation, to Graham Fuller, was “the most systematic,
substantial, and comprehensive vision of Turkey’s strategic position yet written. It is
based on a sophisticated and complex reading of history, political cultures, geography,
geopolitics, global balances and national interests.” 706
Finally, Omer Taspinar states that there are basically three factors that define the
neo-Ottoman tendencies of the AKP. The first is the willingness to come to terms with
Turkey’s Ottoman heritage at home and abroad. Neo-Ottomanism does not seek to recreate the Ottoman Empire with territorial ambitions in the Middle East and beyond. It
favors a more activist policy in foreign affairs, particularly in terms of a willingness to
mediate conflicts. In this neo-Ottoman paradigm, Ankara exerts more “soft power” (i.e.
political, economic, diplomatic and cultural influence) in former Ottoman territories and
in other regions where Turkey has strategic interests. This broad vision for Turkish
foreign policy requires an embrace of Ottoman multicultural legacy.707
It is important to note that neo-Ottomanism denotes a change in the mindset of
traditional Turkish policy making. Since the Ottoman Empire pursued a more tolerant
policy
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multiculturalism and plurality. The starkest implementation of this idea can be seen in the
way the AKP government has handled the Kurdish issue. As long as the Kurds remain
loyal to the existence of the republic, they have been granted their cultural, political
rights. Unlike the Kemalist approach, which has aimed to assimilate Kurds into Turkish
identity, neo-Ottomanism, both under Ozal and AKP government, has accommodated
Turkey’s Kurds.708
The second characteristic of the neo-Ottomanist approach is the sense of self
confidence and grandeur, which is derived from the Ottoman past. As opposed to the
Kemalist isolation, passivity and paranoia of being surrounded by enemies, neoOttomanism sees Turkey as capable and self-confident regional power. Turkey is a
pivotal and central state that has to play an important political, economic and cultural role
in the world. This ambitious undertaking requires Turkey to be at peace with its past. 709
He repeats that Turkey ought not to remain a bridge country but rather a central
one. He defines self-confidence by “not being ashamed of its Eastern identity while
embracing the high standards of the West. The source of Turkey’s self-confidence is
derived from its centuries’ long relationship with both the west and the east. 710 He states
that Turkey no longer should wastes its energy by the view that the state sees its own
people as danger. Turkey has become self-confident enough, to Davutoglu, that
fundamental freedoms are no longer the source of paranoia and fear. This will strengthen
Turkey in its region and in the world. 711
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The third is that the neo-Ottomanism accepts the West as much as it does the
Islamic world. According to this, per its history, Turkey belongs to both worlds. Like the
imperial capital Istanbul, it spans on both Europe and Asia and is “Janus-faced”.712
The official AKP foreign policy in the party program reflects the aspects of the
Davutoglu doctrine. According to this;713
-The geopolitical situation of Turkey has the potential to create an attraction zone
for many cooperation projects. The ability to convert this potential into a regional and
global effectiveness depends on the logical use of the geopolitics in international
political, economic and security relations.
-On the other hand, the dynamic circumstances brought about by the post-cold
war period have created a suitable environment for developing a foreign policy with
several alternatives. The particularity of military alliances and blocks to become the
determinant elements of international relations has been greatly reduced, and
cooperation projects have become a common tool of relations between States. In this new
environment Turkey must also rearrange and create its relations with centers of power
with alternatives, flexibly and with many axis.
-Our Party shall follow a realistic foreign policy befitting the history and
geographical position of Turkey, free from prejudices and obsessions, based on mutuality
of interests. Turkey, which is respectful of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
other countries, deems it its right for other nations and international agencies to respect
its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
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-Against changing regional and global realities, our Party believes that Turkey
must redefine its foreign policy priorities and create a balance between these realities
and its national interests.
This can be seen Turkey’s staunch commitment to the EU membership under the
AKP administration. Turkey has continued to take active part in NATO, attributing
importance to its relations with the United States.
The AKP party program reflects the multi-dimensional foreign policy. It is stated
that: In addition to the traditional Atlantic and European dimensions of the Turkish
foreign policy, efforts shall be maintained to develop a policy with a Eurasian axis
should also be. In this sense efforts will be made to reinforce the cooperation in the
framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). In this regards, the
importance of relations with Russia and China are also emphasized.714
The strategic depth places a great deal of emphasize on the ummah, Muslim
solidarity in the world although there is a sense of national pride that Turkish Muslims
are destined to be the leader of the Muslim world and lead them to the high standard of
living and modernity.
This ambition can be seen in the “vision of 2023”715 centennial year of the
Republic by which time the AKP officers aspires Turkey to be one of the top ten most
important countries politically and economically. Davutoglu said: “Turkey could become
a union of nations just like Britain’s union with its former colonies,” he reported the
foreign minister as saying. “Britain has a commonwealth with its former colonies, he
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reminded me. Why shouldn’t Turkey rebuild its leadership in former Ottoman lands in the
Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia?”716
Davutoglu has criticized the nation-state concept in Turkey, which he believes is
one of the main reasons for it to fail to reach its full potential. He criticizes the Kemalist
detachment from the Ottoman past, Islam and the Middle East. He believes that "a major
reason for Turkey's relative isolation from its neighborhood had to do with the
framework that dominated the mindset of Turkish foreign-policy elites for decades -- a
mindset that erected obstacles between Turkey and its neighbors physically, mentally,
and politically." He goes on saying; “Turkey's reintegration to its environment is
essential and this requires a substantial abandonment of the old foreign policy culture
(the Kemalist).”717
7.8.2 Davutoglu’s Policy Principles: A New Vision for Turkey
In tandem with the Strategic Depth concept, Davutoglu puts forward three
methodological and five operational and principles of foreign policy that he envisioned
for Turkey. The methodological principles are;
• “Visionary" approach to the issues instead of the "crisis-oriented".
• To base Turkish foreign policy on a "consistent and systematic" framework
around the world.
• The adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, which has resulted in the
spread of Turkish soft power in the region.
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The operational principles are;
• The balance between security and democracy.
• Zero problems towards neighbors.
• Proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy.
• Multi-dimensional foreign policy.
•

Rhythmic diplomacy. 718
In addition to these principles, Davutoglu mentions about Turkey’s need for self-

confident foreign policy as well as devising policies autonomously, about which he said;
“We do not receive instructions from any other powers, nor are we part of others’ grand
schemes. In particular, our policies towards neighbors are devised with careful
consideration of our own evaluation of the situation. As has been the case so far, we will
continue to coordinate our policies with those of our Western partners as we see fit, but
will never let such partnership negatively affect our relations with neighbors.”719
In the following part, I will try to explain these principles referring to actual
foreign policy implementations under the AKP government.
7.8.2.1 Balance between Security and Democracy
First, in a post September 11 environment, he asserts, it is important to establish a
fine balance between security and freedom for the sake of democracy. He emphasizes
that Turkey was one of the few countries that had established this balance. Davutoglu
states;
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“In pursuit of our global objectives, we will endeavor to listen to the
consciousness and common sense of humanity, and become a firm defender of universal
values. While embracing these universal principles, we will enmesh them with local
values; and advocate, in particular, human rights and such norms as democracy, good
governance, transparency and rule of law. We will extend our assistance to the people
who rise up to demand such values because given our belief in the principles of justice
and equality, we are convinced that they also deserve to have the same rights and
privileges enjoyed by our own people. As its region experiences democratization, Turkey
will continue its quest to maintain a balance between promoting democratic values and
defending national interests.”720
Despite severe criticism from the Kemalist circles, the AKP initiated what is
called the “Kurdish Opening”, which aims to resolve the PKK problem. One of the
historical moments in this regard came in Diyarbakir in August 2005. He emphasized that
common religious bonds and democratic values are the key in the solution of the
problem.721 Prime Minister Erdogan stated: “The sun heats everybody and the rain is
God’s grace for everybody. Thus I address those asking, ‘What will happen to the
Kurdish problem?’ The Kurdish problem is my problem…. We will solve all problems
through democracy.”722
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Furthermore, emphasizing the importance of establishing a balance between
security and freedom Erdogan said “no stepping back from the Copenhagen criteria in
the fight against terror”723
7.8.3

Zero Problem with Neighbors
One of Davutoglu’s most important theoretical foreign policy approaches is the

“Zero Problem with Neighbors” concept. According to this, Turkey must abolish the
paranoia that it is surrounded by enemies and end subsequent security oriented
policies.724 Davutoglu posits that it is important for Turkey to reintegrate with its
neighbors in order to achieve a regional power status. He goes; “While Turkey goes
through a domestic transformation and reform processes, Turkey also has embarked on
the parallel undertaking of moving to consolidate ties to its region. One strength of our
foreign policy, thus, is the ongoing process of reconnecting with the people in our region
with whom we shared a common history and are poised to have a common destiny.”725
This idea denotes a historical change in Ankara’s threat perception. Davutoglu
notes that decades old chronic problems with once “problematic” neighbors such as
Armenia and Cyprus began to be solved726 The AKP party manifesto included “While
our country’s foreign policy used to be run on the basis of the assumption that Turkey is
surrounded by enemies, we turned this imagination and psychology into the policy of
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Zero Problems with the Neighbors. We are solving problems that were thought to be
insoluble, formed friendships people thought could not be formed.”727
In the following section, I will examine how the zero problem policy has been
implemented by the AKP government.
7.8.3.1 Normalization Efforts with Armenia
Although Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the Republic of
Armenia in 1991, the bilateral relations have been frozen when Armenian forces
occupied the Nagarno Karabakh, which is recognized by the United Nations as Azeri soil.
This incident also resulted in the closure of the Turkey-Armenia border. The worldwide
political campaign of the Yerevan and the Armenian Diaspora for the events of 1915 to
be recognized as “genocide” further strained the relations. The normalization efforts
came by the signing of the Turkish-Armenian Protocols728 by Ahmet Davutoglu and
Edward Nalbandian, on Oct. 11, 2009, in Zurich in the presence of US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and EU foreign affairs and
security official Javier Solana.729 The protocols have been suspended due to the
Constitutional Court of Armenia’s objection730 and the intense opposition of Armenian
Diaspora as well as Ankara’a insistence that the normalization could only be possible
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pending the solution to the Nagarno-Karabakh problem. Despite this setback, it is a
historical step for the reconciliation between the two countries.
7.8.3.2 Syria
The Turco-Syrian rapprochement is another example to the Zero Problem policy.
The relations with Syria hit bottom rock in 1998 when Ankara issued an ultimatum to
Damascus to expel the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Damascus eventually expelled him
in the same year.731 Although the relations began to normalize after 1998, they enjoyed
their peak on December 22-23, 2009 when the Turkish-Syrian High Level Strategic
Cooperation Council, or HSCC, was held in Damascus. According to this Turkey and
Syria were to increase their cooperation in economic, political and security fields.732 As a
result of the HSCC the trade volume between the two countries increased considerably.
In September 2010, the two countries agreed to abolish visa requirements, enabling free
roaming.733 In 2010, 750,000 Syrians entered Turkey while the number of Turks visiting
Syria reached 1.35 million people.734
7.8.3.3 The Cyprus Issue
The Cyprus issue has been a very contentious issue in Turkish foreign policy.
Turkey’s intervention in the civil strife to save the Turks from massacre by the EOKA
militants resulted in the division of the island into north being Turkish south being Greek.
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The Cyprus problem has been an obstacle for Turkey’s EU membership negotiations
partially because of the Greek and Cypriot vetoes. The previous Turkish governments
tended to pursue a statuesque preserving policy vis-à-vis Cyprus. The most serious
attempts to solve the problem came with the AKP government. Due to the EU aspect of
the issue, the AKP pursued an ambitious foreign policy in this regard. The impending
accession of the Cyprus Republic in the EU in 2004 accelerated the Turkish efforts to
facilitate a solution. The change began with abolition of the old aged rhetoric that
“Turkey’s defense starts from Cyprus.” 735
The AKP government started to support the unification of the island under a fair
federal system as opposed to the previous governments in Ankara that promoted the two
state solution.736 This deviation was clearly against the Kemalist policymakers’
perception of a solution to the Cyprus problem.
One of the results of this abrupt policy change was that the Turkish Cypriot
veteran politician Rauf Denktas, who always supported the independence and vehemently
rejected any other solution and was considered to be the father of the self-proclaimed the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was “brushed aside” by the AKP
government. 737 The AKP government perceived him outdated. In a bold move Erdogan
declared on January 2, 2003 “I am not in favor of the continuation of the policy that has
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been maintained in Cyprus over the past 30-40 years. We must produce solutions not
obstacles. We will do whatever is required of us. This is not Denktas’ private matter.”738
Among those who condemned Erdogan’s policies to alienate Denktas were the then
president Ahmet Nejdet Sezer and the members of the People’s Republican Party, all of
whom represent the Kemalist elite.
Then came the peace plan prepared by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
(also named as the Annan Plan).

739

The plan, which was supported by the AKP

government, aimed at unifying the island on equal terms that both parties would be
represented in government. To the dismay of the European Union, in the referendum the
Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected it by 75%, while the Turkish Cypriots supported
it by 65%.
Celenk states that the AKP’s support and willingness for the unification and the
Annan Plan constituted a great contrast to the policies of the previous Turkish
governments, who would have considered the move betrayal to the Turkish interests in
the region. It is one of the many signs that the AKP has denounced the Kemalist foreign
policy. 740
7.8.3.4 Iran
As mentioned in the previous chapters, Iran had been considered by the Kemalist
state to be a great danger due to Tehran’s overt attempts to export its theocratic regime to
Turkey. This threat perception was coupled with Iran’s nuclear program and its Shahab-3
medium range ballistic missiles that would pose threat to Turkey’s populated areas. Until
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2010, Iran was among the threats that were mentioned in the military’s Red Book. In that
year Iran was removed from the perceived threats and even was praised for its
cooperation against the PKK. 741
In August 2007, Turkey and Iran signed an important energy agreement despite
the sanctions on the latter. According to this, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO)
is now allowed to explore for oil and gas in the South Pars fields of Iran and deliver
Iranian as well as Turkmen gas to Europe via Turkey, but also supply the Turkish
market.742
In January 2014, Turkey and Iran signed a comprehensive trade agreement, which
aims the bilateral trade to reach to 30$ billion dollars by the end of 2015.743
Finally, as part of the “zero problem with neighbors” policy, Greece, Iran and
Russia were removed from the “Red Book”, which defines the threat perception.
Whereas, in the 2005 Red Book, Greece's intention to extend its territorial waters from
six to twelve miles was considered a casus belli. In the 2010 Red Book, a war with
Greece in the Aegean region is deemed unlikely and the twelve-mile issue is no longer
considered a casus belli. The new document also emphasizes the need for cooperation
with Greece. Additionally, the rapprochement with Greece included high level of visits.
Then Prime Minister Erdogan visited Greece on May 6, 2004, which was the first in 16
years and the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis visited Turkey on January 23, 2008,
which was first of its kind in 49 years.
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7.8.3.5 Greece
Finally, Davutoglu’s zero problem policy has manifested itself in relations with
Greece. Greece had been in the Red Book of threat perceptions until 2005 because of its
intention to extend the territorial waters in the Aegean Sea to twelve miles from six,
which was considered by Turkey casus belli. 744 The new foreign policy understanding
under AKP places more emphasize on the mutual cooperation with Greece.745 The
rapprochement with Turkey and Greece yielded high level visits. Then Prime Minister
Erdogan visited Greece on May 6, 2004, first of its kind in 16 years and the Greek Prime
Minister Karamanlis visited Turkey on January 23, 2008, which was first of its kind in 49
years.746
Jashua W. Walker argues that a spurned Turkey guided by its policy of “strategic
depth” will not follow the typical Kemalist prescription of isolation, but could just as
easily reach out to other important regional actors such as Iran and Russia to form a loose
alignment.747
7.8.4 Multi-Dimensional Foreign Policy
Davutoglu’s third principle of foreign policy is multi-dimensional foreign policy. This, to
Davutoglu, means that Turkey should pursue a foreign policy that is complementary, not
competition. For example, according to this foreign policy principle, Turkey’s EU bid, its
relations with Russia and strategic relations with the United States are all complimentary
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and synchronized. That is to say, the relations with Russia cannot be considered as an
alternative to the US. 748
Talip Kucukcan and Mujge Kucukkeles argue that due to its geo strategic position
in the Afro-Eurasian landmass, Turkey’s identity mandates that it synthesizes multiple
civilizations. For example, as opposed to the Islamists worldview, such as that of
Erbakan, Turkey cannot see the Islamic world as an alternative to the west, therefore
cannot be anti-Western. Likewise, unlike the Kemalist worldview, the East cannot solely
be an alternative to the West.
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According to Davutoglu’s view of policy, Turkey’s

distinctive identity is based on the blend of West and East, which means one cannot be
forgone for the sake of the other. This requires a multi-dimensional foreign policy.750
However, the rhetoric of some Turkish foreign policy makers occasionally
reflected the opposite of this notion that created an “axis shift” argument. For example
Erdogan said at a press conference with Vladimir Putin;
“EU wants to forget us but it can’t. It is reluctant. We will be more comfortable if
it says so. Instead of stalling us, let it say so and we will go our own way. … Of course,
when this [EU] affair is not proceeding well, as the prime minister of 75 million you start
looking around for alternatives. This is what I told Mr. Putin the other day, ‘Take us into
Shanghai Five and we will forget the EU.’ Take us into Shanghai Five and we will say
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goodbye to EU and leave. What is the point of this stalling?... Shanghai Five is better,
stronger.”751
In fact, Turkey took concrete steps and applied to become a guest member of
Shanghai Cooperation Organizaiton (SCO) in 2007, 2009 and 2010 only to be rejected.
For example, the first application came in 2007 after EU suspended negotiations in
December 2007 on the grounds that Turkey did not fulfill the requisites of the additional
Protocol and the Greek and Cypriot vetoes. On March 23, 2011, Turkey officially bid its
“Dialogue Partnership Status” for the SCO.752
At the annual summit in Beijing on June 7, 2012, the communiqué stated; “The
member states note with satisfaction an increasing interest of the interational community
in establishing contacts with the SCO and welcome the participation of the Republic of
Turkey in the cooperation within the SCO framework as a dialogue partner.” 753
However, the SCO members, especially Russia and China, have certain
reservations regarding a NATO member’s observer status and future membership.754
Last but not least, one of the most striking examples of Turkey’s active/multidimensional foreign policy making can be seen in its relations with Latin American
countries. While occasional visits were made to Latin America during the governments
before AKP, it is during the AKP administration that real dynamism in relations could be
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seen. According to this, political consultation mechanisms have been established with 14
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, and Venezuela). An “Action Plan for Strategic
Partnership” was signed with Brazil during the of-ficial visit of Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan to Brazil between May 25 and 29, 2010.755
Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Groups for 12 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC)
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Jamaican, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Panama,
Peru, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela) was founded in the Turkish Grand National
Assembly, to enhance parliamentary relations with the countries of the region.756
This dynamism vis-à-vis Latin America resulted in a considerable rise in the
number of diplomatic representations.

Accordingly, Turkish Embassies in Bogota,

Columbia nd Lima, Peru became oepraitonal in February 2010 and March 2010,
increasing the number of the Turkish Embassies in the region to eight. The Turkish
Consulate General in Sao Paulo-Brazil was opened in November 2009. Turkish Embassy
in Quito, Ecuador was opened in 2012. In turn, LAC counries have reciprocated by
increasing their representations in Turkey. With the establishment of the Ecuadorian,
Peruvian and Colombian Embassies in Ankara, the number of LAC resident Embassies in
Turkey has reached nine.
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Council established in 2006, founding agreement of Turkey-Mexico Business Council

755

Turkey’s Relations With the Latin American and the Caribbean Countries,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_turkey_s-relations-with-the-latin-american-and-the-caribbean-countries.en.mfa
756
ibid
757
ibid

278

was signed on December 11, 2008. The national oil company of Turkey TPAO/TPIC has
become active in oil producing countries like Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
Furthermore, Brazilian oil companies PetroBras and TPAO/TPIC jointly carried out oil
exploration projects in the Black Sea in 2010 and 2011. 758
Brazil is especially important for Turkey and its most important partner in Latin
America.

Prime Minister Erdogan attended the Third Forum of the alliance of

Civilizations in May 2010, around the time when tripartite agreement between Iran-Brazil
and Turkey on nuclear swap was signed. 759
During that visit, the heads of governments signed the “Action Plan for Strategic
Association” based on eight cooperation points: bilateral and multilateral political
dialogue, commerce and investment, energy, biodiversity and environment, defense,
security, science and technology and lastly education and culture.760 During his visit in
May 2009, which was the first of its kind,761 President Lula da Silva attended multiple
events, including the “Turkish Brazilian Economic Forum” and the opening of the
“Centre of Latin American Studies” at Ankara University.762 Finally, Brazilian President
Dilma Rousseff visited Turkey in October 2011 and “Strategic Perspective of a Dynamic
Association Turkey-Brazil” joint declaration and bilateral cooperation agreements were
signed.763
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Figure 7.1 Turkey-Brazil Bilateral Trade (millions $)
Source:http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/disticaret_ing.zul?param1=4&param2=0&sitcrev=0&isicrev
=0&sayac=5908

7.8.5 Proactive/Preemptive Peace Diplomacy
By this, Davutoglu rejects Turkey’s long established “static” and “onedimensional” understanding of foreign policy given the dynamic environment in global
affairs. The most important aspect of the proactive/ multi-dimensional foreign policy is
Turkey’s active participation in preemption, prevention and resolution of conflicts,
especially in its immediate surroundings. Davutoglu justifies this approach by citing the
increasing divide between Transatlantic, Eurasian, Middle Eastern, North and South. 764
In the AK Party era, proactive diplomacy has been accompanied by the concept of
pre-emptive diplomacy. This type of diplomacy requires diplomatic, rather than military
approach to problems. The most striking examples of this policy approach can be seen in
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Turkey’s active involvement in the conflict resolution in the Palestine-Israel765, SyriaIsrael766, Iranian-Western and Bosnian-Serbian conflicts. This policy approach
acknowledges the importance of nation states as well as non-state actors. 767
To Davutoglu, Turkey must pursue and is pursuing "a multidimensional,
proactive, constructive and forward looking foreign policy initiative aimed at
complementarity rather than competition." It is Turkey’s "strategic location, economic
performance ranking as the 17th largest global economy, historical background,
geographical and cultural ties, stature as a reliable and trusted partner, insight to the
issues and accumulated experience that give Turkey leverage to conduct such foreign
policy." 768
In line with the pre-emptive peace diplomacy the AKP government has also tried
to play a mediator role, especially in the Middle East. Turkey tried to mediate between
Israel and the Hamas. This policy is a new phase in Turkish foreign policy, considering
Turkey had isolated itself from the region in previous eras. Clearly, Turkey’s mediator
role deepened its good relations with the parties, however after 2006, the situation started
to change after Hamas won the Palestinian election and the Israeli-Lebanon/Hezbollah
war broke out. The biggest blow to Turkish mediation came during and after the
Operation Cast Lead of 2008-2009. This ambitious policy approach is certainly a new
concept. However, it was not free of unsuccessful attempts and drawbacks. For example,
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the biggest blow to Turkey’s negotiator position came during and after the Operation
Cast Lead in the winter of 2008-2009. The following section will examine Turkey’s
peace diplomacy in the context of the Iranian’s nuclear program.
Before 2002, Turkey’s official policy in this regards was wait and see, which is
very typical of Kemalist approach. Although, the security elite in Turkey had at times
voiced their concerns over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, they nevertheless, did not take a
concrete step towards it. The advent of AKP in 2002 marked a noticeable difference in
Turkey’s approach to the issue in that it displayed willingness not to be an observer to the
issue but rather a facilitator and then a mediator.769
In 2005, the Iranian issue became so tense that the talks of a joint AmericanIsraeli strike to Iran’s nuclear sites became louder. American journalist Seymon Hersh
said about this immediate issue that; “What we are dealing with is a joint US-Israeli
military operation to bomb Iran, which has been in the active planning stage for more
than a year. The Neocons in the Defense Department, under Douglas Feith, have been
working assiduously with their Israeli military and intelligence counterparts, carefully
identifying targets inside Iran.”770
Turkey’s main concern stemmed from the assumption that a military strike on
Iran and its retaliation would greatly destabilize the region. 771 It is this point that Turkey
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began to assert itself as a negotiator between Iran and the West. This would also help
Turkey to relive the pressure that it had to choose either side. 772
The Turkish mediation between the US and Iran began after Erdogan’s visit to
Washington in December 2009.773 Turkey’s mediator position was accepted by U.S
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who welcomed it. Mohamed El-Baradei, then the
IAEA director general, also asked for Turkey’s diplomatic support to convince Iran to
restart the negotiations. Soon, Ankara began the shuttle diplomacy between Tehran and
related capitals.774 However, the Turkish officials admitted having a difficult time in
convincing their Iranian counterparts to participate in the negotiations. Namik Tan, then
Turkish ambassador to the United States, said; “We went to Iran—and don't forget, it was
the Persians who invented the game of chess—it took two 18-hour days to get their
cooperation”775
Consequently, in October 2009, the notion of a uranium fuel-swap agreement
between the 5+1 countries (the Security Council plus Germany) and Iran was discussed
in Vienna. El-Baradei’s proposed solution was to place Iran’s low enriched uranium
(LEU) in Turkey’s custody in return for the Vienna Group’s supplying Iran with LEU for
the production of electricity.776 The proposal was welcomed by Turkey, Russia and US.
In May 2010, Iran too agreed to send its uranium to be enriched in Turkey. Turkey and
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Brazil, then non-permanent members of the Security Council, negotiated the deal with
Iran at the same time the Security Council was voting over the sanctions.777
Afterward, on June 9, 2010, the Resolution 1929, which “determined to give
effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with
resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and with the
requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive
technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programs, until such time as the
Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met.”,778
was adopted by the UN Security Council. Disappointed by the adoption of the resolution,
Turkey and Brazil considered new sanctions as detriment to diplomatic negotiations and
voted against them, but 12 members of the Security Council were concerned enough
about the proliferation risks posed by Iran and its non-cooperation with the IAEA to vote
for the sanctions.779 To sum, Turkey wanted to integrate Iran into the international
system as the most constructive endeavor in achieving global peace.780
The Balkans policy of Turkey under Davutoglu reflects proactive/preemptive
policy understanding. According to this policy understanding, Turkey under AKP has
pursued foreign policy vis-à-vis the Balkans based on three goals; 1) to strengthen
Turkey’s good relations with traditional Balkan partners; 2) to make openings toward
countries with which Turkey has had problematic relations; and 3) to undertake the role
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of a mediator and lead multilateral initiatives, which is aimed to improve regional
stability.781
One of the most striking examples of this mediator role in the Balkans is the
initiative that Davutoglu launched in 2009 to mend the Bosnia-Serbia relations, which
had been frozen since the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. Turkey initiated trilateral
consultations, which eventually resulted in success. Thanks to the shuttle diplomacy, the
Serbian Government passed the resolution to apologize for the Genocide of Srebrenica in
July 1995782, although the Serbian officials stopped short of calling the killings
‘genocide’783 Bosnia and Herzegovina later appointed an ambassador to Belgrade, which
had been vacant before.
Davutoglu has referred to the Ottoman presence in the Balkans occasionally,
which reinforces the notion of the neo-Ottoman foreign policy making under AKP. In the
conference “The Ottoman Legacy and the Balkan Muslim Communities Today” in
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 16-18, 2009, Davutoglu devotes a great deal
of his speech on the Ottoman past of the Balkans. Davutoglu said;
“… the Ottoman history is a history of Balkan region’ it is a history on the central
character of the Balkan region in world politics. Not only in the political sense, because
the main trade routes of the time were passing through the Balkans. Thessaloniki, which
was a small town before, became the center of economic activities in the region. During
the Ottoman era, Thessaloniki became one of the main centers of international trade
781
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activities…Similarly, Belgrade was like a village or a small town in the 14th century. But,
during the Ottoman period, Belgrade became the central city, pivotal city of Danube and
Central Europe in the economic and cultural sense. Hundreds of mosques and churches
were built with lively cultural activities. Sarajevo should be seen as a miracle, like a
miniature if this heritage. If you understand Sarajevo you can understand the Ottoman
history…Sarajevo is a prototype of the Ottoman civilization. Sarajevo has been the
prototype of the Balkan region, and the global rise of the Balkans.”784
Furthermore, Davutoglu’s frequent visits to the Muslim populated areas of the
Balkans and certain practices during these visits generated a new foreign policy term;
‘mosque diplomacy’. During his visit to Kosovo, Davutoglu performed terawih prayer in
Pristina and Prizren, as well as in the Bosnian city of Mostar, with the local people. In
Constanta, Romania, he performed a noon prayer at the historic Hunkar Mosque, where
he also exchanged best wishes for Eid al-Fitr, a Muslim religious holiday, with residents
of the city. 785
The mosque diplomacy also involved in the restoration of historical mosques in
the Balkans. Turkey’s Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet Vakfı) and the Turkish
Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) performed the restorations. The Fatih
Sultan Mosque in Pristina, the Sinan Paşa Mosque in Prizren and the Hünkar Mosque in
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Constanta, Romania, all Ottoman-era mosques, are among the structures restored by
Turkey. 786
It is important to note here that the restoration of mosques by the Turkish
government as a foreign policy practice is not limited to the Balkans. According to the
Diyanet, Turkey has or is currently involved in mosque projects in the United States,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, the Philippines, the United Kingdom,
Palestine, Belorussia, Somalia

787

and Haiti.788 This is definitely something the secular

Kemalist foreign policy would not have focus on.
7.8.6 Rhythmic Diplomacy
Another aspect of the Davutoglu doctrine is rhythmic diplomacy, which envisages
using diplomacy “simultaneously and harmoniously” in different fields. This aims at a
more active role for Turkey through Turkey’s active involvement in all international
institutions and virtually all global issues.789
Yesiltas and Balci state that Davutoglu’s rhythmic diplomacy concept harbors
mobility and harmony. According to this logic, mobility without harmony may lead to
chaos. Likewise, rhythm without mobility is equally bad for foreign policy as there would
not be progress.790
Davutoglu says; “If we look at the international meetings and organizations it has
hosted since 2003. The NATO Summit and the OIC Summit are just two examples: clearly
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Turkey has gained more influence in international organizations. Interesting
developments in this regard took place in 2007. For instance, Turkey now has an
observer status in the African Union, a natural result of Turkey’s opening to Africa in
2005. Turkey has been invited to the Arab League twice, both at the level of foreign
minister and prime minister. Turkey signed a special agreement with the Arab countries
during a meeting of Iraq’s neighbors held in Istanbul on November 2, 2007.”791
One result of the rhythmic diplomacy was that for the first time since 1961,
Turkey was elected to be a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 20092010. Erdogan said; “This is a reflection of our increasing weight in international
politics and the confidence that the international community has in us (Turkey)” 792
Furthermore, Turkey assumed the chairmanship-in-office of the South-East
European Cooperation Process for 2009 and 2010.793 Turkey is a G20 member794, and
acquired an observer status in the African Union in 2005795, and has a strategic dialogue
mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council (214) and actively takes part in the Arab
League.
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and Latin America was another result of the active diplomacy the AKP government has
pursued.797
7.8.7 Soft Power
One of the most important changes in Turkish foreign policy was the emphasis on
soft power in international relations by resorting to diplomacy, culture, dialogue,
cooperation and historical understanding. There is a visible difference between the
current AKP government, which used democratic tradition, institutions and free market
economy, and the previous discourse in which military might was heavily used in
conducting foreign policy.798
In this regard, the soft power in Turkish politics means that it should take measures
that do not involve coercion in foreign policy making. William Hale states that the zero
problem policy with neighbors is a good example of implementation of soft power as it
means that Turkey abandon the “surrounded by enemies” feeling and was willing to establish
peaceful relations with the neighbors where it had used military threat in the past.799 Hale
also states that in this regard, Turkey’s foreign policy resembled that of the EU.800

In regards to soft power, Davutoglu states; ‘”…the adoption of a new discourse
and diplomatic style has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region.
Althought Turkey maintains a powerful military due to its insecure neighborhood, we do
not make threats.

Instead, Turkish diplomats and politicians have adopted a new
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language in the regional and international politics that prioritizes Turkey’s civil-economic
power”. 801
Tarik Oguzlu mentions about the facilitating factors (internal and external) behind
the rise of Turkey’s soft power. One of them is the changing nature of the
civilian/military relations in favor of the former, which removed the pressure of the latter
in civilian politics. This situation also impacted the PKK problem. The AKP government
clearly distinguished between the PKK and the Kurds in Turkey facilitated the
desecuritization process. 802
The examples of soft power approach in Turkish Foreign Policy are many. One
striking example is Turkey’s “Africa opening”. In this context Somalia is important.
Erdogan’s visit to Mogadishu in 2011 was the first of its kind in 20 years where a world
leader outside Africa visited the country. It was also symbolic that the visit took place in
the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and Turkey delivered humanitarian aid in excess of
$200 million worth. Pinar Tank argues that this visit elevated the war torn country to a
world agenda.803
Most of the state aids are dispersed through the Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency (TIKA), established in 1992. In 2011 the office also donated $93.4
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in humanitarian relief to Somalia. Somalia became the largest receiver of Turkish foreign
aid in Africa. 804
According to Mahmut Ozhan, Turkey’s involvement in Africa and especially in
Somalia is a “novelty” and one of the “firsts” in foreign policy. For the first time, Turkey
initiated a strategy of state building805 in a continent where it had not had experience in
such an area. Another “first” was that the Turkish governemtn cooperated with Turkish
NGOs in the Somalian state building.

Ozkan also argues that Turkey’s active

engagement in Somalia is a reflection of its great interest in the future of Somalia, in
particular, and in that of the continent, generally. 806
The TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), has undertaken
extensive agricultural and infrastructure projects in Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda
and Uganda. The Improving Quality Potato Production project in Comoros Islands and
the national agricultural master plan for Djibouti are examples of such projects.807 TIKA
has currently 11 offices in Africa. (Egypt, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Kenya, Libya, Namibia,
Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia)808
Turkey was the first country to successfully finish the promised housing projects
in the hard hit Aceh, Indonesia in which about 1050 houses, three schools and a hospital
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were built.809 Turkey extended help to flood stricken parts of Pakistan where it engaged
in house and school projects.810 Turkey evacuated its citizens from Libya in 2011 using
the navy, which according to Oya Akgonenc, was an example to using hard power means
to achieve soft power goals.811 The most striking example of using hard power means to
achieve soft power goals was when the Turkish Navy set out on a three-month, 28
country circumnavigation of Africa, which was the first in 148 years that Turkish ships
rounded the Cape of Good Hope.812 On its tour, for example, the Turkish Navy task force
handed 4500 tons of food in Namibia for distribution to drought affected areas, 80
wheelchairs for children as well 300 school bags with stationery.813All of these represent
the humanitarian and constructive outreach aspects of Ankara’s soft-power diplomacy.
7.9 Conclusion
The advent of the Justice and Development Party to power and its three
successive electoral victories that have kept the party at the top of governance has had
important social and political implications for the country. First of all, it became evident
that the social fabric of Turkey has changed such that it allowed for a party with proIslamic and conservative backgrounds to stay in power this long and grow effective in the
country’s administration. Another important aspect of the AKP rule is its profound
impact on the civilian-military relations. With the overwhelming parliamentary
809
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dominance and the popular support coupled with the zealous pursuit of the European
Union reforms and using it as an instrument, the AKP was able to ward off the
dominance of the secular military. The Kurdish opening also resulted in the desecuritization of the PKK conflict. The AKP is now able to effectively control the state
bureaucracy as well as the institutions, including the higher education and judiciary that
once were the bastions of the Kemalist ideology.
Also a contributing factor was the purge of high ranking officers through a series
of court trials, which intimidated and deterred any kind of future anti-government move
from the higher echelon of the military.
The removal of the Kemalist tutelage manifested itself in certain ways. One
remarkable example is “the Kurdish Opening”, a democratic initiative that was
introduced by Erdogan in 2005, to end the PKK violence and restore the state authority in
south east Turkey by improving the rights of the Kurds of Turkey. The government has
moved so far as to hold secret negotiations with the PKK in Oslo in order to find a nonmilitary solution to the problem. Such a move would not have been possible with the
Turkish military, which advocated a full armed solution to the problem, still in power.
The reforms that the AKP undertook literally aimed at erasing the militant aspect
of Kemalism from all aspects of life in Turkey. The national security classes that
promoted the supremacy of the military and that once were mandatory in high schools
were abolished. The military parades and student procession that are reminiscence of
former Communist countries are now anostalgia. These would have been unthinkable for
a government to implement before 2003.
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The waning influence of the Kemalist bureaucracy and the military has had
implications on the foreign policy. The Davutoglu Doctrine that stipulated an ambitious
pro-active, multi-dimensional and identity based foreign policy would not have been
easily implemented with the Kemalist bureaucracy and the military tutelage still in effect.
For example, the thawing relations with Armenia, rapprochement with Greece and the
political steps towards the solution of the Cyprus problem. Rather than insisting on the
existing status quo, attempts to nurture close relations with Muslim world, especially with
Iran, Syria, the Gulf countries and the Hamas Government would not have been possible
if the Kemalist military, which had always advocated a security oriented and secular
foreign policy, was still in charge of foreign affairs. When, for example, Erbakan wanted
to severe ties with Israel, he was met with strong opposition from the generals so much so
that he felt compelled to accept the prescription for Turkish-Israeli relations determined
by the military. However, Erdogan did not hesitate to fry the Turkish-Israeli relations in
2009 after Israel’s Gaza operation. This showed that the civilian government now is in
full charge of foreign affairs.
I should note that my analysis of foreign policy practices is limited up to 2011.
After that date the Arab Spring and the subsequent uprisings has dealt a blow on
Davutoglu’s zero-problem policy as well as the overall neo-Ottomanist approach to the
Middle East.
Goals and priorities of the AKP Foreign Policy
• Making Turkey a regional as well as a global power (Neo-Ottomanism)
• Pro-active/preemptive
• Complimentary foreign policy (Multidimensional/Pro-Western, Euroasianist as
well as Third Worldist)
• The zero problem policy with neighbors
• Soft Power
• Self Confidence
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Instruments of the AKP Foreign Policy
• The Executive Branch (The Presidency)
• Head of Government (The Prime minister)
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Figure 7.2 Turkey-Greece Trade (Millions $)
Source:http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/disticaret_ing.zul?param1=4&param2=0&sitcrev=0&isicre
v=0&sayac=5908

Figure 7.3 Turkey-Russia Trade (million $)
Source:http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/disticaret_ing.zul?param1=4&param2=0&sitcrev=0&isicre
v=0&sayac=5908

295

Figure 7.4 Turkey-Iran Trade (million$) Source:
http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/disticaret_ing.zul?param1=4&param2=0&sitcrev=0&isicrev=0&say
ac=5908

Figure 7.5 Turkey-Armenia Trade (thousands $
Source:http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/disticaret_ing.zul?param1=4&param2=0&sitcrev=0&isicre
v=0&sayac=5908
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Figure 7.6 Turkey-Southern Cyprus Trade (thousands $)
Source:http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/disticaret_ing.zul?param1=4&param2=0&sitcrev=0&isicre
v=0&sayac=5908

Figure 7.7 Turkey-Iraq Trade (in millions $)
Source:http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/disticaret_ing.zul?param1=4&param2=0&sitcrev=0&isicre
v=0&sayac=5908
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
“Is Turkey leaving its traditional westward foreign policy direction in favor of the
east under the AKP government, creating a paradigm shift?” The answer is Turkey is not
leaving the west but the country has experienced an ideological paradigm shift under the
AKP administration; the Kemalist paradigm being replaced by the neo-Ottomanist one.
In order to explain the paradigm shift phenomena in Turkey, this dissertation
compared between the ideological content, institutionalization, the elite formation of the
two competing paradigms; Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism, applying the policy
paradigms theory.
The in-depth examination of the Kemalist ideology yielded that Mustafa Kemal
was inadvertently influenced by the political realities of the time. According to this, the
every trace of the Ottoman was to be completely removed from the public sphere as well
as the state for a clean slate in an attempt to form of the new republic. This made the new
republic a complete anti-thesis of the Ottoman Empire, which was Islamic and multicultural. This prompted the adoption and strict top-down implementation of secularism
and mono-ethnic nationalism, which alienated most Kurds and pious Muslims, creating
resentment towards the Kemalist state. This would later result in the onset of movements,
such as Erbakan’s pro-Islamic National View and the PKK Kurdish violence against the
state.
The foreign policy, too, was an extension of domestic affairs. The flimsy creation
of the state after the devastating war of independence and intense efforts of nation
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building prompted M. Kemal to adopt a more cautious, reactive, stagnant foreign policy,
which became a norm for the foreign policy makers after his death. Additionally, the
legacy of the war of independence, which was fought against multiple invading forces,
created a trauma in the minds of the Kemalist elite. The Sevres Syndrome and the
“surrounded-by-enemies” feeling led to the introvert, suspicious as well as security
oriented nature of the Kemalist foreign policy understanding.
The creation and institutionalization of the new Kemalist elite was in conjunction
with the domestic and foreign state of the time. The hard earned territories could only be
held in hand via top-down, autocratic regime that dictates its citizens the novice elements
of the Kemalist revolution. The Kemalist elite (the core) took full control of the
institutions and bureaucracy of the state, pursuing an exclusionist policy towards those
citizens who think outside the Kemalist ideology. According to this, those Kurds and
pious Muslims as well as rural Anatolia (the periphery) were excluded from participation
in state affairs, their upward social mobilization was prevented and if necessary they were
punished. The first blow to this elitism came when Adnan Menderes, who identified
himself as pro-Islam and his Democrat Party, won the 1950 elections with a landslide. It
is this point that the representative of the Kemalist elite, People’s Republican Party (PRP)
was proven to be ineffective to stop the rise of the periphery through democratic means
and their sharing of the authority, to which PRP felt fully entitled. This brought the
forceful means to the scene, thus the Turkish military. The tutelage of the Turkish Armed
Forces officially began with the 1960 coup, in which the generals forcefully removed the
elected representatives and executed Menderes. The elite reinforced its grip on the state
with institutions that govern all aspect of life, from education to judiciary. The foreign
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ministry bureaucracy as well as the military made sure the Kemalists principles were
adamantly pursued abroad.
The rising treat of Communism in 1970s and ensuing political and social turmoil
compelled the Turkish military to step in and seized the power in an attempt to restore the
Kemalist principles of the state that had “eroded” in the last decade. The military decided
to counter the threat of Communism by loosening the secular principles. This opened up
the way to the rise of Ozal, who was known to be a devout Muslim. Ozal represented the
periphery. His liberal political and economic reforms, which irked the Kemalist circles,
paved the way for the periphery to gradually rise to prominence. Now, the periphery was
closer to the core, even intermingled in certain aspects of life, which increased the
friction between the two camps. For example, as more and more head scarf wearing girls
wanted to have university education, the more the Kemalist status quo asserted the
secular principles through the Higher Education Council, which had banned the headscarf
on campuses.
Ozal’s foreign policy understanding was such that he openly criticized the
existing status quo, bureaucracy and institutions of Kemalism for being too timid,
cautious. Certainly, the end of Cold War helped him to decide to maneuver liberally in
the near abroad and he succeeded to some extend by, for example, initiating the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation and an active diplomacy. However, he was constrained by the
Kemalist institutions, namely military and the foreign policy bureaucracy, which he
criticized for being timid and passive. Between 1983 and 1993, Ozal, especially in his
presidency (1989-1993) brought an unprecedented activism to the Turkish foreign policy
but his unexpected death in 1993 threw Turkey back to its stagnant position, as the flimsy
coalition governments brought political and economic instability. It should be noted that
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the changing international system due to the waning Soviet influence and subsequent
collapse of the Berlin Wall greatly enabled Ozal to implement ambitious foreign policy
goals especially towards the Central Asia and the Caucasus.
1990s also witnessed the rise of the influence of the military. With the Cold War
is over and the separatist PKK terrorism raging, the military asserted itself more than
ever. The epitome of the core vs. the periphery confrontation came when Erbakan, who
was an overt Islamist, anti-Western and anti-Zionist, became the prime minister in 1996.
He was the first ever prime minister, who openly supported the advent of Islamic rule in
Turkey. To some, this marked the triumph of political Islam. However, pro-Islamic
agenda Erbakan pursued at home and abroad had the Turkish military flex its muscles
and Erbakan was forced to resign. The inability of the political Islam to win over the
strong Kemalist military taught some members of Erbakan’s Welfare Party, who later
founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP), that conformity with the system was
the only viable way to success.
The 2002 elections granted the AKP an opportunity to form a single party
government, which meant an outstanding legislative power in the Turkish parliament. In
order to eliminate the clout of the Kemalist institutions and bureaucracy, especially the
military, the AKP implemented policy of de-militarization in governance by aggressively
adopting the EU reforms. While the military and the Kemalists attempt to undermine the
AKP government through covert means and coup attempts they were never materialized.
As a result of a series of court trials, those military officers, who plotted coup against the
government, prosecuted in an unprecedented wave of arrests. The AKP government also
effectively took the administration of such important institutions as the Supreme Board of
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Judges and Prosecutors, the Council of Higher Education, the Presidency of Religious
Affairs, which had been part of the Kemalist state machinery.
The rise of Menderes, Ozal and Erbakan to power before the AKP government
was clearly an indication of serious attempts to puncture the Kemalist hegemony but
since the institutional and bureaucratic makeup of the existing status quo (the Kemalism)
was too strong, they failed to attain their goals. Therefore, their attempts to reorient the
policy goals and priorities of the policies of Kemalism did not amount to a complete shift
or replacement of the Kemalist paradigm. However, it can be said that their trials and
errors heralded the AKP success. With the relative power advantage vested by the single
party rule and staunch pursuit of the EU reforms in the name of civilianization of politics
in Turkey, it is the AKP government, which has been able to gradually eliminate the
institutional and bureaucratic resistance of the Kemalist elite, particularly the military.
For example, one result of the deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations after the 20082009 Israeli-Gaza Conflict was that Turkey, under AKP government, barred Israel from
participating in the Anatolian Eagle air force exercise in 2009 also freezing arms deals
with Israel. In the same situation, it would be expected that the Erbakan government
would not have had enough clout over the military, which had close relations with Israel,
to do the same. This proves how the AKP government has been able to subdue the
Kemalist aspect of the Turkish military. However, the data shows that political
deterioration in relations with Israel did not reflect on trade relations between Turkey and
Israel.
The examination of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government showed
that replacing the Kemalist foreign policy priorities with those of neo-Ottoman did not
result in Turkey’s radical departure from the west. Instead, Turkey continued to be part of
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the western bloc while also increasing its relations with the West. This can be called as
“diversification of foreign policy options”. For example, although it began formal
membership negotiations with the EU in 2006, the next year, Turkey expressed its
intention to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is
considered to be an alternative to EU.
Between 2003 and 2011, the Turkish foreign policy experienced an
unprecedented activism. One of the most striking characteristics of the proactive Turkish
foreign policy during this time was that it carried the neo-Ottomanist features. For
example, as opposed to the traditional Kemalist understanding of foreign policy that
advocates the preservation of the status quo, the neo-Ottoman ideology prompted the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Ahmet Davutoglu to engage with Cyprus and Armenia,
which were considered taboo. Strikingly, the AKP government eliminated Rauf Denktas,
who supported an independent Turkish republic in the north, and promoted a united
Cyprus, which to most Kemalists and nationalist was “treachery”. Likewise, the bold step
came when Turkey and Armenia decided to establish political communication, although
this was to some extent dictated by the United States.
The extent of activism in Turkish foreign policy went far beyond the traditional
limits of Turkey and extended as far as Latin America and Africa. This manifested itself
with the rapid proliferation of consular entities in the aforementioned continents. As
foreign policy instrument, under the AKP government the soft power concept replaced
the more security oriented Kemalist view, which brought pro-active and preemptive
involvement of foreign issues. One such remarkable example was the attempt to reach a
political resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, pioneered by Turkey and Brazil.
Furthermore, Turkey witnessed the rise of identity politics under the AKP government.
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The common denominator, Islam, was the driving force in Davutoglu’s shuttle diplomacy
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The term “Mosque Diplomacy” was also
used to define Turkey’s willingness to reach to the Muslims of the Balkans. Certainly, the
identity based diplomacy, be it Islam or Turkishness, is a major departure from the
Kemalist tenets of the traditional Turkish foreign policy.
The comparison between the Ozal and Erbakan showed that while both
policymakers pursued neo-Otomanist foreign policy, they differed in their interpretation
of identity politics. They both recognized Islam as a common denominator but they again
differed in how they perceive Islam. While Erbakan focused on a more third wordlist
Islamic foreign policy, Ozal’s focus was mostly the newly independent Muslim-Turkic
former Communist/Socialist countries in the Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans.
The AKP era foreign policy can be a combination of both Ozal and Erbakan, thus more
encompassing and comprehensive.
In sum, while Menderes, Ozal and Erbakan challenged the status quo in foreign
policy, by pursuing exceptionally active policies abroad, they failed to completely
overcome the Kemalist institutions and their bureaucracy and create a shift in the
paradigm. The chart below compares the periods of governments that are included in this
dissertation in terms of their ideological features.

304

Ideological Comparison
Kemalism

Ozal

Erbakan

The AKP

Anti-Ottomanist
Exclusionist
(Kurds&Pious
Muslims)
Anti-Identity
foreign policy (antiIslam, anti panTurkist)

Neo-Ottomanist
Pluralist (accepting
Kurds and pious
Muslims)
Turkish-Islam Identity
Synthesis (The
Muslim-Turks in
Central Asia, the
Caucasus and the
Balkans)

Neo-Ottomanist
Pluralist (accepting
Kurds and pious
Muslims)
Islam is the common
denominator in
identity politics.
(Creating D-8 based
on Islamic identity e.g)

In terms of Turks,
the Focus is on the
Turks in Anatolia

In terms of Turks, the
focus is on the Turks in
the newly independent
Communist/Socialist
states.

Pro-Western
One Dimensional
Foreign Policy
Reactive Foreign
Policy
Security Oriented
Foreign Policy/ the
Sevres Syndrome

Pro-Western
Multi-Dimensional
Foreign Policy
Pro-Active Foreign
Policy
Mixture of Soft and
Hard Power in Foreign
Policy (Willing to
annex Mosul and
Kirkuk. Willing to
Militarily Confront
Armenia in the
Nagarno Karabagh
War e.g)
Liberal Economy
(Aspiring to turn
Turkey into a “small
America” with liberal
economic policies)

In terms of Turks, the
Focus is on the
Turkish migrants in
Europe. (The
Political/Financial
Source of the National
View Movement)
Anti-Western
One Dimensional
Foreign Policy
Pro-Active Foreign
Policy
Soft Power Oriented
Foreign Policy.
(Establishing
economic and political
relations with the
Muslim countries e.g)

Neo-Ottomanist
Pluralist (accepting
Kurds and pious
Muslims)
Islam is the
common
denominator in
identity politics.
(The Hamas in
Gaza, the Rohingya
Muslims in Burma
e.g)
In terms of Turks,
the focus is on
worldwide Turkish
population.
(Attempts to create
a Turkish diaspora
concept)
Pro-Western
Multi-Dimensional
Foreign Policy
Pro-Active Foreign
Policy
Soft Power Oriented
Foreign Policy
(Until 2011)
[Emphasizing the
Cultural Ties with
near Abroad.

Etatist/State Control
in Economy

Liberal Economy
(Emphasizing the
Importance of Private
Entrepreneurship)
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Liberal Economy
(Sweeping
privatization of the
State Owned
Enterprises.
Attracting the
Gulf/Oil Money in
Turkey.)

Applying the Theory
The policymaking process can be
structured by a particular set of
ideas, just as it can be structured by
a set of institutions. The two often
reinforce each other since the
routines of policymaking are
usually designed to reflect a
particular set of ideas about what
can and should be done in a sphere
of policy.814

One of the most important
explanatory variables is the ideas
due to the fact that policy change is
typically highly constrained
because the ideas that support the
status quo remain extremely
powerful. However, in the presence
of paradigmatic shifts the policies
themselves can be transformed,
creating a new equilibrium and a
severe break from the past.815
The movement from one paradigm
to another that characterizes third
order change is likely to involve the
accumulation of anomalies,
experimentation with new forms of
policy, and policy failures that
precipitate a shift in the locus of
authority over policy and initiate a
wider contest between competing
paradigms.816
Third-order change entails
simultaneous changes in
instrument settings, instruments
themselves, and the rearrangement
of policy goals.817

“…the actions constituting

The Kemalist elite utilized the Kemalist ideology in
order to create a paradigm. While before the advent of
multi-party system it was the People’s Republican Party
(PRP) that represented the Kemalist ideology as well as
supervised its application in the state and over masses,
after the 1960 coup, the military became the spearhead
of the Kemalist ideology, protecting it from the
perceived internal and external threats. Besides the
Military, the other Kemalist Institutions such as the
Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors and the
Council of Higher Educations, in cooperation with each
other, served to uphold the Kemalist principles.
Ozal and Erbakan were highly constrained to change the
policy paradigm/staus quo (the Kemalism) because the
reinforcing symbiotic relationship between the Kemalist
institutions/bureaucracy and the ideology rendered it
difficult to alter the prevalent paradigm until the
beginning of the AKP era.

Due to its exclusionist nature (especially the pious
Muslims and Kurds) the Kemalist top-down revolution
failed to embrace a wide portion of the Turks, which led
to the emergence and the rise of the “periphery”. This
“anomaly” for the Kemalist paradigm culminated in the
emergence of political movements and actors like Ozal
and Erbakan, who experimented with new form of
policy (neo-Ottomanism) albeit failed due to the potency
of the existing status-quo. However, for the Kemalist
policy realm, the growing anomaly precipitated in the
formation of the AKP government.
As seen in Chapter 7, the AKP took over the Kemalist
institutions/bureaucracy one by one in order to
implement its own agenda. At the same time the AKP’s
manifested policy goal, neo-Ottomanism, is a through
discrediting of the Kemalist ideology. For example, the
neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy promotes soft-power
as an instrument unlike Kemalism, which is security
oriented and hard power is paramount.
The process that culminated in the replacement of the

814 Peter Hall, (Apr., 1993) “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain”,
Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Apr., 1993), p. 290
815 Frank Baumgartner, Ideas and Policy Change, Governance, Volume 26, Issue 2, April 2013
p. 240
816 Hall, Policy Paradigms…, p. 280
817 Hall, p. 279
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paradigm shift cannot be pinned
down to a single moment in time
and that should be considered as a
phrase in a broader process of
change.”818

“…an idea’s time arrives not
simply because the idea is
compelling on its own terms, but
because opportune political
circumstances favor it. At those
moments when a political idea finds
persuasive expression among actors
whose institutional position gives
them both the motive and the
opportunity to translate it into
policy-then, and only then, can we
say that an idea has found a time.”

Kemalist paradigm with that of neo-Ottomanism by the
AKP can be said to have started all the way back to
early 1950s, by which time the Menderes Government
began to take aim at the Kemalist ideology and
institutions. Although, failed, this process continued in
the decades to come. Ozal and Erbakan challenged the
tenets of Kemalism during their tenure.
Ozal and Erbakan could not fully go against the
Kemalist establishment because they lacked opportune
political circumstances. The institutions of the Kemalist
establishment were simply too powerful to overcome for
the two. The AKP, however, was able to translate its
ideology into policy when the right time came after the
government was able to subdue the Turkish military and
the other Kemalist institutions.

819

“Replacing an earlier elite to
institutionalize the new paradigm
may occur relying on force, as in
coup d'état or violent revolution,
through democratic process, such
as elections or nominations,
societal negotiation, or
generational cohort shift. A new
group or coalition with a new
paradigm or model of institutional
arrangements appears on the scene
and assumes a position of power,
enabling it to bring about a
substantial shift in the institutional
paradigm and arrangements.820

No sooner did the AKP acquire the required power to
silence the Kemalist institutions and bureaucracy, the
Kemalist upper echelon in those institutions were
replaced by those who are pro-AKP. For example, the
AKP was able to exert enough influence at the National
Security Council to get pro-government officers to
become the Chief of Staff of the Turkish armed forces.
This replacement process occurred, as Carson suggests,
through democratic elections that conslolidated the
power of the AKP.

818

Marcus Carson, Tom R. Burns, Dolores Calvo eds. (2009) Paradigms in Public Policy: Theory and
Practice of Paradigm Shifts in the EU. Peter Lang GmbH. 1st edition, pp. 377-378
819
Robert C. Lieberman, Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change. The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Dec., 2002), p. 709
820
Carson et.al, p. 21
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